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The literary debt which Erasmus and Thomas More owed to 
Lucian has been often acknowleged, and its influence on their 
major fictional writings has been explored. Too often, however, 
it has been assumed that the nature of his influence was the same 
in both cases. This thesis argues that, in spite of the evident 
similarities between the writings of the two men, they ultimately 
had radically different approaches to literature, and that these 
can be seen in their differing responses to Lucian. 
Chapter One argues that Lucian's most characteristic works 
exhibit the sly irony with which he is usually credited, but 
possess also a form of structural irony which has not had the 
___________ attention -it-deser-ves,-and-whieh-af-:Eeet;;-s-1;;-he--way--±n-wh-±ch-we--read---- ---
him. 
Chapter Two deals with the translations which More and 
Erasmus made from Lucian, and shows that they were responding to 
different elements of his work. Erasmus responds first of all to 
his humour, and sees in him a model for using satirical fiction 
as a means of teaching. More sees the implications of Lucian's 
structural ironies and the subtlety of his use of the Menippean 
persona more clearly than does Erasmus. 
Chapter Three looks at Erasmus' Colloquies, and argues that 
the influence of Lucian is confined to the use of comic and 
satirical dialogue as a way of exposing the folly and vice of the 
age. 
Chapter Four examines The Praise of Folly, and suggests that 
while the influence of Lucian may lie behind Erasmus' use of 
complex irony, this type of irony is not employed consistently. 
It gradually gives way to satire, first of all, and then to an 
appeal to the philosophia Christi which, while expressed 
ironically, is more reminiscent of the Enchiridion than of the 
work of Lucian. 
Chapter Five turns to More's History of King Richard III, and 





develop a complex irony which would allow him to explore the 
meaning of historical events without committing himself to a 
definite statement of his views. Many elements of the work are 
derived, directly and indirectly from his reading of Lucian, 
although the process of composition did not allow him to realise 
fully his apparent intention. 
Chapter Five argues that Utopia is a work of Menippean satire 
which fully utilises the lessons learned from Lucian. Hythloday 
is a Lucianic persona who cannot be taken at face value, and More 
has used this and other devices of complex irony to prevent 
Utopia being read principally as a work of prescriptive political 
theory. 
Both More and Erasmus created fictional works which far 
surpass Lucian in their intellectual scope and literary value. 
For both, however, in their different ways, their encounter with 
Lucian was of importance in determining the form and content of 






All citations from the works of More are from the Yale 
edition, and references are by page and line number. In referring 
to the English version of The History of King Richard III, I have 
silently expanded contracted words. Citations from Erasmus, 
unless otherwise stated, are to the Amsterdam edition of the 
collected works for the Latin, and references are by page and 
line number. English translations are from the published volumes 
of the Toronto edition unles otherwise stated. Citations from the 
letters are from the Allen edit,ion, and references are to the 
number of the letter and line number, except in the case of the 
letter to John Botzheim, where reference is by page and line 
number. Citations from Lucian are from the Loeb edition. English 
titles are taken from this edition; abbreviated Latin titles 
follow the usage of Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon. In Greek 
quotations, final 'sigma' was unavailable, and has, 
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INTRODUCTION 
The influence of Lucian on the writings of Sir Thomas More 
and Erasmus is a question of considerable significance for the 
history of English literature. The fact of their acquaintance 
1 with the Greek satirist is well attested, and the existence of 
a literary debt on their part has been often acknowledged and its 
2 nature explored. 
Too often, however, it has been assumed that the close 
friendship between the two men and the similarity of their 
interests and preoccupations is an indication of a fundamentally 
similar reading of Lucian. In part, this assumption is based on a 
misreading of the nature of much of Lucian's work. 
Criticism of Lucian has taken two general views of his work. 
One approach treats him as a glib and naive ironist of no 
profound originality; 3 the other subsumes him under the category 
1. C. R. Thompson, 'The Translations of Lucian by Erasmus and 
S. Thomas More', Revue Belge de philologie et histoire, 18 
(1939), 855-881 (i.e. 1-27), pp.856, 869; The Complete Works 
Q[ St. Thomas More, vol. 3, part 1, Translations of Lucian, 
edited by Craig R. Thompson (New Haven and London, 1974), 
'Introduction'. 
2. R. Bracht Barham, 'Utopian Laughter: Lucian and Thomas 
More', in 'Thomas More and the Classics', edited by Ralph 
Kean and Daniel Kinney, Moreana
1
86 (1985), 23-43; T. S. 
Dorsch, 'Sir Thomas More and Lucian: an interpretation of 
"Utopia'", Archiv fur des Studium der Neuen Sprechen und 
Literaturen, 203 (1967), 345-363; Alistair Fox, Thomas More: 
History and Providence, (Oxford, 1982), passim.; A. R. 
Heiserman, 'Satire in the Utopia', PMLA, 68 (1963), 163-174; 
H. A. Mason, Humanism and Poetry in the Early Tudor Period 
(London, 1959), p.59 ff.; Walter Wooden, 'Sir Thomas More, 
Satirist: A Study of the 'Utopia' as Menippean Satire' 
(Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 
1971. University Microfilms, 71-20,318); Walter 
Wooden, 'Thomas More and Lucian: a Study in Satiric Influence 
and Technique', University of Mississippi Studies in English, 
13 (1972), pp.45-57. 
3. Graham Anderson, Lucian: Theme and Variation in the Second 
Sophistic (Lugduni Batavorum, 1976); Albin Lesky, ~History 
1 
2 
f . t. 4 o Menlppean sa lre. A careful reading of his work reveals, 
however, an ironist more subtle than at first appears, and one 
sufficiently aware of his own limitations to be able to turn them 
to literary account. He wrote in a period of cultural exhaustion, 
when the most characteristic literary activity consisted of 
5 
reworking the toooi found in literary handbooks and used as the 
basis of teaching in the schools.
6 
Little originality was 
evident in literature, rhetoric or philosophy.
7 
Lucian, however, is an exception to the general rule. 
8 
Perhaps because he was by birth a Syrian, and therefore on the 
margins of Greek culture, his attitude is one of independence 
from the prevailing cultural norms, an independence that is 
suggested by what little can be reconstructed of his biography. 
After receiving the standard school training in philosophy 
and rhetoric, he became one of the tribe of travelling orators 
who composed the Second Sophistic. He practised his craft in 
Greece, Gaul and Rome. He appears, however, to have become 
dissatisfied with the limitations of the sophistical declamation, 
which was more concerned with style than substance, and, as a 
result of this dissatisfaction, to have turned to a study of 
of Greek Literature, translated by James Willis and Cornelius 
de Heer (London, 1966), p.842. 
4. J. Bompaire, Lucien ~crivain: imitation et cr{ation (Paris, 
1958), pp.555-558; Jennifer Hall, Lucian's Satire Monographs 
in Classical Literature, (university of Cambridge, 1967), 
p.393. 
5. B. A. van Groningen, 'General Literary Tendencies in the 
Second Century A. D.', Mnemosyne, Series IV1 18 (1965), 41-
56, passim. 
6. Donald Lemen Clark, Rhetoric in Graeco-Roman Education, (New 
York, 1957), chapters 5 and 6. 
7. Bompaire, 'Premi~re partie', passim. 





dialogue, particularly the works of Plato. He was also well 
acquainted with both Old and New Comedy, and it was by combining 
these sources that he evolved the wholly original form of the 
comic dialogue. This combines the attitudes, and some of the 
stock figures, of the Greek and Roman Comedy with the dialogue 
form, hitherto used as a vehicle of serious philosophical debate.
10 
Although his use of this form has occasioned much debate about 
the extent of his debt to the Cynic satirist, Menippus, a review 
of the evidence makes it certain that this innovation was his 
11 
own. The presence of Menippus as a character in many of these 
dialogues, together with Lucian's acknowledged indebtedness to 
him, has led to this form and its many variants being called 
Menippean satire, a term also applied to the characteristic 
attitudes expressed. 
The generic characteristics of the form have been discussed 
by Northrop Frye, who discusses such traits as 'the setting of 
ideas and generalisations and theories and dogmas over against 
h l 'f h d 1 . 
12 d h f f t e let ey are suppose to exp aln', an t e pre erence o 
practice to theory, metaphysical theory in particular.
13 
Lucian 
can be seen expressing this attitude in Menippus, where the 
motivation for Menippus' journey to the underworld is the 
perplexity caused by the contradictory answers given to his 
questions by the philosophers. The Menippean norm arising as a 
response to this is expressed in the same dialogue by Teiresias: 
9. Emily James Putnam, 'Lucian the Sophist', Classical 
Philology 4 (1909), 162-177 (p.170). 
10. Christopher Robinson, Lucian and his Influence in Europe 
(London, 1979), p.9 . 
11. Barbara P. McCarthy, 'Lucian and Menippus', Yale Classical 
Studies 4 (1934), 3-55 (passim.); Bompaire, p.551ff.; Hall, 
p.73. 
12. Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton, 1957), 
p.230. 
13. Ibid., pp.230-231. 
.I 
The life of the common sort is best, and you will 
act more wisely if you stop speculating about 
heavenly bodies and discussing final causes and 
first causes, spit your scorn at all those clever 
syllogisms, and counting all that sort of thing 
nonsense, make it always your sole object to put 
the present to good use and to hasten on your way, 
laughin~4a great deal and taking nothing seriously 
(c. 21) • 
Frye also says that 'Menippean satire deals less with 
4 
people than with mental attitudes•
15 
and it is in this context 
that the philosophus gloriosus makes his appearance: 'the 
Menippean satirist sees [evil and folly] as diseases of the 
intellect, as a kind of maddened pedantry which the philosophus 
gloriosus at once symbolizes and defines' .
16 
The philosophus 
gloriosus, the philosopher whose proud boast to have solved the 
riddle of human existence is disproved by reference to the 
complexities of experience, is perhaps the commonest figure in 
Lucian. His boastful philosophers were to have a lengthy li~erary 
progeny, including Raphael Hythloday, the central character of 
Utopia. 
More recently, F. Anne Payne has listed exhaustively the 
. . . h' f f . . 17 d~st~ngu~s ~ng eatures o Men~ppean sat~re, including some 
not mentioned by Frye. She points to the use of simultaneous 
unresolved points of view, so that the meaning inheres in the 
18 
form, parody of other· genres, a variety of styles and tones, 
15. Frye, p.309. 
16. Ibid., p.309. 
17. F. Anne Payne, Chaucer and Menippean Satire (Wisconsin, 
1981) . 
18. Ibid., p.4. 
'. 
.I 
and the dialogue between a know-all and a more ordinary human 
being.
19 
The dialogue form is favoured because of its capacity 
to remind us of the presence of alternatives and of the 
. f f' 1 20 uncerta~nty o ~na answers. 
5 
This use of the dialogue form points to a complexity which 
critics have not always noticed in Lucian. He utilises the comic 
dialogue to dramatise not only the standard Cynic themes of the 
futility of human activity but the poverty of intellectual 
activity in his own day
21 
-- a criticism from which not even the 
Cynic heroes, Menippus and Diogenes, are exempted. He himself 
proved to be unable to escape the limitations of the contemporary 
cultural torpor, with the result that much of his work has been 
thought of as a mere pastiche of his literary heritage.
22 
It 
seems, though, that the form which his dialogues finally, after a 
period of experimentation, settled on, was in part derived from a 
desire to expose and parody this very element in contemporary 
cultural activity. His use of an extensive comic framework for 
his dialogues is designed to provide a context in which the more 
serious material is set and apart from which it cannot adequately 
be judged. 
It is in this light that we should consider Frye's comments 
on Lucian's use of the device of the 'other world' which 'appears 
as an ironic counterpart to our own, a reversal of accepted 
social standards' .
23 
In Lucian, this is found in The Downward 
Journey and Charon (and, one might add, Dialogues of the Dead) ; 
it is a world in which the 'simple equality of death is set 
. h 1 . 1' . f l'f , 24 d . h' h h aga~nst t e camp ex ~nequa ~t~es o ~ e an ~n w ~c t e 
19. Ibid., pp.7-10.; see also Hall, p.466, n.1. 
2 0 . Ibid. , p. 11, 
21. Robinson, p.52. 
22. Anderson, passim. 
23. Frye, pp.232-233. 




complexities of experience are cancelled. In Lucian, this 
cancellation is shown to be deceptive, since it is set in a 
dramatic context which makes it difficult for the reader to take 
it at face value. The seemingly inconsequential frame of the 
dialogue qualifies one's attitude towards the content; the desire 
to cancel complexity is itself subject to ironically complex 
interrogation. 
This form could also be used as a vehicle for satire, and the 
pages of Lucian are full of satirical attacks on philosophers, 
charlatans, superstition and folly of all kinds. In the most 
characteristic dialogues, however, this satire is contained 
within a complex form that makes it difficult to take a simple 
attitude towards the ostensible theme of the dialogue. This 
double focus of the Lucianic dialogue was to result in the quite 
different readings of Lucian which we can find in the works of 
More and Erasmus. 
Although Lucian's work was not unknown to the Middle Ages, it 
was not until the late fifteenth century that his writings became 
widely disseminated. They began to be printed and translated, and 
he became one of the most popular Greek authors. His style, if 
impure by classical standards, was nevertheless simple; combined 
with the appeal of his subject matter, this made him a natural 
choice for pedagogy. It may also have been these combined 
attractions that led Erasmus and More to settle on Lucian for 
their joint translations of 1506. 
The friendship of More and Erasmus, their history of co-
operative literary effort, and their common activity as humanist 
reformers have led to an £ priori assumption of the identity of 
their reading of Lucian. 25 A close reading of their prefaces to 
their translations shows, on the contrary, that they were. 
responding to different elements in Lucian. Further, it can be 
shown that they were responding to the two different ways of 
reading a Lucianic dialogue outlined above. With this in mind, it 
25. Mason, p.59 ff. (London, 1959); c. R. Thompson, 1939, p.856; 
CW 3.1, pp.xli-liii. 






can be seen that a consideration of their respective debts to 
Lucian is not merely a question of tracing literary influence; 
their respective responses to Lucian are symptomatic of different 
views on the nature and function of literature. Lucian becomes a 
touchstone by means of which the nature of Erasmus' and More's 
fictional works can be differentiated. 
For the joint volume of translations of 1506, More translated 
four pieces, Erasmus ten long pieces as well as eighteen shorter 
ones. In addition to the translations, both men wrote a mock 
declamation in reply to Lucian's The Tyrannicide, and both 
included dedications giving their reasons for making the 
translations. 26 Erasmus continued to publish additional 
translations and dedications until as late as 1517. 27 
It is these dedications that first interest us, containing as 
they do Erasmus' comments on the material he was translating. 
Toxaris concerns friendship, an institution fallen into desuetude 
amongst Christians, but which ought to be better observed; the 
dialogue is therefore 'frugifer' as well as 'iucundus' (422/26). 
In Alexander, Lucian shows himself as one 
than whom no-one is more useful at detecting and 
exposing the impostures of those who, even now, 
impose upon the people with magical wonders, 
feigned religion, pr2aended pardons and other 
tricks of that sort. 
Erasmus is clearly stressing the utility of Lucian both as a 
satirist of impostors and as a purveyor of instruction; such an 
attitude to the pagan classical authors had been utilised at 
26. Opera omnia I.i, 370. 
27. Ibid., I. i, 37.1."'4. 
28. ' ... quo nemo sit vtilior ad depraehendendas 
coarguendasque quorundam istorum imposturas, qui nunc 
quoque vel magicis miraculis, vel ficta religione, vel 
adsimulatis condonationibus aliisque id vel genus 





least since St. Jerome, so that Erasmus belongs to a lengthy 
tradition of Christian apologists for pagan literature. In the 
case of these two dialogues, at least, such an attitude is 
applicable. Not all of Lucian's works, however, are amenable to 
such an interpretation. When Erasmus comes to write a dedication 
to ~ Dream, QL The Cock, the limitations of his approach become 
apparent. Lucian, he says, best exemplifies the Horatian precept 
of mixing profit with pleasure (470/24-26). In the dialogue, 
Lucian 
censures Pythagoras as an impostor and a cheat; he 
laughs at the haughtiness and bearded wisdom of the 
Stoics; he teaches that the life of the rich and of 
kings may be barren and hateful; in contrast, he 
teaches that poverty ~~ unencumbered, cheerful and 
content with its lot. 
All these elements are present in the dialogue, but nowhere does 
Erasmus take acount of the interpretative complications caused by 
the extensive comic framework. The element of utility in the 
dialogue is subordinate to other elements. 
Erasmus' reasons for translating Lucian are, as Robinson 
says, threefold: it was a useful exercise for improving his 
Greek; style, language and content made him a suitable author for 
children; and he could be interpreted simply as conveying moral 
. . 30 
~nstruct~on. 
The case of More is superficially similar. In his prefatory 
letter to Thomas Ruthall he begins by using Lucian as an exemplar 
of the familiar Horatian precept that literature should be utile 
et dulce. When, however, he discusses indivhl-..1cd dialogues, he 
draws conclusions wilfully at variance with the content of the 
dialogue. In The Cynic, he says, 
. 29. 'Pythagoram velut impostorem ac praestigiatorem taxat; 
Stoicorum fastum et sapientem barbam ridet; diuitum ac 
regum vita quantis sit erumnis obnoxia docet; contra, 
quam expedita res paupertas hilaris suaque contenta 
sorte' (471/18-21). (My translation). 




the severe life of the Cynics, satisfied with 
little, is defended and the soft, enervating luxury 
of voluptuaries denounced, by the same token 
Christian simplicity, temperance, and frugality, 
and finally that strait and narrow P3!h which leads 
to Life eternal are praised (5/2-6) . 
9 
The atheistic Lucian is thus made to preach Christian ethics, but 
the dialogue does not support such an interpretation. The Cynic 
is that typically Menippean figure, the philosoohus gloriosus; 
his method of argumentation is exposed by a naive interlocutor, a 
Menippean eiron. That More did read the dialogue in this way is 
confirmed by his more complex reworking of the same method in 
Utopia. 32 Similarly, his account of Menippus points to the 
obvious elements in the dialogue. Its wider and potentially more 
subversive implications are passed over in silence. 33 
Erasmus' interpretation of Lucian can be verified from his 
comments on literature in such works as De ratione studii, 
Institutio principis Christiani, and De pueris instituendis. In 
the Institutio of 1516, we find Erasmus saying that the lessons 
of virtue must be inculcated in the prince 'nunc sententia, nunc 
fabella, nunc exemplo, nunc apophthegmate, nunc proverbio' (Opera 
omnia IV.1, 140/145-146). He should be taught Aesop's fables as 
pleasurable stories, then should be taught their real morals 
(146/7, 142/189-194). Similarly, in the plan of study which 
Erasmus put forward in ~ ratione studii, he stresses the moral 
utility of literature: 
And so it will come about (assuming mental agility 
on the teacher's part) that if some passage is 
encountered that may corrupt the young, far from 
31. ' ... paruoque contenta Cynicorum uita defenditur, 
mollis, atque eneruata delicatorum hominum luxuria 
reprehenditur? Nee non eadem opera, Christianae uitae 
simplicitas, temperantia, frugalitas, denique arcta illa 
atque angusta uia, quae ducit ad uitam, laudatur' (4/2-
6) • 
32. Fox, p.136. 
33. Fox, pp.37-38, 41-43. 
' ,. 
harming their morals, it may in fact confer some 
benefit, namely by concentrating their attention, 
partly on annotation of the passage, ~~rtly on 
loftier thoughts (CWE 24, 683/21-25) . 
10 
As Sr. Geraldine Thompson has shown, Erasmus' method here is 
founded upon the exegetical tradition in the interpretation of 
Scripture.
35 
Although he utilises all four levels of 
interpretation, his .role as a teacher leads him to stress the 
1 ' 1 1 1 1 f ' 
36 h f' d ' tropo og~ca or mora eve o mean~ng. W at we ~n ~n 
Erasmus is the application of this tradition of exegesis to works 
of fiction; this will be of particular importance in discussing 
the structure and meaning of The.Praise of Folly. 
The combination in Erasmus of the traditions of irony and 
exegesis is exemplified in the Colloquies. These were begun in 
1497/1498 as exercises to instruct Erasmus' pupils in Paris in 
the writing of Latin, but their utililty as a vehicle for 
instruction led Erasmus to add many new dialogues until the 
edition of 1532.
37 
The form itself, as well as the content of 
many of the pieces is indebted to Lucian, but in none of them is 
the irony as complex as that to be found in The Praise of Folly. 
Their method has been well described by Sr. Thompson: 
In most of the dialogues, some wrong-headed opinion 
is tabled and given either ironic or 
straightforward consideration until its absurdity 
34. 'Atque ita fiet (si modo sit ingenii dextri praeceptor) 
vt etiam si quid inciderit quod inficere possit aetatem 
illam, non solum non officiat moribus, verumetiam 
vtilitatem aliquam adferat, videlicet animis partim ad 
annotationem intentis, partim ad altiores cogitationes 
auocatis' (Opera omnia I.2, 139/2-5). 
35. Sr. Geraldine Thompson, 'Water wonderfully clear: Erasmus 
and the exegetical tradition', Erasmus in English 5 (1972), 
5-10 (passim); Under Pretext of Praise (Toronto, 1973), 
pp.24-29. 
36. Sr. G. Thompson, 1972, pp.7-8. 
37. The Colloquies of Erasmus, edited by Craig R. Thompson 
(Chicago and London, 1965), p.xxii. 
\ 
.. , .. 
or iniquity is obvious -- obvious to the gu~g if 
there is a gull, to the reader in any case. 
11 
The dramatic situation is normally dwelt on only briefly by 
comparison with Lucian, the interest lying in the satirical 
attack on a range of vices and follies, or in the exposition of 
an alternative to these. Even in those which owe an explicit debt 
to Lucian -- Charon, Exorcism, Q£ The Spectre, Alchemy, A 
Pilgrimage For Religion's Sake -- the irony is not complex; it 
rarely extends further than presenting a figure who unknowingly 
puts forward foolish views, while there is normally, as in The 
Seraphic Funeral, a reliable interlocutor on hand to help the 
reader to see the other's foolishness. 
The avowed purpose of these dialogues, then is didactic, and 
in the accompanying piece The Usefulness of the 'Colloquies', 
Erasmus is explicit about this: 
this little book, if taught to ingenious youth, 
will lead them to more useful studies, to poetry, 
rhetoric, physics, ethicsS
9
and finally to matters 
of Christian piety (633). 
This was written in 1526; the consistency of the views 
expressed here with those expressed twenty years earlier is 
notable. 
This consistent emphasis on the utility of literature makes 
The Praise of Folly a seemingly uncharacteristic Erasmian work. 
In contrast to the Colloquies, where the irony was, for the most 
part, straightforward and non-problematical, that of The Praise 
of Folly is altogether more complex. In part, of course, this is 
due to the rhetorical method that Erasmus is following, that of 
the paradoxical encomium, which is designed to praise trivial or 
38. Sr. G. Thompson, 1973, p.105. 
39. 'Atqui hie libellus, si tenerae pubi praelegatur, 
tradet illos ad multas disciplinas magis habiles, ad 
poeticen, ad rhetoricen, ad physicen, ad ethicen, demum 





1 . h' 40 foo ~sh t ~ngs. Erasmus explicit.ly acknowledges this model in 
his preface (68/22-33). 
The Praise of Folly, however, is more complex than any of 
41 
these models, and this in itself poses problems of 
interpretation. More specifically, it raises question about 
Erasmus' use of Lucian, which is more complex here than in the 
Colloquies. It is no surprise to find Lucian being used to 
support local sallies of Moria's ironical and satirical wit, but 
he shares this distinction with a great number of other writers. 
The use of the Lucianic metaphor of life-as-a-play, however, has 
more than merely local significance; it occupies a pivotal 
structural position in the work, and interpretation of the 
metaphor and Erasmus' elaboration of it is crucial to the 
interpretation of the work as a whole. 
The main critical divergence as to the interpretation of The 
Praise of Folly may be said to turn on an analysis of the 
structure of the book. It is generally agreed that the structure 
. . t. 42 
~s tr~par ~te, and that the first section, at least, is a 




in a continued irony, several different attitudes 
are kept in balance to produce a meaning that is 
Arthurs. Pease, 'Things Without Honour', Classical 
PhilologyJ21 (1926), 27-42. 
Sr. G. Thompson, 1973, p.53. 
42. Analysis of The Praise Q[ Folly as a formal oration on the 
model of either Quintilian or Aphthonius produces a more 
complex structure, but one that is seemingly superimposed on 
the tripartite division under discussion. For rhetorical 
analyses, see The Praise of Folly, translated from the Latin, 
with an essay and commentary, by Hoyt Hopewell Hudson 
(Princeton, 1951) and Walter Kaiser, Praisers of Folly 
(Cambridge, Massachussetts, 1963), pp.35-50; and for a 
criticism of their views, Wayne Rebhorn, 'The Metamorphoses 
of Moria's Structure' and Meaning in The Praise of Folly, 
PMLA, 89 (1974), 463-476 (p.463). 
larger than and in a sense more precise ~~an that 
produced by a narrowly direct statement. 
Opinions differ as to whether this description is adequate for 
13 
h h l k bl d l ' l' 44 ' ' t e w o e wor . Some, nota y Dean an Rosa ~e Co ~e, ma~nta~n 
that this is the case. For others, the meaning of Folly changes 
from section to section, and while this may give its own unity to 
the book, it does not necessarily mean that the Folly of the 
45 
first section is identical with that of the other two. 
This tripartite structure reveals the tendency of Erasmus' 
work to move from the ironical to the didactic. As the Colloquies 
had employed, for the most part, local ironies in conveying their 
didactic intent, so Erasmus here begins with the ironical 
complexity of the opening section, where it is not always an easy 
matter to decide whether Folly speaks in jest or in earnest. As 
the tone becomes more serious, the mode alters from irony to 
satire and the satire itself becomes progressively darker as it 
' ' d ' h h th ' 1 d 1 ' ' h ' h ' , 4 6 w~n s ~ts way up t roug e soc~a an re ~g~ous ~erarc ~es . 
From this, she moves to the short section on the Folly of the 
Cross. For all that one section dovetails neatly into that 
following, it is difficult to maintain that Folly has the same 
character throughout the work. Eras~us' tendency to concentrate 
on the moral level of discourse has taken him far beyond his 
Lucianic starting point. From a position which is recognisably 
complex irony, Erasmus moves to one that is closer to the point 
43. Leonard F. Dean, 'The Praise of Folly and its 
Background', in Twentieth Century Interpretations of 
'The Praise Q[ Folly' edited by Kathleen Williams (New 
Jersey and London, 1969), 40-60, (p.41). 
44. Dean, passim.; Rosalie Colie, Paradoxia epidemica (New 
Jersey, 1966), pp.18-20. 
45. Rebhorn, pp.464, 472; Sr. G. Thompson (1973), pp.68-9, 72; 
Richard Sylvester, 'The Problem of Unity in The Praise of 
Folly', English Literary Renaissance, 6 (1976), 125-139 
(p.138); Kaiser, pp.51-62. 
46. Sylvester, p.138. 
13 
14 
of view expressed in the Enchiridion -- and it is to be noted 
that he claimed to teach the same message in both works (Allen 
II, 337/86-94). In effect, Folly has become the sky-man whom she 
had earlier criticised for being too ready to strip the masks 
from the actors and reveal the illusions of life for what they 
are. 
This tendency of Erasmus to abandon the implications of the 
complexity of his work shows again his response to one side of 
the Lucianic equation. More's response, in both The History Q( 
King Richard ]lX and Utopia was of another kind. The History is 
generally acknowledged to belong to literature as well as to 
history
47 
and given the considerable prima facie evidence for 
More's contact with the medieval and classical idea of history as 
an exemplum teaching useful truths, it is scarcely surprising 
that some critics have felt the work to be primarily didactic, a 
48 kind of dramatic treatise on the nature of tyranny. On close 
examination, however, More's history resists easy classification 
in any such genre. Its purpose is seen to be a consideration of 
the way in which an individual can act historically without being 
compromised by contact with evil. The method used to explore this 
possibility is that of complex irony, and it is in this that we 
feel the presence of Lucian. Alison Hanham, indeed, has argued 
47. A. F. Pollard, 'The Making of Thomas More's Richard III', in 
Historical Essays in Honour of James Tait, edited by J. G. 
Edwards, V. H. Galbraith and E. F. Jacob (Manchester, 1933), 
223-238, (p.230); A. R. Myers, 'The Character of Richard 
III', History Today 4 (1954), 511-521, (p.515); Alison 
Hanham, Richard ]lX and His Early Historians (Oxford, 1975), 
p.155; Fox, p.77. 
48. T. G. Heath, 'Another Look at Thomas More's Richard', 
Moreana, 19-20 (1968), 11-19; Arthur Noel Kincaid, 'The 
Dramatic Structure of Sir Thomas More's History Qf King 
Richard III', Studies in English Literature 1500-1900, 12 
(1972), 223-242; Robert E. Reiter, 'On the Genre of Thomas 
More's Richard III', Moreana, 25 (1966), 5-16; Elizabeth 
Story Donno, 'Thomas More and Richard III', Renaissance 
Quarterly, 35 (1982), 401-447. 
15 
that the entire work is a Lucianic,· irreverent comment on the 
f f . . h' 49 era t o wr~t~ng ~story. 
More's purpose, however, runs deeper than mere parody, and 
the Lucianic elements in the work go to the heart of this 
purpose. More was struggling with the problem of the conditions 
·under which one can enter royal service. If the atmosphere of 
evil hangs so heavily over courts, how can one engage in 
political action without becoming tainted by it? 
Specific Lucianic elements in the History raise this problem 
locally. Buckingham's speech on sanctuary uses a range of 
sophistic tricks and specious logic that remind one of, for 
example, the speaker of The Tyrannicide. 5° Clerical opposition 
collapses in the face of this sophistical tour-de-force: is this 
the condition of courtiers when princes wish to impose their 
will? The farcical episodes concerning the proclamation of 
Richard as king bring forward Richard and his chief supporters 
naked, as it were: how can men who act so ludicrously be so 
dangerous? 
The metaphor of the stage, drawn from Lucian, crystallises 
what has been emerging, especially when the pun upon 'scafoldes' 
unites the notions of politics as theatre and as the most serious 
and dangerous thing in the world. In this sense, the tone of the 
History can justifiably be called tragi-comic.
51 
More's 
attitude, however, is not that of the people watching this farce: 
And so they said that these matters bee Kynges 
games, as it were stage playes, and for the more 
part plaied vpon scafoldes. In which pore men be 
but the lokers on. And thei that wise be, wil medle 
no farther; For they that sometyrne step vp and 
playe with them, when they cannot play their 
49. Hanham, p.l59. 
50. Patrick J. Sullivan, '"The Painted Processe": A Literary 
Study of Sir Thomas More's History of King Richard III' 
(unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of California, 
Berkeley, 1967. University Microfilms, 68-5831), pp.27-30. 
51 . Fox, p. 9 3 . 
r 
partes, they disorder the·play & do themself no 
good (81/6-10). 
16 
His own answer to the problem of how one can be simultaneously 
involved in and detached from the conflicts of history is 
suggested in the final episode of the English version of the 
History, through Cardinal Morton's subtle incitement of 
Buckingham to rebellion. The balance achieved here between 
detachment and involvement is more complex than the attitude of 
the narrator, and forms an instructive contrast with the attitude 
of Erasmus in Institutio principis Christiani, where much less 
acknowled~e1•1«nC is given to the real complexities of political 
discourse. 52 Unlike Folly/Erasmus, More could not take the 
option of taking no part in the play; nor would he simply strip 
away the masks. 
The paradox presented in the metaphor of politics as theatre 
and dramatised in the scene between Morton and Buckingham is 
explored again, in more depth and greater complexity in Utopia 
and in that work, too, Morton is presented as the pattern of 
political action that More wished to imitate.
53 
As in the 
History, too, Utopia utilises the lessons derived from Lucian, 
while far surpassing that author in its intellectual and artistic 
complexity. 
Utopia is concerned with similar public themes to the 
History, and, like the latter work, utilises existing genres for 
a wholly original purpose -- in this case, the genres of travel 
literature and the imaginary ideal commonwealth.
54 
Like the 
52. Sullivan, p.113. 
53. Fox, p. 7 6. 
54. CW 4, clxxix; Dorsch, p.349; P. Coles, 'The Interpretation 
of More's Utopia', The Hibbert Journal, 66 (1958), 365-370 
(p.368); H. w. Donner, Introduction to 'Utopia', (London, 
1945); A. Prevost, 'L'Utopie: le genre litteraire', Moreana, 
31/32 (1971), 161-168 (p.161); R. S. Sylvester, '"Si 
Hythlodaeo Credimus": Vision and Revision in More's Utopia', 
in Essential Articles for the Study of Thomas More, edited by 
R. s. Sylvester and G. P. Marc'hadour, (Hamden, Connecticut, 
1977), 290-301; George M. Logan, The Meaning of More's 





History, it dramatises the issues with which it is concerned, and 
does so in a way which makes it difficult to say which side of 
the question More favoured. 
55 
It is even more indebted to Lucian than was the History. The 
island of Utopia owes much to Lucian's True History; Lucian is 
mentioned by name as one of the favourite authors of the 
Utopians; the Lucianic metaphor of life-as-a-play again has a 
centrally important function; its use of dialogue is more 
indebted to Lucian than to either Plato or Cicero
56 
and, most 
importantly, the narrator, Raphael Hythloday, is a version of the 
Lucianic philosophus gloriosus, while his interlocutor, Morus, is 
h 
. . . / 57 
t e Luc~an~c ~ngenue. 
More extends this prototype far beyond its Lucianic origins, 
nor is he detached and uninvolved as Lucian usually is. 
Emphasising the Lucianic features of Utopia is, however, 
necessary in order to correct an older view that the work was 
. . '1 . 1' . 1 . 58 h wr~tten pr~mar~ y as a ser~ous po ~t~ca treat~se. T at 
55. W. J. Barnes, 'Irony and the English Apprehension of 
Renewal', Queen's Quarterly, 73 (1966), 357-37~ (pp.366-367, 
373); David M. Bevington, 'The Dialogue in Utopia: Two Sides 
to the Question', Studies in Philology, 58 (1961), 496-509. 
56. John D. Schaeffer, 'Socratic Method in More's Utopia', 
Moreana 69 (1981), 5-20. 
57. Wooden, 1971, p.153. 
58. Russell Ames, Citizen Thomas More and His Utopia (Princeton, 
1949); Fritz Caspari, Humanism and the Social Order in Tudor 
England (Chicago, 1954), p.55; R. W. Chambers, Thomas More 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1963); Donner, op. cit.; P. Albert 
Duhamel, 'The Medievalism of More's Utopia', Studies in 
Philology, 52 (1955), 99-126; Martin Fleisher, Radical Reform 
and Political Persuasion in the Life and Writings Q.f Thomas 
More (Geneva, 1973); J. H. Hexter, More's 'Utopia': The 
Biography of~ Idea (Princeton, 1952); Karl Kautsky, Thomas 
More and his Utopia, with an Historical Introduction, 
translated by H: J. Stenning (London, 1927); Mason, op. cit.; 
J. K. McConica, English Humanists and Reformation Politics 
under Henry VIII and Edward VI (Oxford, 1965), p.41; R. J. 
Shoeck, 'On Reading More's Utopia as Dialogue: "A Nursery of 
Correct and Useful Institutions"', Moreana, 22 (1969), 19-32; 
Frederic Seebohm, The Oxford Reformers: John Colet, Erasmus 







different critics have taken diametrically opposing views on 
exactly what More was espousing is itself evidence of the danger 
of trying to extract a political philosophy from Utopia. 
More was too sceptical in temper to commit himself wholly to 
his vision of an ideal commonwealth. Even as the book stood 
before the creation of Hythloday, Utopian institutions were not 
intended to be adopted uncritically. Following the writing of 
Book I, the vision was entrusted to a spokesman whom we can never 
59 fully trust, and it becomes apparent that More was concerned 
chiefly to debate the principles on which good and sound 
government should be conducted rather than to recommend a 
particular political and social ideal. 
The contrast with Erasmus is again evident, particularly when 
one compares their uses of the metaphor of life-as-a-play. Where 
Erasmus, in The Praise of Folly, had withdrawn from some of the 
implications of this metaphor, More uses it to express his sense 
of the complexity of human affairs, specifically, political 
affairs. Morus' hard-won grasp of reality must be balanced 
against Hythloday's moral fervour, and the conclusion of Book II 
is deliberately open-ended and ambiguous. The debate which More 
holds with himself is without parallel in the 'political' works 
of Erasmus. 
The fictional writings of Erasmus and More, then, so often 
uncritically assumed to be of the same type, can be shown to 
exhibit fundamental differences in approach. These differences, 
having their source, no doubt, in the personalities of the two 
men, can be compared in terms of their radically different 
edition, (London, 1869), p.347; Edward Surtz s. J., The 
Praise of Pleasure (Harvard, 1957) and The Praise of Wisdom 
(Chicago, 1957). For a recent re-statement and modification 
of this view, see Logan, op. cit. 
59. Barham, pp.37-38; Barnes, p.367; Fox, p.60ff.; Robbins. 
Johnson, More's 'Utopia: Ideal and Illusion (New Haven and 
London, 1969), p.40ff. and 'The Argument for reform in Morers 
'Utopia', Moreana, 31/32 (1971), 123-134, (pp.126 ff.); 




approaches to the work of Lucian. The Greek satirist and ironist, 
himself not especially profound, becomes a touchstone for two 
contrasting approaches to literature, so that his influence on 







LUCIAN: A REINTERPRETATION 
Criticism of Lucian has generally failed to account for the 
essential ambiguity of his satirical dialogues, contenting itself 
with regarding him as a mere entertainer with neither depth nor 
complexity. His satires upon religion, philosophy and 
charlatanism of all kinds have been distorted by isolating them 
from the context in which they occur. In part, this is due to a 
failure to appreciate the ambiguity of his relationship to the 
chief literary and cultural tendency of his age, that movement 
known as the Second Sophistic. Only by placing Lucian correctly 
in his historical setting can his literary techniques be properly 
evaluated. 
The roots of the Second Sophistic were firmly embedded in the 
traditional literary education of the classical era, but, as van 
Groningen notes, it was so firmly tied to a mechanical system of 
rhetorical education that literary life was 'no more than a 
1 
prolongation of the school'. and second century literature was 
'a museum of fossils' .
2 
In public speaking, verbal arrangement, 
sound and rhythm were more important than knowledge. 'No effort 
was demanded of the audience; neither originality of thought nor 
3 
sincerity of feeling were pursued nor expected' . 
A cultural vacuum of this sort gave rise to the figure of the 
sophist. It is, as Bowersock notes, sometimes difficult to 
distinguish between the orator and the sophist
4 
but it is 
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group of orators, practising their art in a more or less 
dilettantish fashion: 'The sophist was an virtuoso rhetor with a 
big public reputation' .
5 
He was a public speaker declaiming on a 
range of themes from Lucian's fly and Dio's parrot to Aristeides' 
praise of Rome and the more 'philosophical' themes of Dio 
Chrysostom. The essential element was the love of display and the 
desire to please an audience. 
It would be misleading, however, to place all the literary 
figures of this age on the same level as the vulgar practitioners 
recorded in the pages of Philostratus, and one who stood apart 
from the general tendencies of the age and mercilessly exposed 
its follies was Lucian. Little is known for certain about his 
life. Apart from his own works, we have chiefly a 'wretched 
derivative notice in a Byzantine lexicon' 6 although prior to 
this we can trace non-biographical notices in Lactantius and 
Eunapius.
7 
The notice in the Suidas tells us that he was born 
under the Emperor Trajan, which would place his date of birth no 
later than A. D. 117, and that he was torn to pieces by dogs 
because of his opposition to Christianity and blasphemy of 
Christ.
8 
This certainly owes more to Christian hostility than to 
fact, and Baldwin notes that the same fate was said to have been 
shared by Euripides and Heraclitus. 9 The chronicler of Lucian's 
age, Philostratus, makes no mention of him, no doubt because he 
was not a public figure in the same sense as Herodes Atticus, 
Pollux, Favorinus and Dio Chrysostom, nor was he, unlike other 
sophists, a noted public benefactor.
10 
This paucity of information leaves us heavily dependent on 
what Lucian said of himself, and the literal accuracy of much of 
5. Ibid., p.13. For a view that stresses the importance of the 
holding of public office for the sophists, see E. L. Bowie, 
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this is questionable. He was born in Samosata (Hist. conscr.24; 
Pisc.19),
11 
and described himself as a Syrian (Bis. Acc.14; Adv. 
Ind.19). After leaving school, he was apprenticed to his uncle as 
a sculptor, with notable lack of success (Somn.); he then went to 
Ionia in pursuit of education and probably entered a school of 
rhetoric (Bis. Ace.), where he learned the art of oratory. We do 
not know when he learnt Greek, but even if he had some knowledge 
of the language before entering the school, it was almost 
certainly here that he acquired his fluency in the classical 
literary language. Helm cites Rh. Pr.B as evidence that Lucian 
acquired his education only with difficulty
12 
but the passage 
occurs in the context of an allusion to a much-used literary 
topos and can hardly be meant as literal truth. 
Suidas has it that after he finished his education he 
practised as a lawyer in Antioch, abandoning this due to his lack 
13 
of success. Lucian himself says nothing of this, unless Bis. 
Acc.32 should be taken as a reference to it. Bowersock accepts 
h . f f . h . 
14 b 1 t ~s as a re erence to orens~c r etor~c, ut sure y goes too 
far in stating that 'There is nothing, indeed, to suggest that he 
ever ranked (or practised) as a sophist' .
15 
The numerous 
prolaliae and meletae, as well as his own account of his success 
in Gaul (Bis. Ace .1.,'1 ) , all militate against this view. 
A career as a public orator led him to Italy (Herod.5) and 
Gaul, in which latter country he claimed to have achieved notable 
popularity and success (Apol.15). As Baldwin notes, Oratory 
1 . , . . d 
16 d . b g asses over Luc~an s career ~n Ion~a an Greece an ~t may e 
that he found success harder to come by in these areas because of 
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He says that he visited Rome (Niqr.2) and his meeting with 
Nigrinus may have been influential in his decision to abandon 
rhetoric for philosophy (Nigr.38) .
17 
He also visited Macedonia 
(Herod.?; Scyth.8), and in the middle of his career he seems to 
have spent a considerable amount of time in Antioch (Pr. Im.; 
Im.), Athens (Eun.) and Corinth (Hist. Conser.). This period, A. 
D. 162-165, is that of the Parthian wars and Lucius Verus' 
residence in the East, and it would be interesting to know if 
Lucian was trying to court Imperial favour, perhaps presenting 
himself to the co-Emperor as a potential official war historian, 
unlikely as this seems. Late in life, he was translated into the 
Imperial service in Egypt, but the details of this episode are 
18 
vague. He later seems to have lost this position and to have 
resumed his oratorical career (Herod.?; Bacch.7). The exact date 
of his death is unknown, but a reference to Marcus Aurelius shows 
that he was still alive at about A. D. 180 (Alex.48). 
Such is the skeletal information we possess on Lucian's 
career. There are critical problems involved in much of this, 
since in The Dream Q£ Lucian's Career, The Double Indictment Q£ 
Trial £y Jury and Nigrinus the literary form in which he has 
chosen to give details of his autobiography suggests that his 
several conversions may contain more imaginative than literal 
truth. Yet in the first two examples cited, there is clearly a 
basis of fact which makes it difficult to agree with Anderson's 
statement that these conversions, like those of Dio of Prusa and 
Justin Martyr, are merely 'bookish' .
19 
We should rather say that 
these are sufficiently real events given a literary and bookish 
turn of expression. 
Lucian twice records the fact of his abandoning rhetoric 
(Nigr.38; Bis. Acc.31-32), and the second of these references 
points directly to the ambiguity of his relationship with the 
Sophistic. He had made a success of his professional career as a 
17. Helm, 1725-1726. 
18. Baldwin, pp.9-10. 
19. Graham Anderson, Lucian: Theme and Variation in the Second 




sophist but became disgusted with the vulgarities of many of his 
fellow practitioners. Yet, as Putnam notes, he utilised the 
common techniques of the sophists at all phases of his career.
20 
The few early, purely sophistic works which are still extant show 
his mastery of academic forms as the suasoria (Phalaris I and 
II); the controversia (The Tyrannicide; Disowned); the encomium 
(The Elv.; MY. Native Land); ecphrasis (Herodotus; The Hall; 
Hippias Q£ the Bath); and the prolalia, a short piece serving as 
an introduction to a longer speech (The Scythian or the Consul; 
Harmonides; Amber Q£ The Swans; The Dipsads) . That some of these 
prolaliae, notably Dionysus, Heracles and The Dream Q£ Lucian's 
Career can be assigned definitely to a late period of his career 
is evidence that Lucian never wholly abandoned sophism. 
At first sight it appears that by using sophistic forms and 
techniques while attacking sophism Lucian has laid himself open 
to a charge of inconsistency. This, however, is not wholly true, 
and the charge can be refuted by examining the precise use he 
made of these forms and the literary contexts in which he did so. 
His charges against the sophists are set out explicitly in three 
works, A Professor of Public Speaking, Lexiphanes and How To 
Write History. 
The first of these is in ironic form, being advice from a 
teacher of rhetoric to a pupil on the easiest way to achieve 
literary success. There are two roads to Rhetoric: 'one of them 
is but a path, narrow, briary and rough, promising great 
thirstiness and sweat ... The other, however, is level, flowery 
and well-watered' (Rh. Q£.7) .
21 
The guide to the rough road will 
point out the indistinct footsteps of Demosthenes, Plato and one 
or two more, and urge one to follow them. This man the teacher 
describes as an 'antediluvian, who displays dead men of a bygone 
20. 
21. 
Emily James Putnam, 'Lucian the Sophist', Classical 
Philolo&y 4 (1909), .162-177 (p.163). , 
~ ~tv~panbcr ecr~t~cr~ev~ Ka\ aKave&o~cr Kat ~paxeta, noAb ~b 
o(~ocr ~~~a(voucra Kat topro~a· ... ~ e~{pa 0~ nAa~eta Ka\ 
five~p~ Kci\ e~uopocr. 
· .. 
25 
era to serve as a pattern, and expects you to dig up long-buried 
22 speeches as if they were something tremendously helpful' (c.lO). 
The other road has for a guide 'a wholly clever and handsome 
gentleman who is able to make one an orator without effort' 
23 
(c.ll). The novice need not worry about having gone through 
all the rites of initiation preliminary to rhetoric (c.14). He 
needs only ignorance, recklessness, effrontery, shamelessness and 
gay clothing (c.15), fifteen or twenty Attic words to sprinkle in 
whenever he speaks, as well as a heap of obscure words and new 
monstrosities coined by the speaker himself (c.l6-17). He must 
read, not the classics, but 'the speeches of the men who lived 
only a little before our time, and these pieces that they call 
24 
"exercises'" (c.17). 
Similar thoughts are found, cast in a non-ironic form, in 
the dialogue Lexiphanes, which ridicules fashionable linguistic 
affectations, and in which Lycinus gives to Lexiphanes advice the 
obverse of that imparted by the teacher of rhetoric. If 
Lexiphanes wishes to be praised for style, he must read the best 
poets and orators, Thucydides and Plato, and take from them all 
that is fairest (c.22). In a phrase explicitly recalling A 
Professor of Public Speaking , Lycinus advises him: 'please 
remember not to imitate the most worthless productions of the 
25 
Sophists, who lived only a little before our time' (c.23). 
Both these treatises contain what J. W. H. Atkins rightly 
11 hl 1 . f h h' t' ,
26 
ca s 'a rut ess ana ys1s o t e sop 1s 1c manner and a 
fuller treatment is given to the same ubject in How To Write 
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J. w. H. Atkins, Literary Criticism in Antiquity, 2 vols 
(Cambridge, 1934), 2, 338-339. 
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26 
perfectly simple and easy to write history, and that anyone can 
27 
do it if only he can put what comes to him into words!' (c.5). 
These people neglect the distinction between history and 
panegyric (c.7), and between history and poetry (c.8). They court 
'private whim and the profit they expect from their history' 
28 
(c.13). 
They indulge in absurd imitations of Thucydides (c.15), and 
are full of faults of expression and of arrangement of their 
material (c.24). In this treatise, as in the other two, we have, 
29 
as Atkins says, 'the sophists as they lived and spoke and wrote' 
and we easily recognise them as the people attacked in The Double 
Indictment 31 as the lovers of rhetoric. We can surmise, then, 
that when Lucian says in The Double Indictment that he left 
rhetoric for philosophy, he meant that he had set his face 
against the more vulgar manifestations of the Second Sophistic. 
The gravamen of his charge against the sophists is that 
they neglected to cultivate an appreciation of literary 
tradition, and it is by appeal to tradition and to the doctrine 
of mimesis that Lucian balances his criticisms with positive 
precepts. The concept of mimesis or imitation has had a long 
history in literary criticism. It has been discussed in many 
different senses by writers from Plato onwards, but the fullest 
discussion, and the one most immediately relevant to Lucian, is 
to be found in Quintilian's Institutio oratoris, completed some 
twenty-five years before Lucian's birth. Quintilian writes that a 
significant part of art consists of imitation: 'And it is a 
universal rule of life that we should wish to copy what we 
approve in others' .
30 
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that it was above all necessary to imitate with understanding, 
31 
and with a clear sense of what was good and bad in style' . 
27 
In How To Write History
1 
Lucian puts forward a theory of 
imitation similar to that found in Quintilian, and opposes this 
to the vulgarities of many of his contemporaries. It is 'not 
strictly perhaps a treatise on writing history, so much as a 
32 
discussion on sane writing in general', although it should be 
noted that even regarded as a treatise on historiography it 
exposes contemporary historians to scorn and ridicule in the 
33 
light of precepts drawn from Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon. 
Lucian writes that one of the supreme qualities of the best 
. t f h. . ' f . ' 34 h. h wr1 er o 1story 1s power o express1on , w 1c may come 
through practice, toil and imitation of the ancients (c.34). He 
invokes both Herodotus and Thucydides explicitly (c.42, 57), as 
examples worthy of imitation, as he had invoked Plato and 
Thucydides in Lexiphanes. It is by falling short of such 
standards -- indeed, by ignoring them altogether that the 
worst writers of the age express their ignorance. In putting 
forward such precepts, Lucian was 'one of the last exponents of 
classical doctrine',
35 
and was clearly attempting to recall his 
contemporaries to the traditions of earlier times. The idea of 
mimesis, though, did not stop at mere slavish imitation of 
ancient models. In the expression given to it by Quintilian, it 
showed itself capable of allowing for originality. Imitation 
should not be limited to one style, nor be regarded as a mere 
matter of words. 'What was really to be imitated was the methods 
of this or that writer: his judgement, his arrangement, his 
appeal to the emotions ... ' .
36 
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The first point, then, that we must realise, is 
that imitation alone is not sufficient, if only for 
the reason that a sluggish nature is only too 37ady 
to rest content with the inventions of others. 
28 
He joins Horace in insisting that 'its real function lies not in 
the reproduction of earlier models of expression, but in 
conducing to the discovery of new effects and the development of 
38 
style in general', and insists that 'It is a positive disgrace 
b 11 h
. . . . , 39 
to e content to owe a our ac levement to lmltatlon . 
Because of the impossibility of complete and exact imitation, it 
was not to be followed as an end in itself, but 'rather as a 
means to further artistic advance, an incentive to improve on 
1 . h. , 40 ear ler ac levement . 
However generous the conception was at its best when related 
to personal reading of ancient authors, both the theory and the 
practice of mimesis degenerated when refracted through the 
distorting media of rhetorical schools and handbooks. As J. 
Bompaire points out, 'Pour les esprits exp~ditifs, en tout cas 
1 • 1' d 1' I 41 1 ces manue s tlennent leu e ltterature' . Not on y was 
classical education literary in nature so that reading was the 
basis of imitation -- this is so even in Quintilian -- but 
reading itself could consist of extracts culled from ancient 
authors with regard to beauties of style and subject-matter. Such 
a practice clearly made it difficult to avoid mechanical copying 
and attain to genuine imitation in the spirit of the original, 
let alone to originality. 
The doctrine of mimesis, then, not only made allowance for 
originality, but tended towards it as its highest end and 






Ante omnia igitur imitatio per se ipsa non sufficit, 
vel quia pigri est ingenii contentum esse iis, quae sint 
ab aliis inventa. (Inst. Orat. X.2.4.). 
Atkins, p.280. 
Turpe etiam illud est, contentum esse id consequi quod 
imiteris (ibid., X.2.7.). 
Atkins, pp.280-281. 









literary taste as Lucian, there was a risk of being tainted with 
the same kind of novelty as that of the sophists. In honouring 
absurd new subjects and indulging in stylistic mannerisms 
designed to please an audience, they had degraded genuine 
originality to the status of mere novelty and confused the 
creative spirit with subservience to fashion. Consequently we 
find Lucian both aware of the originality of his comic dialogues 
and concerned lest his fidelity to literary tradition be 
overlooked. 
His most extended discussion of this problem is to be found 
in Zeuxis Q£ Antiochus in which he tells us that members of a 
recent audience of his had noisily praised him: 'The substance of 
their approbation was the strangeness of the thought in my 
42 
composition and the degree of freshness it displayed!' (c.l). 
Their praise caused him, he says, considerable annoyance, and he 
reflected: 
So this is the only attraction in my writings, that 
they are unconventional and keep off the beaten 
track, while good vocabulary, conformity to the 
ancient canon, penetration of intellect, power of 
perception, Attic grace, good construction, genera~3 
competence perhaps have no place in my work (c.2). 
In a similar vein he writes in To One Who Said 'You're~ 
Prometheus in Words' : 
42. 
43. 
I am not at all satisfied to be thought an 
innovator with no older model to father this work 
of mine. No, if it were not thought graceful as 
well, I should certainly be ashamed of it, believe 
me, and trample it under foot and destroy it. The 
originality would be no help, as far as I am 
.. ·; 
concerned, to prev~~t the ugly thing's being 
obliterated (c.3). 
Yet c.6 of the same work shows that he still took considerable 
pride in his hippocentauric creation. 
30 
This odd combination of pride and diffidence goes some way 
to accounting for the ambivalence we feel in reading Lucian's 
dialogues. It is, not however, the whole explanation, for which 
we must turn to another aspect of his relationship to the Second 
Sophistic. One of the salient features of the movement was its 
lack of originality. Even the best of its literary artists were 
content to use old forms, and none of them, Lucian included, 
could be called original thinkers. What passed for thought in 
the movement was a collection of clich~s and commonplaces from 
rhetorical handbooks or from the platitudes of the various 
philosophical sects, and in this context Graham Anderson has 
correctly stressed the common bonds between Lucian and the 
sophists: 'The second century was the age of the HalbphilosOph, 
the rhetorical writer who concerned himself with moral (and very 
often religious) commonplace. Lucian has the repertoire and 
45 
outlook of such a person' . A strictly limited number of 
themes and tropes was endlessly varied and elaborated upon in 
46 
something akin to the art of fugue. Lucian seems to have fully 
realised the impasse to which classical culture had come but was 
incapable of suggesting any way out. His dissatisfaction found 
its expression in a literary form which took as its content those 
weary, over-used clich~s and variations and by a subtle use of 
literary context exposed their hollowness. Not only that, but in 
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Classical Studies, 27 (1982), p.64. 
Bompaire, p .113. 
31 
contemporary culture, Lucian himself fully participated in it.
47 
He too was an entertainer, reading his dialogues to an 
appreciative and admiring audience. His strategy is rescued from 
the charge of cynicism by its fantasy, irony and humour. 
This simultaneous awareness of the limitations of 
contemporary culture and participation in some of its most 
characteristic forms is crucial to an understanding of Lucian's 
literary art, yet its implications have rarely been noticed by 
critics, or, if noticed, not pursued. Anderson is content to 
regard him as a virtuoso sophist. In Lucian, he writes, 'whatever 
the subject and whatever the genre, we are dealing with ingenious 
variations on a handful of themes' .
48 
His endless self-repetition 
results in 'a literary texture dense with self-pastiche' .
49 
This 
is partly a result of his rhetorical training. No orator could 
afford to forget his elementary training in the practice of 
variations on a theme. 
It is clear from Philostratus' Vitae sophistarum 
that the second-century sophists were professional 
entertainers competing regularly for the loyalty of 
audiences who expected constant novelty within a 
very limited range. The virtuoso had every 
temptation to exploit his successes as 
resourcefully as he dared; and the fashion for 
extempore public speaking made it still more 
advisable to have one's personal repertoire at the 
ready. Lucian could sneer at the professional 
upstart who drew on his own storehouse of clich~s; 
but no-ogU did so more persistently than Lucian 
himself. 
This is an admirably succinct statement of literary conditions 
and methods in general, but hardly an adequate account of 
Lucian's response to them. 
47. E. L. Bowie, 'Lucian', in The Cambridge History of Classical 
Literature, vol.1, edited by P. E. Easterling and B. M. W. 
Knox, 673-679, (pp. 673-674); Jacqueline de Romilly, A Short 
History of Greek Literature (Chicago and London, 1985), 
p.201. 
48. Anderson, 1976, p.1. 
49. Ibid., p.l. 
50. IhicL., Ff-3...:4-. -
,-. 
32 
Robinson, too, stresses the use of stock types drawn from 
handbooks, or from comedy and diatribe.
51 
'The same characters, 
the same settings, the same themes, the same examples recur in 
works whose compositional features are quite unalike' 52 As for 
the activities and problems with which Lucian's characters 
concern themselves, these rely heavily on 'the moral commonplaces 
53 of Cynic diatribe' and 'lists of topoi in manuals'. He 
reaches the same conclusion as Anderson: 'Clearly ... it is not 
themes and characters, stock types all, which maintain the 
satirical interest. More important still is the skill with which 
Lucian varies their presentation' .
54 
In spite of this, Robinson 
goes on to say that these works 'play with the audience's 
awareness of their literary antecedents ... In fact, what we are 
d 1 . . h . ll l f l' . 
55 ea lng Wlt ls an exce ent examp e o lterary lrony' 
Finally, he points out that 'The theme of the satires is not, in 
a sense, their ostensible subject-matter, but the fact of 
imitation itself' . 56 This is valuable, but Robinson fails to 
extend it as a critical principle to Lucian's practice of 
variation on a theme, and his use of topoi and commonplaces. The 
theme of the satires is not imitation alone, but the restricted 
type of imitation practised by the sophists. 
Bompaire goes close to the heart of Lucian's method by 
drawing a distinction between rhetorical and literary creation. 
He traces nearly everything in Lucian to rhetorical elements, and 
writes: 
Le monde lucianesque adopte pour l'essentiel les 
personnages de la declamation, avec les donn~es qui 
les situent dans le temps et l'espace. En outre, 
dans sa totalit/, le monde dent Lucien pose les 
51. Christopher Robinson, Lucian and his Influence in Europe, 
(London, 1979), p.9ff .. 
52. Ibid., p.14. 
53. Ibid., p.16. 
54. Ibid., p.39. 
55. Ibid., p.44. 
56 . Ibid. , p. 4 4 . 
probl~mes et g7int les passions est un univers de 
biblioth"eque. 
33 
He notes the mass of borrowings of all types in Lucian and makes 
the valuable .comment: 
(elles) ne sont pas une fin en soi, elles 
s'}ns"erent dans une ensemble ... elles constituent 
l'etape premier de la crtation, l'ecrivain 
reservant son talent pour les ~S~pes plus subtils 
de l'ironie ou de la fantaisie. 
The writing which does not rise above its sources and its 
borrowings is what Bompaire calls 'rhetorical' creation. Literary 
creation, on the other hand, is close to what Quintilian meant by 
the best type of mimesis, that which imitates not the letter but 
the spirit of the ancients, and is thus capable of originality on 
its own account. In Bompaire's words: 
Dans la cr~ation litt~raire, la Mim{sis trouve son . 
expression parfaite: 1' assi __ \ilation profonde se 
substitue a !'utilisation imm{diate ... 5g laplace 
est libre pour une recr~ation du mod~le. 
In a similar vein he writes that in reading Lucian we ought not 
to stop at mechanical borrowings, exploitation of simple readings 
and received ideas: 
' / ; 
Il ... faut ... saisir le moment ou le precede 
h ,.,. . 1 1 1' ,.,. d~.' 1 r etor~que, oya ement app ~que, n'est eJa p us 
qu'une my~tification, o~ la vir~Bosit{ du souvenir 
devient resurrection du mod~le. 
And finally: 
La Mim~sis, loin d'€tre une charge est la condition 
.... d . . l't,.,. . meme e cette or~g~na ~ e. D~sons encore que 
57. Bompaire, p.161. 
58. Ibid., pp.235-236. 
59. Ibid., p.547. 





l'originalite( relative de ~lauteur est une forme 
sup(rieure de l'imitation. 
34 
To any reader of Lucian, originality can mean only the 
creation of the comic dialogue. We know little of the process by 
which he came to create this form, and the explanation of Helm, 
that he simply took it over from Menippus, is quite inadequate, 
there being no evidence that Menippus ever used it. Lucian 
himself twice explained his new creation, but in terms that leave 
many questions still unanswered. 
In The Double Indictment, Dialogue complains that she was 
formerly dignified, pondering upon the gods and the nature of the 
universe, but Lucian (appearing as The Syrian in the dialogue) 
gave her a comic mask Q~d penned her up with Jest, Satire, 
Cynicism, Eupolis and Aristophanes. Finally, 'he even thrust in 
upon me Menippus' .
62 
As a result she has been turned into a 
monstrous blend, 'neither prose nor verse, but (I) seem to my 
hearers a strange phenomenon made up of different elements, ·like 
63 
a Centaur' (c.33). In reply, Lucian says that when he found 
Dialogue he was dour, 
continual questioning' 
'and had been reduced to a skeleton through 
64 
(c.34). Lucian forced him to smile and 
paired him with Comedy so as to procure for him great favours 
from his hearers. Dialogue, he says, had been used to quibbling 
over subtleties. 'Reflection is sweet to him, and he sets great 
store by himself if they say that not everyone can grasp his 
penetrating speculations about "ideas"' (c.34) .
65 
In To One Who 






Dialogue used to sit at home by himself, and indeed 
spend his time in the public walks with a few 
companions; Comedy gave h€Yself to Dionysus and 
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joined him in the theatre, had fun with him, jested 
and joked ... Dialogue's companions she mocked as 
"Heavy-thinkers" and "High-talkers" and suchlike 
... Dialogue, however, took his conversations very 
seriously, philosophising about nature and virtue. 
So, in musical terms, there were two octaves 
between them from highest to lowest. Nevertheless, 
I have dared to combine them as they are into a 
harmony, though they are not in the least doct~e 
and do not easily tolerate partnership (c.6). 
35 
These are fine descriptions of his achievement, but neither tells 
us why he decided to combine Comedy and Dialogue. He was clearly 
dissatisfied with the limitations of sophism, and steeped in the 
literature of the Greek past. His temperament naturally inclined 
towards all forms of comedy, and Plato presented him with a 
living example of dramatic dialogue. Most importantly, he was 
steeped in the best traditions of mimesis, which stressed 
eclecticism and borrowing the best parts of one's models so as to 
create something new. If his creation was original, the 
possibility of and need for originality were both sanctioned by 
tradition, and his yoking of comedy and dialogue amounts to 
something more than the rhetorically-sanctioned combination of 
67 
old forms for new effects spoken of by Putnam. If we abandon 
the notion of Lucian as merely battening upon tradition and learn 
to think of him as a genuine creative artist in exactly the same 
sense as his predecessors, then it is easy to see him creating 
the comic dialogue as a response to the cultural and artistic 
impasse in which he found himself. 
66. 
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36 
Unlike Athena, comic dialogue did not spring fully armed 
from the head of its creator. There was a period of 
experimentation during which Lucian was obviously under the 
influence of Platonic dialogue, although he invariably gives this 
an individual flavour. Even earlier than this, he had introduced 
snatches of dialogue into such purely sophistic works as Amber,or 
The Swans, while The Dance and Toxaris, or Friendship are written 
entirely in dialogue. The first, a treatise on dancing, involves 
' 1 t f 1' , 68 no rea contac o persona 1ty ; while the second merely uses 
dialogue as a frame for pairs of tales on friendship. Nigrinus, 
too, is clearly sophistic in spirit. Its numerous sophistic 
69 
traits have been listed by Putnam, and it again merely uses a 
frame dialogue, while its burden is carried by a lengthy 
narration. 
These early efforts are a long way from the spirit and 
technique of the later dialogues, and the 'Platonic' dialogues 
are equally experimental in character. Of these, The Parasite is 
an ironical praise of parasitism, based on the discussion in 
Plato's Gorgias of both cookery and rhetoric as arts of flattery. 
The Carousal, or The Lapiths is barely a dialogue at all, 
consisting as it does of a long narrative of how representatives 
of various philosophical sects had made fools of themselves at a 
banquet, the whole being introduced by a short dialogue in which 
the narrator, Lycinus, converses with a friend. The setting is 
based on Plato's Symposium, and may also be indebted to a 
Convivium attributed to Menippus,
70 
but in spite of the humorous 
exposure of charlatans, a recurrent motif in Lucian, thE dialogue 
lacks any subtlety. 
The Parasite and Hermotimus Q£ Concerning the Sects are 
linked together as explorations of the Socratic method. 
Hermotimus is Lucian's most extended treatment of philosophical 
questions, and he conjoins the method of Socratic enquiry to a 
68. Ibid., p.169. 
69. Ibid., p.l75. 




thoroughly sceptical point of view in order to reduce his Stoic 
interlocutor to perplexity. Tackaberry has shown Lucian's debt to 
scepticism in this dialogue. 71 and this dedication to sceptical 
formulations no doubt explains why the pursuit of philosophy is 
taken to a reductio ad absurdum -- although this may possibly be 
more indebted to a desire to parody the Socratic method. In any 
case, the dialogue is, for our taste, too long, overly 
repetitive, and shows that close examination of a philosophical 
question, even in a humorous spirit, was not Lucian's forte. 
Both The Lover Of Lies, Q£ The Doubter and Anacharsis, or 
Athletics can be seen as developments of this early group. Both 
show a definite advance in dramatic ability, and Anacharsis is 
the first occurrence in a Lucianic dialogue of the philosophus 
gloriosus, although Solon is here treated not as a philosopher, 
but as an eloquent citizen of Athens. Among the techniques used 
to deflate Solon are an involved rhetorical simile which 'shows 
up the wisest man in Athens as a glib but unconvincing sophist' 72 
who is forced to justify athletics by comparing it to cock-
fighting (c.37). These techniques will recur frequently in later 
dialogues. 
The Lover Of Lies is another dialogue which is essentially a 
narrative set in a frame of dialogue, and, like The Carousal, is 
an exposure of charlatans. Its introduction uses a quasi-ironical 
setting, since if respectable poets and cities are allowed to lie 
(c.2-3), perhaps that is some slight mitigation in favour of the 
philosophers present at the banquet. Each of the stories told is 
progressively more incredible, and the ironic interruptions of 
Tychiades are not taken seriously. In each of the tales, Lucian 
exhibits a considerable talent for comic invention, but the 
dialogue lacks the ironic tension between setting and content 
which is one of the characteristics of the later works. 
71. W. H. Tackaberry, Lucian's relation to Plato and the post-
Aristotelian philosophers, University of Toronto Studies, 
Philological Series, No.9, (Toronto, 1930), pp.55-58. 









The remaining dialogues all, for one reason or another, fall 
into the group classified as 'Menippean', although this term 
actually begs more questions than it answers; as a Menippean 
satirist, Lucian is very much sui generis. That he rather than 
Menippus was the inventor of the comic dialogue has been 
indisputable since Barbara P. McCarthy's masterly review of the 
evidence.
73 
In view of his eclectic approach to the literature 
of the past, it is not difficult to see him as having utilised 
Menippus as one source among many. 
The relation of the four series of miniature dialogues to 
those of fuller length is difficult to determine, although 
Dialogues of the Gods and Dialogues of the Dead in particular 
share many points in common with the longer pieces. Dialogues of 
the Courtesans owe their inspiration to New Comedy, and are 
skilful character sketches with an occasional satirical bent 
(e.g. D. meretr.1; 11). Yet even these, short as they are, 
provide Lucian with an opportunity to conflate sources and repeat 
material and situations used elsewhere in his work. The same can 
be said of Dialogues of the Sea-Gods, fifteen brief portraits of 
various sea-gods. Whimsically humorous rather than satirical and 
full of real charm, they contain fine examples of the exercise of 
ecphrasis (15.3), and in their vividness show that they are more 
than mere imitations of their several sources. But they contain 
little hint of criticism or mockery, and, exquisite as they are, 
they remain outside the mainstream of Lucian's work. 
Dialogues of the Gods brings us closer to that mainstream, 
if only because several of the situations recur in more extended 
dialogues. Although they are not always markedly satirical, the 
rationalist base of the humour was capable of further extension. 
More importantly, the casual way in which the gods talk of their 
affairs -- in a manner reminiscent of Plautus -- contains an 
implicit valuation of their worth as gods which will recur in 
many later dialogues. Although this is not their main point, we 
73. Barbara P. McCarthy, 'Lucian and Menippus', Yale Classical 
Studies 4 (1934), pp.3-55. 
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surely do not feel that these debased anthropomorphic deities are 
worthy of much respect, let alone devotion. 
Similarly, in Dialogues of the Dead it is impossible to feel 
that the setting of Hades is to be taken literally. It is 
compounded of a variety of literary sources and traditions and is 
essentially metaphorical -- that is, it is a convenient setting, 
sanctioned by tradition, for examining men's attitudes and 
behaviour. In Lucian's mind it has no more reality than his 
Olympus. He used it because it was universally known and required 
no explanation. 
The first thing to notice in these dialogues is the frequent 
occurrence of Cynic spokesmen such as Menippus, Diogenes, Crates 
and Antisthenes, all with more or less interchangeable opinions. 
Menippus is no more important than the other three, in spite of 
making rather more appearances. This is surely an argument in 
favour of the opinion advanced by Bompaire that Menippus has no 
special importance for Lucian other than as a representative of 
h 
. 74 
t e Cyn~c sect. 
It is noticeable, too, that on one occasion in these 
dialogues, Menippus' position, as usual a Cynic clich~, is 
ironically undercut by Hermes. On being shown the skull of Helen 
of Troy he asks: 'Was it for this that so many Greeks and 
barbarians fell and so many cities were devastated?' (D.mort., 
5.2) .
75 
Hermes replies: 'Ah, but you never saw her alive, 
Menippus, or you would have said yourself that it was forgiveable 
"they for such a lady long should suffer woe" (ibid.)' .
76 
Menippus' reply that the Achaeans 'did not know for what a short-
lived thing they strove' does not fully recover his position. The 
Cynics, no more than the Stoics, are exempt from the implied 
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attitude here is paralleled by himself and other Cynic spokesmen 
throughout most of Dialogues of the Dead, in all the full-length 
underworld dialogues, and in the other 'episcopic' dialogues. In 
these larger pieces it is ironised by setting and context; here, 
notable irony occurs only in the place cited, an indication that 
these miniatures are indeed early pieces. 
Because they are early, they form a useful introduction to 
many characteristic Lucianic themes. In Hades, the rich and the 
tyrants can be distinguished only by their groans (1.1~ 
Menippus is continually 'laughing and generally mocking those 
hypocritical philosophers' (1.2) ;
77 
the rich waste their time in 
piling up gold which they cannot take with them (1.3); there is 
no physical beauty left in Hades but 'all with us ... is one and 
78 
the same dust, skulls bereft of good looks' (1.3). These themes 
recur constantly in Lucian, and it is interesting to see so many 
of them being crowded into one short dialogue. Obviously designed 
to introduce the series of miniatures, it stands equally well as 
an introduction to a significant part of the Lucianic corpus. 
From the third dialogue onwards, the themes touched upon by 
Diogenes are elaborated by Menippus and other Cynic spokesmen. He 
insults dead rulers who, when alive, 'expected people to worship 
(you), treated free men with contempt, and forgot all about 
death' (3.2) .
79 
He insults the Homeric heroes and historical 
figures such as Croesus, Midas and Xerxes, and philosophers such 
as Empedocles (6). Both he and Diogenes make fun of the seers 
Amphilocus and Trophonius (10), the god Heracles (11), and the 
deified hero Alexander (13). 
Dialogue 20 makes a sustained attack on a philosopher: 'an 
august personage, to judge by his appearance, and a proud man' , 
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Menippus calls him an 'impostor, full of talk of marvels', and 
he is found tb be concealing beneath his cloak 
hypocrisy ignorance, contentiousness, vanity, 
unanswerable puzzles, thorny argumentations, and 
complicated conceptions •.. yes, and plenty of 
wasted effort, and no little nonsense, and idle 
talk, and splitti~ of hairs, and ... gold ... and 
soft living, shame~rssness, temper, luxury, and 
effeminacy' (20.8). 
This is a reasonably comprehensive indictment, and in its details 
and general attitudes agrees with what Lucian says elsewhere 
about philosophers. 
In general, these miniatures give notice of themes -- even 
phrases -- found constantly in the later Lucian. It is noticeable 
i 
that the char,acterisation of Menippus exhibits three different 
tendencies -- the rude name-caller, the quizzical questioner of 
mythology, and, briefly but significantly, the eiron ironised. 
Evidently Lucian was still feeling his way to some more general 
statement of his views, and, in general, the artistic and 
intellectual effects of the longer Menippean dialogues are quite 
different from those of the miniatures. Since the ethical and 
philosophical opinions put forward are the same in both cases, 
the critical task is to ask why these effects differ, and what 
implications this has for a consideration of Lucian as artist and 
satirist. 
It is customary to divide the longer dialogues into groups, 
according as ;their main influence is thought to be Old Comic or 
Menippean, and elaborate schemes have been proposed for 
identifying the 'Menippean' dialogues.
82 
Yet an examination of 
81. 
82. 
cl ' ~ l / / c..f ' , / ' 
o~v ~ev ~~~v a/..a~ovetav KO~t~e~ o~v Be a~aetav Kat ,, ' / ' ' ' ' / ' / eptv Kat Kevo6o~tav Kat epro~~cretcr anopoucr Kat /..oyoucr 
' I ,, " / •'' / aKavero6etcr Kat evvotacr no/..un/..oKoucr a/../..a Kat ~\~atonovtav 
I ' \ ""' , , ' ' tl ~a/..a no/../..~v Kat /..~pov ouK o/..tyov Kat ue/..oucr Kat 
" ' ./ ' ( ' ' ' / ~tKpo/..oytav,v~' ~ta Kat·Ypucr ov ye ~ou~t Kat ~ounaeetav \ \) / '~v\' \''I/ oe Kat avatcrxuv~tav Kat op~v Kat ~pu~~v Kat ~~aKtav. 
F. Anne Payne, Chaucer and Menippean satire (University 
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42 
the dialogues suggests that such schemes are arbitrary, and that 
all the dialogues are united by a common technique. 
This technique is exemplified in the obviously paired 
dialogues, Menippus, ~ The Descent Into Hell and Icaromenippus, 
~ The Sky-man In both of these, although the central figure is 
Menippus, it is clear that he is not intended for our unqualified 
admiration, and that he has much in common with the ironised 
figure of Dialogues of the Dead 5. 
Menippus is thought to be based on a lost Menippean original 
known as Necyia,
83 
and Helm argues that it is merely a redaction 
of this work, citing as evidence the verse/prose mixture, the 
Cynic tendency,the metaphor of life as a play, exempla drawn from 
diatribe, historical exempla taken from the fourth century B. C., 
and parallels with Seneca's Menippean satire, Apocolyntosis.
84 
All this really proves is that if Menippus did write a Necyia 
Lucian had probably read it and used such elements of it as 
fitted his general outlook. But there is no proof that Menippus 
ever wrote in dialogue, and, as McCarthy has put it, the 
influence may well be confined to the actual narration put in the 
h f . 
85 h f h mout o Men1ppus. S e urt er says: 
The narratives in the Necyomanteia and the 
Icaromenippus probably reflect Lucian in their 
general form. But the elaborate technique of hig
6 
dramatic dialogues is Lucian's own development. 
This technique is more subtle that Anderson allows when he 
writes: 
He claimed to have blended Dialogue, Comedy and 
'Menippus' together, and took some satisfaction in 
his technique. And he was faced with the problem of 
arranging these diverse sources, along with the 
inevitable rhetg7ical clich~s, in a way which would 
avoid monotony. 
83. Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosopharum VI.101. 
84. Helm, 1750. 
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This is true if we view Lucian, as Anderson does, as a mere 
entertainer, but if we ask ourselves whether he may have had a 
more serious purpose, then we are forced to draw different 
conclusions about his use of his sources. 
In his introduction to the Loeb edition of Menipous, A. M. 
43 
Harmon writes: 'The unity of the dialogue is badly marred 
because Lucian has given it a double point, aiming it not only at 
the philosophers but at the rich' .
88 
This defect, he believes, 
arises from imperfect adaptation of the Menippean original which 
'must have been a satire against wealth and power' which 'Lucian 
parodies and turns against the philosophers' .
89 
In fact, it is 
one of the characteristics of Lucian's personae that they allow 
themselves to be distracted, to attack more than one target at a 
time. Something of this sort was done in Dialogues of the Dead 1, 
and we shall see it again in Icaromenippus. 
The opening of Menippus exhibits the mixture of prose and 
verse which is regarded as characteristic of the genre, but.it is 
noticeable that both here and in ~ Rants there is really very 
little verse, and that in both dialogues the speaker drops it 
after criticism. It is far less prominent in these pieces than in 
Seneca's Apocolyntosis so, again, we may legitimately doubt the 
extent of Menippus' influence on Lucian. 
The impulse for Menippus' journey to Hades was his discovery 
that the laws contradicted what the poets said about the gods, 
and forbade 'adultery, quarrelling and theft' (c.3). Not knowing 
who was in the right, he decided to consult the philosophers, 
90 begging them 'to show me a plain, solid path in life' (c.4). 
This is the 'mean and sure estate' said by Wooden to be one of 
h 1 ' 1 b f th ' . ' 
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is not quite as simple as that. Menippus finds that the 
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philosophers were even more ignorant than other men, giving him 
contradictory advice which amounts to a clich~d survey of the 
various schools (c.4). Worst of all, their practice directly 
opposed their preaching (c.5). 
Oddly, Menippus makes no mention of the question he had 
originally intended to put to the philosophers -- that is, since 
the laws and the poets are mutually contradictory, who is in the 
right? Indeed, the question is no sooner put than it is dropped 
in favour of the all-embracing attack on the philosophers. And 
after this, the task becomes to find out from Teiresias 'what the 
92 
best life was, the life a man of sense would choose' (c.6) . 
. What is the cause of this shift of focus? Is it the result of 
artistic incompetence, or is it an indication that we should look 
more carefully at the content of the dialogue? It is one of the 
characteristics of Menippean irony that it uses surface 
incongruities to stimulate the reader to look further, to seek 
the reason for these incongruities. 
But what is it to which Lucian is inviting us to pay 
attention? Since the character of Menippus is the focal point of 
the dialogue, is Lucian asking us to scrutinise carefully his 
claims and attitudes? In Dialogues of the Dead 5, Menippus, by 
simplistic attitudes and rhetorical cliches, had laid himself 
open to the charge of preferring those cliches to reality. And so 
it is here. What, after all, is the gravamen of his attack on the 
philosophers? It is merely that different sects have different 
opinions, and that is not something that can be taken as the 
basis of a serious criticism of philosophy. Menippus is the 
master of the trite and sweeping generalisation -- and not 
Menippus alone, but all of Lucian's satiric personae. 
The episode of Mithrobarzanes is a further example of the 
way in which Lucian distances himself from Menippus. He is, to be 
sure, poking fun at the mystery religions, but some of the irony 
rubs off on Menippus himself. We have already been prepared for 
this in the introduction. Menippus' costume of 'a felt cap, a 
92. 
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lyre and a lion-skin' (c.l)
93 
is as ridiculous as the verse he 
spouts, but the details are not arbitrary. As Bompaire points 
94 
out, they evoke respectively Odysseus, Orpheus and Heracles. 
45 
All three made descents to the underworld, but all call up quite 
different associations. Odysseus evokes epic, Orpheus religion 
and Heracles heroism, legend and, through Aristophanes' Frogs, 
comedy. 
What is the purpose of this bizarre assemblage of allusions? 
Is it here only for comic effect, or as a virtuoso exercise meant 
to evoke our admiration of the author's literary skill? Or is it 
one more of Lucian's warning signs, meant to make us hesitate 
before assenting to any of Menippus' opinions? In fact, it serves 
both ends, and is both an indication of Lucian's essential 
ambiguity and a source of the prevalent misinterpretation of him. 
Of course it was intended to entertain, and no doubt did so as 
well then as it does now. But it was also intended to raise 
questions about the figure of Menippus. Surely his attack on the 
philosophers is too glib, consisting of attitudes too easily 
struck, to be taken altogether seriously? 
Menippus' tendency to multiply the point of the dialogue is 
evident again when, in Hades, he pays most attention to the fate 
of the wealthy, dwelling in detail on Minos' harsh judgement upon 
them. After his review of the inhabitants of Hades in which he 
concludes that all are alike in death (c.l5), he breaks into an 
elaborate metaphor in which human life is compared to a pageant 




For a brief space she lets them use their costumes, 
but when the time of the pageant is over, each 
gives back the properties and lays off the costume 
along with his body, becoming what he was before 
95 
his birth, no different from his neighbour (c.16). 
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This is drawn straight from the rhetorical textbooks and the 
cliches of the Cynic diatribe, as are the similar examples at 
Icaromenippus 17 and Charon 18-19. Are we to take this as 
Lucian's own point of view or should our opinion of the 
characterisation of Menippus cause us to ponder on its 
truthfulness and appropriateness? In all probability, we are 
intended to question not so much the sentiments expressed as the 
manner of their expression. 
After these peregrinations and digressions, Menippus is 
recalled to the point of the dialogue, narrates the decree pased 
against the rich, and finally consults TeJresias about what sort 
of life is best and is told: 
The life of the common sort is best, and you will 
act more wisely if you stop speculating about 
heavenly bodies and discussing final causes and 
first causes, and spit your scorn at those clever 
syllogisms, and counting all that sort of thing 
nonsense, make it always your sole object to put 
the present to good use and to hasten on ypur way, 
laughin~6a good deal and taking nothing seriously 
(c.21). 
This answers to Menippus' original reason for going to consult 
the seer, but is so similar to his own attitude that one can see 
the sense in Payne's remark that 'all his efforts teach him only 
97 
what he already knows.' Further, since most of the dialogue 
has been a digression from this central point, Teiresias' 
comments serve to remind us of the essentially episodic nature of 
Menippean narrative, the shifting of the focus of attack from one 
object to another so that what is finally satirised is not just 
the specific people and attitudes listed by Menippus, but the 
characteristic attitude of the persona in thus scattering his 
96. 
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shot and applying to each target the cliches of the textbook and 
the diatribe. 
Icaromenippus is quite clearly a companion piece to this, 
but its structure is a little clearer, so that we can see more 
easily what use Lucian was making of the figure of Menippus. In 
relation to this piece, Bompaire makes some valuable remarks, 
contrasting its nonsense form and edifying foundation. He traces 
the rise of this type of dialogue to the collapse of 
philosophical dialogue in the Hellenistic era and says: 
sa valeur intellectuelle et morale serait faible et 
beaucoup plus net son role de divertissement, sa 
parente avec la Comedie ancienne, a la fois 
parodique et fantastique ... ce qui dans le 
dialogue socratique est un ~gdre amusant devient 
chez elle une grosse farce. 
These comments are correct as far as they go, but are really only 
a description of Lucian's technique, not an explanation of it. 
Nevertheless, the distinction between the nonsense form and the 
edifying foundation is valuable, although this is less a matter 
of contrast between the two than a a matter of one modifying the 
other, the nonsense form providing an ironic context for the more 
serious matter. 
The structural parallels between Menippus and Icaromenippus 
99 
have been noted by Anderson, who also notes that in 
Icaromenippus, Lucian is simply exploiting a preconceived pattern 
100 
of comic dialogue; he is a 'literary Procrustes'. This point, 
and those mentioned by Bompaire, are integral elements of 
Lucian's satirical technique. The opening dialogue of 
Icaromenippus is similar to that of Menippus , and the attack on 
the philosophers is couched in identical terms (c.4-10). The 
ascent of Olympus through one eagle's and one vulture's wing is 
as improbable as the descent to Hades through the agency of 
98. Bompaire, pp.551-552. 
99. Anderson, 1976, p.140. 




Mithrobarzanes. It is also equally redolent of literary 
associations, in this case Aesop and Icarus, and Trygaeus in 
Aristophanes' Peace. The satirical function is also the same 
that of placing Menippus as a literary figure, the complex and 
contrasting associations of the allusions making us uncertain 
which of his literary forebears Menippus is most supposed to 
recall. We are thus wary of taking anything he may say at face 
value. 
48 
The tour of Hades is replaced by Menippus as episcopos, 
viewing human life from his vantage point in the moon. What he 
sees is a panorama of vice, crime and varied human activity, 
which causes him to produce a rhetorical metaphor similar to that 
at Menippus 16. This time he compares human life to a choir whose 
members sing different tunes (c.l7), and to a swarm of ants 
(c.l9). None of this has much to do with the original purpose of 
his journey, and the fantastic setting makes it difficult for us 
to accept his conclusions. Thus the inter-relation between form 
and setting is much more complex than allowed for by Bompaire. 
With the scenes in Olympus, the episodic nature of the genre 
is again apparent, and the treatment of the gods is similar to 
that of Mithrobarzanes. In the walk with Zeus and the hearing of 
prayers, Menippus must accept everything at face value, but 
Lucian hardly expects us to do likewise. Zeus' perplexity at 
being expected to provide beneficial replies to mutually 
contradictory prayers is one of Lucian's criticisms of 
contemporary religion, but it is not expressed by Menippus, whose 
presence in Olympus is merely a pretext for this. criticism. 
Finally, Zeus' attack on the philosophers, made from a 
different standpoint from that of Menippus, is similar in tone, 
as was that of the moon earlier. But if a personified heavenly 
body and a father of gods whose existence we cannot take 
literally can make this kind of criticism, does that not 
seriously compromise Menippus' earlier attack? Does he, as the 
apparent central norm, have any more status than Zeus or Selene? 
Zeus, of course, does not solve Menippus' original difficulty, so 
! ' -
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that we can agree with the editor of the Loeb volume that 'what 
M . b . b k . h' b h' ' 101 en~ppus r~ngs ac ~s not ~ng ut moons ~ne . 
The two dialogues so far discussed are essentially narratives 
with a dialogue frame, and connected to these by reason of its 
location in Hades is a more 'genuine' dialogue, The Downward 
Journey Q£ The Tyrant. Unlike the other two, it is not centred on 
a single protagonist, although many of the attitudes expressed 
are of the same order as those discussed above. Apart from the 
obvious debt to Aristophanes' Frogs, it contains elements 
indebted to the comic agon and the rhetorical law-suit, and the 
combination of these with elements from Old Comedy and dialogue 
reminds us that the formal base of the Menippean satire is 
thoroughly eclectic. 
The 'ethical' centre of the dialogue is the satire on the 
tyrant Megapenthes, who comes up with a variety of reasons for 
having his doom reversed and being allowed to stay on earth a 
little longer. The point of the dialogue is summed up neatly and 
wittily when, in reply to his question 'Who shall dare to pass 
102 
judgement on a tyrant?', Hermes says: 'On a tyrant, no-one, 
but on a dead man, Rhadamanthus' (c.13) .
103 
In opposition to the 
tyrant, the cobbler Micyllus is only too glad to have died and to 
have joined Megapenthes in Hades, where both will have equal rank 
(c .15) . 
Although this dialogue contains no eiron who will in his 
turn be ironised, it does contain several elements that suggest 
that this, too, is a debate whose basic terms are literary and 
rhetorical. For one thing, as Harmon points out, it is unusual 
for the Fates to be assigned functions in the underworld. 
104 
Further, the businesslike tone adopted by Charon in lamenting 
that Hermes' delay in bringing bodies to the ferry means that 'it 
is almost dusk and I haven't earned a single obol yet' (c.1),
105 
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is an indication that the mythological setting is not to be taken 
seriously. 
The description of the tyrant and his deeds is entirely 
conventional, in spite of the characteristically humorous tone in 
which it is treated. In the same way, Micyllus' description of 
the joys of poverty when compared to the woes of the tyrant 
(c.l5) is indebted entirely to literary and rhetorical sources. 
By setting this debate in a highly improbable Hades and by 
endowing it with a comic tone and absurd ending, it seems that 
Lucian is implying that debates couched in such conventional 
terms are a futile exercise. It is not that Lucian is necessarily 
disagreeing with any of the sentiments expressed; what he 
disapproved of was the type of expression given to them, the 
pretence that this type of debate was in any way an original or 
valuable contribution to human thought and culture. 
We can now see that Lucian's technique in these dialogues 
was to satirise his own b~tes noires in terms that were as 
conventional as those of any sophist, while simultaneously 
distancing himself from the almost platitudinous conventionality 
of their expression. The same technique can be seen at work i~ 
Charon Q£ The Inspectors and in The Dream Q£ The Cock. 
Charon covers much of the same ground as the dialogues 
already discussed. It includes the two underworld characters of 
Charon and Hermes, and, like the other two dialogues, uses an 
elaborate rhetorical simile. Here again we find edifying material 
enclosed in a comic frame and set in an ironic context, while the 
piling of Ossa upon Pelion performs a similar function to the 
bird feathers of Icaromenippus. This is the functional sine~ 
llQll of what follows, while simultaneously being so absurd in 
itself that it is necessary only to recall the physical situation 
of Hermes and Charon in order to adjust one's expectations of the 
value of their discourse. 
The world portrayed is that of the sixth century B. C. as 
recorded by Herodotus, and the stale and weary exempla add force 
to the equally unreal reflections of Charon and Hermes. 
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Hermes lists the ills that attend mortal life and the folly of 
men's not reflecting on what fate finally awaits them. Charon 
supplies a Cynic simile comparing the life of man to bubbles in a 
stream, some of which burst quickly, others over a longer period. 
After more reflections on the futile activities of men and a 
brief survey of famous cities fated to extinction, Charon 
concludes: 
How silly are the ways of unhappy mankind, with 
their kings, golden ingots, funeral rites and 
battles-- but never a thought of Charon! (c.24) . 106 
As in other dialogues, everything points to the ethical 
discussion in Charon having been placed in an ironical context in 
order to devalue it. This is even more apparent in The Dream~ 
The Cock, where the technique approaches something akin to 
schematisation. The Loeb editor calls this piece a 'Cynic sermon 
107 
in praise of poverty' , a description whose inadequacy can be 
seen by reflecting that the 'sermon' occupies just six of the 
dialogue's thirty-three sections. This discrepancy has been noted 
by Anderson, who concludes that much of the material in the 
108 
dialogue is superfluous to the plot. In a later article, 
Anderson expands on this by suggesting that Lucian puts his Old 
Comic material first and last, so as to leave the middle for a 
virtuoso display of moralising, and that 'he is simply putting 
the more inventive and memorable parts of his creations in the 
right place from the audience's point of view' . 109 The analysis 
of other dialogues suggests that this disparity may not be as 
inartistic as a bare statement of the facts suggests, and that 
the sheer bulk of the 'superfluous' material means that Lucian 
was now so confident of his technique that he could give full 
'2/'? \ / ' / I 
106. ota ecr~t ~a ~rov KaKooat~ovrov avepronrov npay~~a-
,.... / .-. ' / A / I' ~'., pacrtAetcr, nAtv9ot xpucrat, ent~U~pta, ~xar Xaprovocr u~ 
o~oe\cr A6yocr. 
107. Lucian, vol.2, p.171. 
108. Anderson, 1976, p.l45. 




reign to his talent for comic invention and leave the 'meaning' 
of his dialogue to look after itself. 
52 
The credibility of everything in the dialogue depends, of 
course, on our acceptance of the wildly comic and implausible 
talking cock, and it is necessary to remember throughout that the 
Cynic sentiments are spoken by this creature. As for the fact of 
a talking cock, he himself cites excellent classical precedents, 
mainly from Homer. If we take Homer seriously why not Lucian's 
talking cock? Even more astonishing, the cock claims to be a 
reincarnation of Pythagoras (c.4). Well might we say with 
Micyllus 'This story is not quite plausible or easy to believe 
... ' (c.4) .
110 
Yet if the doctrine of transmigration can be taken 
seriously, what is inherently improbable in the master coming 
back in this form? 
The fantasy element in the cock's adventures in his various 
incarnations is integrally related to the advice he gives to his 
master, since it is on the basis of his experience in so many 
lives that he can talk with authority on the relative happinesss 
of rich and poor. Micyllus is forced to agree that the life of 
the poor is indeed better and more carefree than that of the 
rich, although he still requires to be shown that he is better 
off than his wealthy neighbour (c.27-28). 
The ironic setting of this short sermon raises the question 
of whether everything in the dialogue is tainted with the irony 
applied to Homer and Pythagoras. That Lucian was capable of 
writing diatribe in a serious vein can be seen from On Funerals 
and On Sacrifices. Clearly, Lucian was applying to this sermon 
the same irony as he elsewhere applied to Menippus and other 
personae. The content of what the cock says may be 'correct', but 
its expression is so stereotyped that it has lost all power to 
move or persuade. Once again we can see that there are two 
possible ways of reading Lucian and that while neither 
necessarily excludes the other, one is more inclusive and capable 
of being made yet more complex and flexible in the hands of a 
more subtle and penetrating intellect. 
) \ \ A ) \ / "" e./ 





It is one of the disadvantages of Lucian's use of the jargon 
of contemporary culture that it prevented him from realising the 
full potential of the form he had created, and perhaps nowhere is 
this more apparent than in the two dialogues dealing with the 
classical philosophers. The first of these, Philosophies For 
Sale, may be based on a Sale of Diogenes attributed to Menippus.
111 
It consists of representatives of various philosophical sects 
being auctioned off by Hermes and Zeus. Neither the circumstances 
of the auction nor the involvement of the two gods are explained 
by Lucian, nor, indeed, is there any explanation of how so many 
people who were far from being contemporaries have come to be 
gathered together in this fashion. Immediately we are faced with 
a series of those surface incongruities that are a mark of 
Lucian's style. If we accept this, then the sale itself appears 
less fantastic, and if we keep the setting constantly in mind 
as we are virtually compelled to do -- then it has its effect on 
the way in which we view proceedings. 
The representatives of the various creeds are presented by 
the minimum amount of their philosophy needed to identify them, 
the Stoic alone being dealt with in any detail. Lucian is dealing 
in caricature rather than exposition. His attitudes to all these 
sects can be paralleled, in other works, and here he is openly 
proclaiming the satirist's superiority to the philosophical 
schools in terms that imply that he does not consider the matter 
to be of much consequence. The usual Menippean preference for 
practice over theory
112 
is strengthened by his distrust of the 
shallow way in which such matters were commonly debated in his 
time. 
Even so, there are good grounds for the belief that his own 
knowledge of philosophy was not especially extensive: his one 
attempt to deal relatively seriously with the subject in 
Hermotimus is by no means an unqualified success, and for one who 
111. Lucian, vol.2, p.449. 






professed himself ~o be a lover of philosophy, it is anomalous to 
treat the topic in the same manner which he uses for such canards 
as the Olympian gods. This impression is strengthened by The Dead 
Come ...1.Q t,.jfe Q£ The Fishermap, his 'apology' for the previous 
piece. The framing of the serious matter of the dialogue between 
comic scenes, and the use of surface incongruities such as the 
behaviour of the philosophers are familiar aspects of his 
technique. Here, however, they serve to throw doubt on his claim 
to be a genuine lover of philosophy, and this suspicion is 
reinforced when we find that his defence is composed of clich~s 
of the same type as he so often satirised in others. 
In effect, Lucian was trapped by his participation in a 
culture he so evidently despised. Having created the new genre of 
the comic dialogue, he was an insufficiently profound thinker to 
bring it to its full potential. This is shown in the dialogue 
Zeus Catechized, which centres on the issue of free will and 
predestination. It is an amusing exposure of a crudely 
reductivist view of predestination, but never manages to suggest 
that the problem can be posed in other than sterile rhetorical 
terms. The unexplained presence of Cyniscus in Heaven indicates 
that Lucian is merely playing with traditional concepts of the 
gods, and that the terms of the debate have little reality for 
him. The absurdity of the traditional conception of the gods 
seems so self-evident to him that both Stoics and their Cynic and 
Epicurean opponents are taking part in a sterile debate couched 
in the clich~s of the handbook. As often, the form and setting 
chosen by Lucian allow him to lend apparent support to the Cynic 
viewpoint while subtly underlining the shallowness of culture 
which allows a debate to be conducted in such terms. 
In the course of the debate, Zeus agrees with Cyniscus that 
the Fates control eveything, including the actions of the gods 
(c.4). In that case, why do men sacrifice to the gods? Zeus 
responds by accusing Cyniscus of getting his questions from the 
sophists, and the reply that 'they did not put me up to ask you 
this, but our talk itself as it went on led somehow or other to 
55 
the conclusion that sacrifices are superfluous' (c.6),
113 
is 
deliberately disingenuous. For both his questions and his method 
are sophistic and Lucian is drawing our attention to the fact to 
ensure that while we may sympathise with Cyniscus in the 
argument, we are also aware of his limitations. The rest of the 
debate follows similar lines as Cyniscus easily overthrows any 
argument Zeus can bring against him -- so easily, in fact, that 
we wonder whether his questioning is as spontaneous as he claims. 
The frequent references by Zeus to Cyniscus as a sophist have a 
double function. On the one hand, they show that Zeus is 
conscious of the weakness of his position when it is exposed to 
critical examination. On the other hand, the term 'sophist' was 
not one of approbation in Lucian, and Cyniscus is to be judged by 
what Lucian thought of sophists in general. In spite of the 
superficial correctness of his arguments, he is a creature of 
rhetoric, with the result that the debate is academic, not vital. 
There is no real meeting of minds in this or any of Lucian's 
dialogues. They display attitudes towards various problems 
without enquiring deeply into them. 
The related dialogue Zeus Rants is much more clearly 
ironical. The opening prose/verse mixture does more than merely 
point to possible literary antecedents: it at once establishes 
Zeus as a purely poetic conception so that whatever the content 
of the following dialogue may be, we are from the outset 
disinclined to believe in these gods. 
The substance of the debate is the same as in Zeus 
Catechized, whether or not the gods are still to be honoured 
(c.3). A debate between the Stoic Timocles and the Epicurean 
Damis on Providence, suspended from the previous day, is about to 
recommence, and the gods are naturally interested in its outcome. 
An assembly of the gods is called, but, curiously, it is their 
statues who attend. This is a splendid piece of irony on Lucian's 
' I,, I I ' ... / , I t \ 6 • \ 
113.oux un EKEtvrov avanetcr9etcr ~au~a cre ~pro~~cra, o oe A yocr au~ocr 
J 1 ~} tl < ,... •• ' t "' ' I A \ "!' ' ouK otu onrocr ~~tv npotrov Etcr ~ou~o anEp~, nept~~acr Etvat ~acr 
eucrtacr. 
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part since it ensures that the unreality of the gods is before 
our eyes even as they discuss that very issue! As Coenen puts it: 
Die Gleichsetzung der dotter mit ihren Statuen ist 
nicht nur als Polemik gegen die Verehrung der 
Gotterbilder zu verstehen. Vielmehr soll damit wohl 
eine weit radikalere Folgerung nachgelegt werden; 
Diese Getter sind tatsachlich mit ihren Statuen 
identisch; sie haben keine i~~ere Existenzweise; 
d.h. sie sind Menschenwerk. 
As if that were not irony enough, Lucian has Momus prefigure 
almost the whole of Damis' argument. He then represents the gods 
as being incapable of deciding how to respond to their dangerous 
situation. Their impotence is demonstrated even before the debate 
resumes. This use of structural irony suggests that the entire 
affair is academic. 
If evidence is needed that Lucian is being ironical at the 
expense not merely of a particular argument, but of the whole 
rhetorical tradition, it is found in an examinatio;Xthe arguments 
of both protagonists. Timocles' argument from the order of nature 
in c.38 is by no means original with him, most of his points 
b . f d . f 1 . , d 
115 
e~ng oun 1n, or examp e, C1cero s De natura eorum. 
Damis' attack on the poets (c.40) and his reference to the 
'consensus gentium' have an equally long history. Both men are 
indebted to a sterile rhetorical tradition, and although Damis is 
allowed to 'win' the argument, his particular arguments are no 
more profound or original than those of his opponent. In this, as 
in other dialogues, the irony has a double focus. Within the 
debate it is directed chiefly against Timocles. The debate, 
however, occupies only the latter half of the dialogue, and is 
set in an ironic context which includes the arguments of both 
protagonists as well as the idea of the debate itself. 
114. Lukian: Zeus tragoedus, edited by Jurgen Coenen, 
Beitrage zur Klassischen Philologie, 88 (Weisennheim am 
Glan, 1977), pp.53-54. 
115. A list of parallels can be found in Coenen's notes on this 
section. 
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There is one further Lucianic dialogue requiring discussion, 
although its inclusion in the canon is still a matter for debate. 
This is The Cynic, a discussion of which is necessary if only 
because More was sufficiently convinced of its authenticity to 
include it in his translations from Lucian. It consists of a 
cynic defending his sect from the criticisms of Lycinus. It lacks 
the elaborate setting of the best of Lucian's dialogues, but 
there is nothing in his ironic deflation of the Cynic that is 
radically inconsistent with his treatment of other personae. In 
response to questions from Lycinus, the Cynic expounds his 
philosophy. He attacks extravagance (c.2), praises the virtues of 
self-sufficiency by proving that his body is in no worse 
condition than that of Lycinus (c.4), praises temperance and 
attacks greed (c.6-10), and finally gives a long explanation of 
the Cynic philosophy. 
There are several elements in this which make one wonder 
whether this Cynic should be taken at face value. The discussion 
about the state of his feet (c.4) seems like a reductio ad 
absurdum; he frequently fails to understand the force of Lycinus' 
objections; under pressure he abandons dialogue in favour of 
monologue; and his final comparison of himself to the gods 
because of his mode of dress reads like comic exaggeration. In 
sum, the Cynic unwittingly portrays himself as an arrogant 
boaster, a philosophus gloriosus, and has at least that much in 
common with other Lucianic personae. If this dialogue is not by 
Lucian, it was certainly written by a competent imitator. 
Lucian is not the mere entertainer for whom he is so often 
mistaken. He shared much -- perhaps too much -- in common with 
the sophists and cultural showmen of his time, but possessed a 
spirit of critical independence which others lacked. His 
dissatisfaction with the vulgarity of much of what passed for 
culture in his age led him to create a new literary form. His 
creation of the genre of comic dialogue was in the best spirit of 
the classical tradition, and allowed him to express his 







personae appear in carefully created ironic contexts, and neither 
they nor their opinions can be isolated from those contexts 
without incurring the risk of misrepresentation. 
The brilliance and wit of his writing drew attention to the 
propositions put forward by his personae, and all too often, 
their opinions and attitudes have been mistaken for those of 
their creator. Erasmus, for example, seems to have been drawn to 
the moral commonplaces expressed by the Lucianic personae, while 
More was attracted by the way in which the full range of Lucianic 
irony could be used to create a simulacrum of intellectual and 
creative detachment. Their different ways of reading Lucian led 
them to create works of their own which, while being Lucianic in 
spirit, are utterly different in their final effect . 
'' 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE FIRST ACQUAINTANCE: TRANSLATIONS OF LUCIAN 
Lucian was one of the most popular classical authors in the 
Renaissance, with more than 270 printings of both the authentic 
and spurious works made before 1550.
1 
The first edition of the 
complete Greek text was published at Florence in 1496, with that 
of Aldus Manutius appearing in Venice in 1503.
2 
It was after the 
publication of this edition that Lucian became widely known north 
3 
of the Alps. 
Among those who made translations from Lucian were Thomas 
More and Erasmus, whose joint volume of translations appeared 
from the press of Badus Ascensius at Paris in 1506. It was partly 
these translations which helped to introduce Lucian to a wider 
audience.
4 
Later eminent translators included Pirckheimer, 
Melanchthon, Ulrich von Rutten, Hans Sachs and Peter Mosellanus.
5 
No doubt Erasmus and More were not single-handedly responsible 
for this interest in Lucian, although Erasmus' translations were 
1. C. R. Thompson, 'The translations of Lucian by Erasmus and 
St. Thomas More', Revue Belge de Philologie et histoire, 18 
(1939), 855-881 (i.e. 1-27), p.4; 19 (1940), 5-35 (i.e. 28-
58) . 
2. The Complete Works of St. Thomas More, vol.3, Part 1, 
Translations of Lucian, edited by C. R. Thompson (New Haven 
and London, 1974), p.xxli. 
3. Ibid., p.xxviii. n.2. 
4. C. R. Thompson, 1939, p.15. 
5. Christopher Robinson, Introduction to Luciani dialogi in 
Opera omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami, Recognita et 
adnotatione critica instructa notisque illustrata, Ordinis 
Primi, Tomus Primus, North-Holland Publishing Company 




reprinted more than forty times between 1506 and 1550 --
occasionally with those of More, occasionally in an incomplete 
edition. 
6 
But in England at least, and within the More circle in 
particular, the influence of their translations is easily 
traceable. More himself was the first Englishman to translate 
Lucian into Latin, and his were the first printed versions by an 
Englishman. They were reprinted in his lifetime more frequently 
than any of his other writings, at least nine times before 1535.
7 
Within the More circle, his brother-in-law, John Rastell, 
printed and probably wrote an English translation of Menippus. 8 
Sir Thomas Elyot is the possible author of an English translation 
9 
of Cynicus dated c.1530. and evidence for its having been 
translated from More's Latin is the naming of the Cynic's 
' 1 ' h h ' 10 1 1 ~nter ocutor as Luc~an rat er t an Lyc~nus. E yot may a so 
have been the author of a dialogue entitled Hermathena, dated 
' 15°2 h' h ' ' ' ' f ' 11 o , w ~c ~s an ~m~tat~on o Luc~an. 
The influence of Lucian, though not specifically of More's 
translations, can be seen in the plays of John Heywood, the 
husband of More's niece, Joan Rastell. Of The Play of the Four 
PP's Pearl Hogrefe writes that it 'has qualities of Lucian--
imagination, fantasy, satire, other humorous details and lively 
dialogue ... in developing it, John Heywood writes in the spirit 
of Lucian ... ' .
12 
Further, a passage from Lucian's Icaromenippus 
6. Ibid., pp.365-366. 
7. CW 3.1, p.xxv. 
8. Pearl Hogrefe, The Sir Thomas More Circle: & Program of Ideas 
and Their Impact QU Secular Drama (Urbana, Illinois, 1959), 
p.298. 
9. J. K. McConica, English Humanists and Reformation Politics 
Under Henry VIII and Edward VI (Oxford, 1965), p.123. · 
10. Alistair Fox, Thomas More: History and Providence (Oxford, 
1982), p.36. 
11. McConica, p.122. 





is generally recognised as the source of The Play of the Weather, 
14 
evidence of a similarity of taste in More, Erasmus and Heywood. 
It is, then, evident that the interest of More and Erasmus 
in Lucian had a substantial role to play in spreading his 
influence in Northern Europe and England. Their translations 
would be important for that reason alone, even had they not 
influenced their own original works in certain significant ways; 
and it is with that which we are now concerned. 
Erasmus was acquainted with Lucian as early as 1499, when 
he referred to A True History (Allen I, 88/27-28). An early 
attempt to translate Gout was abandoned, with Erasmus being 
'strongly deterred by the epithets with which the choruses 
abound; I had no hope of imitating in Latin the felicity we find 
. h k . , 15 . . 1 . d f , 1 ~n t e Gree express~ons s~m~ ar ev~ ence or More s ear y 
interest is lacking, although he had at least begun to learn 
Greek by 1501.
16 
By 1505, the date of Erasmus' second visit to 
England, both men were proficient in Greek, and the project of a 
joint volume of translations was decided upon. Which of the two 
first suggested the project is uncertain, and the reference by 
Erasmus -- 'I began to write Latin declamations at the urging of 
17 
Thomas More' -- should probably be taken as referring only to 
the writing of declamations in reply to The Tyrannicide.
18 
At 
any rate, the volume which eventually appeared contained, besides 
13. Ibid., p.305. 
14. Ibid., p.309. 
15. potissimurn deterritus epithetis, quibus abundant chori; in 
quibus non erat spes in Latinis assequi compositionis 
felicitatem, quam videmus in Graecis dictionibus (Allen I, 
p.7/1-3). . 
16. C. R. Thompson, 1940, p.40. 
17. 'Latine declamare coepi, idque impulsore Toma Moro' (Allen 
I, 191/3; IV, 21/254-256). 
18. CW 3.1, p.xxviii, n.2. 
. ' 
. ~ 
these declamations, four translations by More and, by Erasmus, 
translations of ten full-length pieces, and eighteen of the 
' ' d' 1 19 mlnlature la ogues. 
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It is convenient to deal with Erasmus first, since his 
attitude to Lucian is demonstrably quite different from that of 
More, and because More, in his prefatory letter, pretends to be 
reading Lucian in the same way as his fellow translator. Erasmus' 
comments on Lucian are contained principally in the various 
prefaces he wrote for the edition of 1506, and his way of reading 
seems odd, occas.ionally even perverse, until it is realised that 
it is of a piece with his general views on literature. In 
particular, what he says of Lucian, and the way in which he can 
be shown to have read him, must be taken alongside his views on 
literature as set out in De ratione studii (1511), Institutio 
principia Christiani (1516) and De pueris instituendis (1529) . 
Although all of these are dated later than the prefaces to 
Lucian, they reveal a consistently held view of literature which 
is of crucial importance in helping us to understand his approach 
to the Greek ironist. 
What is common to the first of these two works and to the 
prefaces to Lucian is an interpretation of the Horatian maxim 
utile et dulce in which the element of utility -- primarily of 
moral utility -- is of paramount importance. The pull towards 
didacticism and its relationship to irony and satire will be of 
importance in determining the relationship of The Praise of Folly 
to Enchiridion, and can be seen clearly in these pedagogic works. 
In De ratione studii, a disquisition on the method of teaching 
literature to schoolboys, Erasmus writes that, in reading a text, 
one should pay attention to the relevant parts of the passage 
under discussion, and point out the pleasure and benefit to be 
drawn from a particular author (CWE 24, 682/20). After paying 
attention to relevant linguistic points, the teacher 
19. Thompson, 1939, pp.15-16; Robinson, p.370. 
should turn to philosophy and skilfully bring out 
the implications of the poets' stories or employ 
them as patterns ... And so it will come about 
(assuming mental agility on the teacher's part) 
that if some passage is encountered which may 
corrupt the young, far from harming their morals it 
may confer some benefit, namely by concentrating 
their attention, partly on annotation of the 
pasaae, partly on loftier thoughts (CWE 24, 683/17-
25). zu ' 
He then provides an interpretation of Virgil's second 
Eclogue, which he calls 'a symbolic picture of an ill-formed 
friendship (CWE 24, 686/26-27), and concludes by saying 
If, then, he prefaces his remarks in this way, and 
thereupon shows the passages which indicate the 
boorish and mistaken affections of Corydon, I 
believe the minds of his audience will suffer no 
ill-effects, unless somebody comes to the work who
21 
has already been corrupted (CWE 24, 686/34-687/3). 
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This may be a legitimate method of interpretation, but it was not 
what Virgil intended. His eclogue seems, rather, to be a 
complaint about unrequited love, but because of his determination 
that literature should contain uplifting moral truths, Erasmus 
cannot countenance such an interpretation. 
Similar comments are found in Institutio principis 
Christiani, a,treatise on the correct way of educating a prince. 
Literature has a role to play in this. Because of the dangers to 
20. 'Postremo ad philosophiam veniat, et poetarum fabulas 
apte trahat ad mores, vel tanquam exempla, ... Atque ita 
fiet (si modo sit ingenii dextri praeceptor), vt etiam 
si quid inciderit quod inficere possit aetatem illam, 
non solum non officiat moribus, verumetiam vtilitatem 
aliquam adferat, videlicet animis partim ad annotationem 
intentis, partim ad altiores cogitationes auocatis' 
(Opera omnia I.2, 138/6-139/5). 
21. 'Haec, inquam, si praefetur, tum autem locos 
demonstratorios perperam et bucolice a rustico 
affectatos indicet, nihil opinor turpe veniet in mentem 
auditoribus, nisi si quis iam corruptus accesserit' 
(Opera omnia I.2, 142/13-15). 
J' 
I - .. 
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which he is exposed by his exalted position, 'the prince must be 
more sincerely strengthened by the best of principles and the 
22 
precedents of praiseworthy princes' (Inst., 146). These 
principles 'must be impressed, crammed in, inculcated, and in one 
way and another kept before him, now by a suggestive thought, now 
by a fable, now by analogy, now by example, now by maxims, now by 
a proverb' (Inst., 144-145) .
23 
A comment on Aesop's fables shows 
the relationship of utile to dulce in Erasmus: 
When the little fellow has listened with pleasure 
to Aesop's fable of the lion and the mouse or the 
of the dove and the ant, and when he has finished 
his laugh, then the teacher should point out the 
new moral: the first fable teaches the prince to 
despise no one, but to seek zealously to win to 
himself by kindnesses the heart of even the lowest 
peasant, for no one is so weak that on occasion he 
may be a friend to help you, or an enemy to harm 
you, even though ¥~u be the most powerful 
(Inst., 146-147). 
The same type of interpretation can be applied to the fable of 
the eagle and the beetle, the story of Phaethon, and the tale of 
Ulysses' blinding of the Cyclops (Inst., 148). In the course of 
this instruction, 'If there are any stories that seem too coarse, 
the teacher should polish and smooth them over with a winning 
22. 'Quo diligentius erit optimis decretis, laudatorum principum 
exemplis aduersus haec praemuniendus' (Opera omnia IV.1, 
141/176-177). 
23. '··· infigenda sunt, infulcienda sunt, inculcanda sunt et 
alia atque alia forma renouanda memoriae, nunc sententia nunc 
fabella nunc simili nunc exemplo nunc apophthegmate nunc 
proverbio;' (Opera omnia IV .1, 140/144-146) . 
24. 'Vbi libenter audierit puellus Aesopicum apologum de 
leone muris beneficia vicissim seruato, de columba 
formicae opera incolumi, vbi satis arriserit, tum 
praeceptor adiiciet earn fabellam ad principem attinere, 
ne quem omnino despiciat, sed infimiae quoque plebis 
animas sibi benefactis studeat adiungere, quod nemo sit 
adeo imbecillis, quin et per occasionem prodesse queat 
amicus et nocere inimicus idque potentissimis etiam' 
(Opera omnia IV.1, 142/189-194). 
( 
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manner of speech' 25 (Inst., 148). This is the method Erasmus had 
used in his interpretation of Virgil, and it suggests that in the 
interests of inculcating moral principles, it may on occasion be 
necessary to distort the literal sense of a passage. In a similar 
vein he states in De pueris instituendis: 
Is there anything a boy would rather listen to than 
Aesop's fables, which present serious moral lessons 
in the guise of humorous sketches? The stories told 
by other ancient authors offer similar benefits. 
When a child hears how Ulysses' comrades were 
changed by Circe's magic into swine he will find 
the story amusing, but he also learns one of the 
basic principles of philosophy, that persons who 
refuse to be guided by the dictates of right reason 
but instead allow themselves to be swept along by 
the whims of the passions are not truly human but 
are only brutes. Could a Stoic sage proclaim this 
truth more seriously? Yet here it is t~~ght by a 
story designed to amuse (CWE 26, 336) . 
And: 
25. 
The essence of comedy is portrayal of character, 
but it leaves an impression even on children and 
the uneducated; here, too, an immense amount of 
moral tea~9ing is imparted by means of humour (CWE 
26, 336). 
'Si qua videbantur acerbiora, ea formator orationis 
iucunditate leniat atque edulcet' (Opera omnia IV.1, 142/211-
212) . 
26. 'Quid libentius audiat puer quam apologos Aesopicos, 
qui tamen per risum iocumque tradunt seria praecepta 
philosophiae, qui fructus est in caeteris veterum 
poetarum fabulis. Audit puer socios Vlyssis arte Circes 
versos in sues aliasque formas animantium. Ridetur 
narratio, et tamen interim discit puer, quod in morali 
philosophia praecipuum est, eos qui non gubernantur 
recta ratione, sed affectuum arbitrio rapiuntur, non 
homines esse, sed beluas. Quid Stoicus diceret grauius? 
Et tamen idem docet ridicula fabula' (Opera omnia I.2, 
66/21-28) . 
27. 'Quid comoedia dulcius? quae quum ~eecrt constet, mouet 
et imperitos et pueros. At hie quanta philosophiae pars 





Further, he writes: 'Yet there's nothing which prevents 
usefulness from going hand in hand with pleasure, and integrity 
with enjoyment' (CWE 26, 338) . 
28 
66 
In these three treatises, written over a period of eighteen 
years, is found essentially the same view of literature. The 
method is neither individual to, nor original with, Erasmus. Its 
essential elements can be traced back to the patristic tradition 
of Scriptural exegesis.
29 
The principal Erasmian text for this 
is De ratione concionandi. Here he explains that there are four 
senses to be distinguished in the classification of writing, and 
these he names the literal, the allegorical, the tropological and 
the anagogica1.
30 
Definitions are provided for the use of 
teachers: tropology is close to the literal sense, applying 
scripture to the morals to be taught; allegory accommodates the 
text to Christ and the Church Militant; anagogy transports one 
from here_to the Church Triumphant, beyond which there is nothing 
31 
further. Erasmus is at his best in interpreting the mora~ 
32 
sense. 
Further light is shed on the exegetical method in St. 
Augustine's De doctrina Christiana. This was written to expound 
the correct method for interpreting Scripture, but many of its 
ideas are demonstrably comparable to the way in which Erasmus 
read secular literature. Not that he did so with this work in 
mind, but he was working within the exegetical tradition which 
Augustine had helped to form. For the humanists, as for the 
patristic writers, there were difficulties involved in the use of 
classical authors who, in spite of their not having the benefit 
28. 'Nihil autem vetat quo minus voluptati comes sit vtilitas et 
iucunditati iuncta sit honestas' (Opera omnia I.2, 69/8-9) . 
29. Sr. Geraldine Thompson, Under Pretext of Praise: Satiric 
Mode in Erasmus' Fiction (Toronto, 1973), p.24. 
30. Ibid., pp.26-27. 
31. Ibid., p.27. 
32. Ibid., p.28. 
of the Christian revelation, often expressed profound and 
significant moral truths. Augustine deals directly with this 
problem: 
If those who are called the philosophers, 
especially the Platonists, have said things which 
are indeed true, and are well accommodated to our 
faith, they should not be feared; rather, what they 
have said should be taken from them ~~ unjust 
possessors and converted to our use. 
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There was, then, excellent precedent for Erasmus' extraction of 
these truths from the pagan writers and their application as 
Christian maxims to contemporary circumstances. 
Further justification for the Erasmian method could be found 
in Augustine's distinction between literal and figurative 
meanings in a text: 
There is a miserable servitude of the spirit in 
this taking of signs for things, so that one is not 
able to raise the eye of the mind above things that 
are co3~oreal and created to drink in eternal 
light. 
Thus the literal acceptance of certain passages in the classical 
authors is not only not necessary, but may obscure a figurative 
meaning of far more profound significance. This is so even in 
Scripture itself, in which there are many passages of seemingly 
vicious meaning. These, however, are said to be figurative: 
33. 'Philosophi autem vocantur, si qua ... vera et fidei 
nostra accornrnodata dixerunt, maxime Platonici, non solum 
formidanda non sunt, sed ab eis etiam tanquam injustis 
possessoribus in usum nostrum vindicanda/ (III.60.2). 
English translations are taken from Saint Augustine, On 
Christian Doctrine, translated by D. W. Robertson Jr. 
(New York, 1958). 
34. 'Ea demurn est miserabilia animi servitus, signa pro 
rebus accipere; et supra creaturam corpoream, oculum 
mentis ad hauriendum aeternurn lumen levare non posse' 
(ibid. III.v.9). 
i . 
Those things which seem shameful to the 
inexperienced, whether simply spoken or actually 
performed by the person of God or by men whose 
sanctity is commended to us, are all figurative, 
and their secrets are to be removed as k~5nels from 
the husk for the nourishment of charity. 
This is clearly reminiscent of the passage from Virgil's 
second eclogue and the method of its explication. Erasmus has 
taken from Augustine both a justification of the use of pagan 
authors as teachers of moral truths, and a method of obviating 
any difficulties that arise from such a use of classical texts. 
68 
There is clearly a set purpose in his sifting out the 
allegorical and moral meaning of a text, and it will be seen that 
in the application of such a method, the ironical context of a 
passage is not of prime importance. This raises the question of 
the purpose of irony, satire and literature in general: 
For Erasmus, certainly, all satire, perhaps all 
fictional writing, is just as good as, and no 
better than, its capacity ~~ effect or sustain good 
thoughts and godly living. 
37 
The urge to better his fellow men is paramount, and irony 
gives way to the direct statement or direct exhortation. Such a 
view can be exemplified by a study of his prefaces to his 
translations of Lucian, which show clearly that 
in the early Erasmus, the Erasmus who is the 
companion of More, the vein of Lucianic satire 
38 
cannot be dissociated from the reforming motive. 
35. 'Quae autem quasi flagitiosa imperitis videntur, sive 
tantum dicta, sive etiam facta aunt, vel ex Dei persona 
vel ex hominum quorum nobis sanctitas commendatur, tota 
figurata aunt: quorum ad charitatis pastum enucleanda 
secreta sunt (ibid.III.l2.18). 
36. Sr. G. Thompson, p.5. 
37. Ibid., p.6. 
38. McConica, p.15. 
! 
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'It is not possible to read them and mistake the work for a 
purely literary exercise' 39 They have explicit application to 
contemporary religious decay. Nor is it accidental that in the 
catalogue which he compiled in 1523-1524, he assigned his 
translations of Lucian to those works which concern literature 
and education, and also to a fourth volume consisting of works 
which contribute to the building of character (Allen I, p.38/26-
39; p.39/33-35). 
He seems to have had three types for reasons for venturing 
on these translations. In the first place, it was a useful 
exercise for improving his Greek: 'I was forced to become my own 
teacher, to translate many pamphlets of Lucian, so that by this 
h d d k . 1 , 
40 h h . met o I rea Gree more attent1ve y . He t oug t Luc1an a 
suitable author for the novice in Greek, because of the grace of 
his language and the attractiveness of his content -- and not its 
attractiveness only, but its mixture of levity and seriousness, 
dulce et utile. 41 
In De ratione studii he recommends Lucian as a author whose 
refined diction and charming subject-matter make him especially 
suitable for using to teach Greek to schoolboys (CWE 24, 669/5-
6) . On both stylistic and linguistic grounds, Lucian is 
particularly suitable for the beginner in Greek, and pre-
eminently suitable for children. He is valued also for his moral 
instruction, and as Robinson writes of Erasmus: 'His own prefaces 
leave us in no doubt that his principle in selecting the 
dialogues was that of 'vtilitas'' .
42 
--even to the point of 
3 9 . Ibid. , p. 16 . 
40. '··· coactus ipse mihi praeceptor esse, verti multos Luciani 
libellos, vel in hunc vsum, ut attentius Graece legerem' 
(Allen I, pp. 7 /24-8/1) . (My translation) . 
41. Robinson, p.365. 










assuming that Astrology must have a moral content, since 'Lucian 
was not accustomed to undertake anything trivial' . 43 
It is primarily the ~dition of 1506 that can be said to 
contain prefatory material of any importance. As a guide to the 
interpretation of Lucian, some of these prefaces present fewer 
problems than others, since such works as Toxaris and Alexander 
lack the structural ironies of the 'Menippean' dialogues, and 
Erasmus easily transfers their moral lessons to evils of his own 
day. Thus Toxaris shows that friendship was 
something so sacred that it was once worshipped 
among the most barbarous nations. It has completely 
fallen into disuse amongst Christians, so that not 
~ust the t~~ces but the essence of the thing exists 
~n no-one. 
H. A. Mason, to be sure, thinks that this indicates a certain 
moral coarseness in Erasmus;
45 
in fact, it indicates an ability 
to draw an uplifting moral from an unedifying source. In a 
similar vein he says of Alexander: 
nobody is more useful for detecting and exposing 
the impostures of those who, even now, impose upon 
people with magical wonders, feigned religion, 
46 
pretended pardons and other tricks of that sort. 




'rem adeo sanctam vt barbarissimis etiam nationibus 
olim fuerit veneranda. Nunc Christianis vsqueado in 
desuetudinem abiit, vt non dicam vestigia, sed ne nomen 
cuidem ipsum extet' (Ooera omnia I.l, 423/20-22). (My 
translation) . 
H. A. Mason, Humanism and Poetry in the Early Tudor Period 
(London, 1959), p.72. 
46. 'nemo sit vtilior ad depraehendendas coarguendasque 
quorundam istorum imposturas, qui nunc quoque vel 
magicis miraculis vel ficta religione, vel adsimulatis 
condonationibus aliisque id genus praestigiis, vulgo 
fucum facere solent' (Opera omnia I.1, 449/7-10). (My 
translation) . 
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The exegetical procedure is justifiable in these cases, but the 
same method is applied to more problematic pieces such as The 
Dream Q£ The Cock and Timon. In his preface to the first of 
these, Erasmus writes of Lucian that 'he mingles serious matters 
with trifles, trifles with serious matters, so he speaks the 
truth while he laughs and laughs while speaking the truth', 
47 
and takes the opportunity to attack philosophers: 'What is more 
hateful, what is less bearable than dishonesty tricked out in the 
. f . ?' 48 gu~se o v~rtue. In the course of the dialogue, he says, 
Lucian taxes Pythagoras with being an impostor and a cheat, 
laughs at the Stoics, and opposes poverty to riches. Such a view 
of the dialogue is seriously misleading. The mixture of comic and 
serious material is so heavily biased in favour of the comedy 
that to regard it as merely a sugar-coating for a didactic pill 
leads one to suggest that Lucian's artistic procedure in the 
dialogue is seriously flawed. That is not the case, since the 
actual function of the comedy is to cast the 'serious' material 
in an ironic light. 
Yet it is not the case that Erasmus failed to recognise 
Lucian's irony-- rather, he was primarily concerned with the 
moral utility of literature, and its pleasurable elements were a 
means to this end. The same can be said of his comment on Timon: 
'Hardly another dialogue of Lucian is more pleasant or more 
useful to read than this' .
49 
The comment is not amplified, but 
in the light of what has been said about The Dream or The Cock, 
it is likely that Erasmus read Timon as a satire on wealth, 
although the elaborate comic/ironic setting makes such an 
interpretation difficult to sustain. 
47. 'seria nugis, nugas ser~~s miscet; sic ridens vera dicit, 
vera dicendo ridet' (Opera omnia I.l, 471/12-13). (My 
translation) . 
48. 'Quid enim odiosius, quid minus ferendum, quam improbitas 
virtutis professione personata?' (Opera omnia I.1, 471/4-5). 
(My translation) . 
49. '···est Luciani dialogus quo vix alius lectu vel vtilior 
vel iucundior' (Opera omnia I .1, 488/10-11) . (My 
translation) . 
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The attitude to Lucian which Erasmus exhibits in these 
prefaces can also be seen at certain points in the Adagia where 
he quotes from Lucianic texts. In the third Chiliad of the 
completed work there are some forty-six references to or 
quotations from Lucian, most of which, since they do not appear 
in ironic contexts, call for no comment. As is characteristic of 
the Adagia, texts are extracted from longer works to illustrate a 
moral or pedagogic point. 
In Adagia 2331,
50 
he quotes from The Dream~ The Cock to 
show that the cock, as being crested and armed, is sacred to 
Mars. In c.3 of this work Lucian is repeating, in part, a story 
from the Odyssey (8.300-366), but the context in which he repeats 
it and adds the details about Alectryon make it doubtful that he 
intended the tale to be taken wholly seriously. When Ares was 
having his affair with Aphrodite, he used to leave Alectryon 
outside the door to tell him when Helion rose, lest the sun 
should warn Aphrodite's husband, Hephaestus. On one occasio~, 
Alectryon fell asleep, Hephaestus was warned and the lovers 
trapped. The angry Ares then changed Alectryon into a bird. This 
is one of a number of precedents cited by Lucian in order to have 
us suspend our disbelief about the improbability of the dramatic 
situation he has created. Yet in spite of the evident comedy and 
irony of the original, Erasmus' citation of the tale does not 
distort its literal meaning. 
The same can be said of his quotation from Alexander 8 in 
Adagia 2428.
51 
Lucian, in describing the beginnings of the 
rogueries of Alexander and Coconnas, quotes humorously the phrase 
'Here beginneth the war', from the commencement of Thucydides' 
narration of the Peloponnesian War. The comic disparity between 
the two contexts is obvious, and Erasmus' listing of various uses 
to which the quotation has been put does not distort Lucian's 
50. Opera omnia II.5. 
51. Opera omnia II.5. 
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humorous use of it. In a similar vein, in No.2436, he quotes 
from How To Write History another Thucydidean citation used in an 
ironical context-- 'War is the father of all things', including 
the current plethora of historians. Again the comic disparity 
between the two contexts is obvious, although in giving the text 
an interpretation which opposes it to the philosophers' ideas on 
the origins of things, Erasmus makes it serve as a pretext for a 
serious reflection. 
The exegetical method can raise problems of interpretation. 
The citation of Timon at Adagia 2602
53 
to support the idea that 
wealth is 'omnia formidantem nullique fidentem' is itself 
supported by other quotations from Juvenal, Aristophanes and 
Euripides. Yet it is questionable whether Lucian intended his 
elaborate metaphor to be taken wholly seriously. The 
personification of Riches; the detailed description of the 
·conversations of Riches, Hermes and Zeus; the journey to earth; 
Timon's improbable conversion; and the farcical d(nouement all 
serve Lucian's purpose of setting a commonplace literary and 
philosophical topes in an ironical context. The last thing he 
intended was a sermon on the uncertainty of the possession of 
wealth. Yet that is clearly the way in which Erasmus read the 
dialogue. One must begin to question whether his application to 
fiction of the method of Scriptural exegesis is an appropriate 
response to a work of irony. 
The same limitation of the Erasmian method can be seen in 
No. 2702,
54 
where he cites a Homeric quotation-- 'No god am I, 
why liken me to them?' -- in support of a Plutarchian 
moralisation on pride. But its use by Lucian in Icaromenippus is 
quite clearly ironic. Menippus is startled to meet Empedocles in 
the moon, and the philosopher uses the quotation to reasssure 
52. Opera omnia II.5. 
53. Opera omnia II.5. 
54. Opera omnia II.5. 
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him. Unless Erasmus' word 'Usurpatur' to refer to this quotation 
is intended to imply that its context was ironical, then he has 
misinterpreteted the quotation and its context. 
Two more of the Adagia provide even clearer examples of the 
limitations of Erasmus' method when applied to the ironically-
structured dialogues of Lucian. No.2523 is a discussion of the 
phrase 'Paries dealbatus' quoted from Acts 23: 3, an attack on 
Ananias 'because he was much different within from what his 
external appearance proclaimed' . 55 This is supported by 
reference to the 'sepulchra dealbata' of Matthew 23: 27, and to 
The Cock 24ff. in which the cock, recounting how he used to rule 
over a great country, says that the troubles that surround rulers 
make it folly to envy their wealth and pomp. Rulers are compared 
to the colossi made by Phidias, Praxiteles and Myron: 
each of which outwardly is a beautiful Poseidon or 
a Zeus, made of ivory and gold, with a thunderbolt 
or a flash of lightning or a trident in his right 
hand; but if you stoop down and look inside you 
will see where bars and props and nails are driven 
clear through, and beams and wedges and pitch and 
clay and a quantity of such ugly stuff housing 
within, not to mention numbers of mice and rats 
that keep their court in them sometimes. That is 
what monarchy is like (The Dream~ The Cock 24) . 56 
Erasmus then quotes similar sentiments from Plato and Seneca, but 
it is clear from the analysis of The Cock that none of its 
apparently lofty moral sentiment is susceptible to such a 
straightforward interpretation as Erasmus here supplies. To 
55. 
56. 
'quod lange alius esset intus, quam cultu habituque externo 
prae se ferret' (Opera omnia II. 6, 358/226-227). 
75 
ignore the structural ironies of the piece is to miss the double 
meaning which Lucian gives to such commonplaces, quoting them 
simultaneously as worthwhile and valuable sentiments, and as 
examples of trite and trivial philosophising. It is apparent that 
Erasmus sees no great contextual difference between this 
quotation and those from the New Testament. Even if the 
difference in literal meaning is disregarded, it is clear that to 
overlook the ironic context of the Lucianic quotation is a 
serious critical error. 
Similar strictures can be applied to his citation of 
Icarornenippus 10 in Adagia 2601.
57 
This is the lengthy adage 
entitled Scarabeus aguilarn guaerit. It is supported by Lucian's 
use of the Aesopic fable, but again the context in Lucian is 
clearly ironic. Menippus, in describing how he carne to go on a 
journey to heaven, tells how he put on a vulture's and an eagle's 
wing, saying 'the story-teller Aesop had something to do with it, 
for he made Heaven accessible to eagles and beetles and now ~nd 
then even to camels' . Erasmus' references to Aesop in Institutio 
principis Christiani and De pueris instituendis show the way in 
which he read this writer. Lucian, however, is plainly using the 
fable for ironic effect, as a way of distancing himself from 
Menippus. In The Praise of Folly, Erasmus made effective and 
memorable use of this technique, but in this instance he has 
chosen to put it to one side as irrelevant to his immediate 
didactic purpose. 
An example of a different type occurs in No.2251, where 
Erasmus cites Dialogues of the Sea-gods not in a direct 
quotation, but in summary of the content of the dialogue. In 
Lucian's dialogue, the sea-nymphs Doris and Galatea converse 
about Galatea's lover, Polyphemus. Much is made of the contrast 
between Galatea's beauty and the wild and hairy appearance of the 
Cyclops. The whole is conducted in a tone of light banter. The 
interpretation given to this by Erasmus strains credulity: 






You cannot at the same time follow such diverse 
callings as letters and money, pleasure and glory, 
the world and Christ. For there is no harmony 
between the river Galatea and the waves of the sea. 
This is made plain5~n Lucian's dialogue between Galatea and Doris. 
76 
Plainly, Lucian's dialogue can be made to yield no such meaning. 
As it stands, it is a harmless piece of pleasantry, and Eramsus' 
outlandish interpretation is of a piece with his treatment of 
Virgil's Eclogue. Nor is it going too far to suggest that the 
fastidiousness which could force 'interpretations' upon such 
harmless passages as these is of a piece with the moral 
earnestness which could draw lessons from Lucian's Menippean 
dialogues while ignoring the all-important context. 
When Erasmus writes of Lucian's mingling of the trifling and 
the serious he clearly considers that Lucian's humour and irony 
is little more than pleasantry, designed to make moral 
instruction more palatable. The potentially more subversive 
ironies in Lucian are not his principal interest. This attitude 
was to have important consequences for The Praise of Folly 
Erasmus' most extended 'Lucianic' piece. 
The way in which Erasmus can be said to have read Lucian is 
only superficially similar to the reading given by More -- this 
in spite of the frequently met notion that More was in agreement 
59 with Erasmus' estimate of Lucian's substance and style, and 
that 'the identity of language they used to justify their joint 
60 
work' extended to an identity of critical opinion on Lucian. 
The evidence for More's contact with and response to Lucian is 
slighter than in the case of Erasmus. We have only the four 
58. Non potes idem diuersa sequi velut litteras et pecuniam, 
voluptatem et gloriam, mundum et Christum. Nam Galateae 
fluuio male conuenit cum marinis fluctibus. Declarat hoc 
Luciani dialogus inter Galateam ac Doridem (Opera omnia 
II.5, 214/170-173). (My translation). 
59. CW 3.1, p.xli. 






translations and preface of 1506, and a small number of epigrams 
translated from the Palatine Anthology. Nor are the latter very 
helpful in assessing his response to Lucian. No.25 concerns a 
Cynic who refused radishes and leeks at dinner 'lest -- he said 
-his virtue became his belly's slave. But when he had glimpsed a 
snowy-white onion he shed his character of unyielding wisdom, 
asked for it, and with unexpected relish gobbled it all up. 
"Onions", 
61 
he said, "do virtue no harm'". No.58 informs us that 
'the only true riches are those of the mind which values itself 
above its possessions' 
62 
No.157 asks: 'If an untrimmed beard 
63 makes a philosopher, why could not a bearded goat be a Plato?'. 
In the earlier Progymnasta, No.5 enjoins us to enjoy wealth as 
though death were at hand, and spare our wealth as if we were to 
live all over again.
64 
In all, More translated only seven of the 
twenty-five epigrams which the Anthology attributes to Lucian, 
and the sentiments expressed in these are so utterly commonplace, 
their expression so lacking in vigour and wit compared to other 
Lucianic pieces that it is difficult to think of them as having 
exercised any strong and lasting influence on More. 
The joint translations with Erasmus are a different matter, 
since much of what More learnt from Lucian was later to be 
applied in The History of King Richard III and Utopia. It is not 
so much the translations themselves that are of interest as the 
prefatory letter to Thomas Ruthall. What More found in Lucian ---





a form of dialogue that dramatised ambiguity as a 
function of meaning, a demonstration that all 
aspects of human experience could be comprehended 
within an ironic view of life, and an active 






response that was non-despairing, even though it 
originated in a view of ~gings that was as 
sceptical as More's own. 
78 
The letter itself is 'provocatively disingenuous', 66 and is, at 
least in part, aimed at securing Lucian's admission into polite 
society. It is, in fact, a piece of irony, and all the more 
deceptive for superficially expressing the same sentiments as the 
. Erasmian prefaces. 
Lucian, says More, was among the foremost 'who fulfilled the 
Horatian maxim and combined delight with instruction' (CW 3.1, 
3/5-6) .
67 
He non-dogmatically and wittily censured human 
frailties. More then gives his account of the three dialogues he 
has chosen to translate. The Cynic had been approved by St John 
Chrysostom: 
And not without reason: for what should have 
pleased that grave and truly Christian man more 
than this dialogue in which, while the severe life· 
of Cynics, satisfied with lit·He is defended and 
the soft, enervating luxury of voluptuaries 
denounced, by the same token Christian simplicity, 
temperance, and frugality, and finally that strait 
path which leadg
8
to Life eternal, are praised? (CW 
3.1, 3/33-5/6). 
More must have realised that the dialogue was more subtle than 
this. Our sympathy remains with Lycinus (significantly retitled 
65. Fox, p.36. 
66. Ibid., p.36. 
67. 'qui Horatianum praeceptum impleuerit, uoluptatemque cum 
utilitate coniunxerit' (CW 3.1, 2/5-6). 
68. 'Neque id immerito. Quid enim placere magis uiro graui, 
uereque Christiano debuit, quam is dialogus, in quo dum 
aspera, paruoque contenta Cynicorum uita defenditur, 
mollis, atque eneruata delicatorum hominum luxuria 
reprehenditur? Nee non eadem opera Christianae uitae 
simplicitas, temperantia, frugalitas, denique arcta illa 
atque angusta uia, quae ducit ad vitam, laudatur' 







'Lucianus' by More) because of the style of argument employed by 
the Cynic. He is arrogant and overbearing, resistant to close 
questioning, and pays no real heed to reasonable objections 
raised by Lycinus, such as that Nature and the gods have given us 
things to enjoy, and to deprive oneself of the fine things of 
life is madness (CW 3.1, 13/22-15/4). In response, the Cynic 
launches into a lengthy disquisition on temperance giving Lycinus 
no chance to respond. Much of what he says is perfectly 
reasonable, but, as always in a Lucianic dialogue, the context 
must be kept firmly in mind. 
His physical appearance is absurd. He has a beard, long 
hair, and no shirt; he abuses his body by inflicting on it what 
it likes least; and he sleeps on the ground (CW 3.1, 19/1-6). He 
contradicts himself by comparing the Cynic way of life favourably 
to both animals and gods. One may wonder about the propriety of 
wishing to have feet no different from horses' hooves, of needing 
no more bedding than the lions do, and no more extensive fare 
than the dogs (CW 3.1, 19/35-37). His final comparison of himself 
to the gods because, as represented in statues, they have long 
hair and beards and wear no shirts neatly reveals his egotism. 
This had already been indicated as his argument for temperance 
became more intemperate, and in the way in which he addressed 
Lycinus as 'you', accusing him of various vices, although he can 
know nothing of him personally. So spellbound is he by his own 
rhetoric and his eloquent defence of Cynicism that he is unable 
to engage in genuine dialogue. In a later, Morean incarnation he 
was to become Hythlodaeus. 
We can see, then, that The Cynic is susceptible to a much 
more subtle reading than that ostensibly given to it by More. It 
is not that Lucian necessarily disagreed with the sentiments 
expressed by the Cynic, but that he did disagree with his manner 
of expressing them, and with his tendency to turn dialogue into 
monologue. By causing us to question the Cynic's manner of 
argument, Lucian invites us to examine the truth of what he says. 
This is not simply to be rejected, but to be scrutinised 
I 
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carefully, without allowing oneself to be carried away by a 
torrent of words. The dialogue exists, not to advocate a 
particular point of view, but to stress the need for intellectual 
openness and the careful testing of a variety of attitudes and 
assumptions about life. Just as the character of the 
Cynic was to be writ large in Hythlodaeus, so the method of the 
dialogue was to be writ large in Utooia. 
The second dialogue discussed by More is Menippus, sive 
Necyomanteia, (wrongly given in the Latin as Necromanteia) . Of 
this More writes 'how wittily it rebukes the jugglery of 
magicians or the silly fictions of poets or the fruitles 
contentions of philosophers among themselves on any question 
69 
whatever!' (CW 3.1, 5/8-11). As a description of the dialogue 
this is wilfully inadequate. The value More saw in it resides on 
two levels. If one takes at face value the simile of life as a 
play and the final pronouncement of Teiresias, then the dialogue 
. d d b d . t . d' f h . 70 can ln ee e rea as a correctlve o a mlsrea lng o T e Cynlc: 
life is too problematic to be reduced to one set of attitudes, no 
matter how superficially attractive these attitudes may be. The 
view of man as the unresisting plaything of Fortune is, of 
course, impossible to reconcile with the teleological assumptions 
of Christianity, and it is doubtless for this reason that More 
makes no explicit reference to this central 'meaning' of the 
dialogue. Yet the omission is so startling as to draw the 
reader's attention ineluctably to these passages. By this means, 
More ensures that the reader notices what is important in the 
dialogue without incurring the risk of having to answer charges 
raised by those who considered Lucian an atheist. 
But there is a further level of irony in the dialogue, not 
mentioned explicitly by More. It did not, however, escape his 
attention, as can be seen from his use of the same type of 
69. 'quam salse taxat, uel Magorum praestigias, uel inania 
Poetarum figmenta, uel incertas quauis de re philosophorum 
inter se digladiationes' (CW 3 .1, 4/8-10). 
70. Fox, p.41. 
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structural irony in Utopia. The elaborate Menippean simile and 
the pronouncement from Teiresias are both set in an ironic 
context which makes it impossible to accept them unquestioningly. 
Again, it is not so much a matter of disagreeing with what is 
said as of refusing to admit any unexamined premisses. As 
elaborated in Utopia, this method becomes one of refusing to 
grant the status of 'truth' to any one proposition, and of 
dramatising the conflict of ideas in such a way that the meaning 
of the dialogue resides, not in any part of its content, but in 
its form as dialogue. This is what Lucian had done in Menippus 
and other dialogues of the same type, and it was a method that 
More eagerly seized on as providing an artistic solution to the 
problem of expressing contradictory impulses in his own 
character. But this is to anticipate. For the moment, it is 
sufficient to note that the ways in which Erasmus and More read 
Lucian were not only different but quite incompatible. That More 
was not wilfully over-reading Lucian is shown by his recognition 
that the third dialogue, The Lover of Lies, can be read as a 
simple moral lesson: 'which ... is entirely concerned ... with 
ridiculing and reproving the inordinate passion for lying' (CW 
71 
3.1, 5/12-14). The dialogue, as More says, will teach us 
that we should put no trust in magic and that we 
should eschew superstition, which obtrudes 
everywhere under the guise of religion. It teaches 
us also that we should live a life less distracted 
by anxiety; less fearful, that is, of any glo92Y 
and superstitious untruths (CW 3.2, 5/22-25). 
And in Erasmian fashion he goes on to apply the lesson to those 
71. 'totus uersatur ... in ridenda, coarguendaque metiendi 
libidine (CW 3.1, 4/12). 
72. '· .. ut neque magicis habeamus praestigijs fidem, & 
superstitione careamus, quae passim sub specie 
religionis obrepit, tum uitam ut agamus minus anxiam, 
minus uidelicet expauescentes tristia quaepiam ac 






who think they've done a great work, and put Christ 
in their debt forever, if they've feigned a story 
about a saint or a horrendous tale of hell to drive 
some old woman to tears7§r to make her tremble with 
fear (CW 3.1, 5/34-37). 
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More, then, was quite capable of distinguishing between Lucian's 
dialogues on the basis of their technique and the type of irony 
employed. 
Erasmus, however, was not wholly devoid of subtlety in his 
reading of Lucian, and he, along with More, noticed the slight 
irony employed in Lucian's The Tyrannicide, and both employed the 
same technique in their reply to it. The passage referred to in 






the tyrant's son and left the sword lying near the 
grief-stricken father would kill himself. He then 
Therefore I request that you give me the reward 
which is my due, not because~~ greedy Q£ 
avaricious, Q£ because it was mY purpose 1Q benefit 
mY native land for hire, but because I wish that my 
achievements should be confirmed by the donative 
and that my undertaking should escape 
misrepresentation and loss of glory on the grounds 
that it was not fully executed and has been 
pronounced unworthy of a reward (CW 3.1, 199/36-
42) . (My emphasis) . 
The emphasised words may or may not have been intended to cast 
doubt on the claimant's motives, but they are certainly capable 
of that construction, and it was this sly irony that both More 
and Erasmus noticed and applied in their own declamations. More 
introduces this in two ways. First, his declaimer says: 
When I considered the meagre resources of our 
treasury, the present scarcity of funds, and the 
73. '···qui se tum demum rem magnam confecissse putant, 
Christumque sibi deuinxissse perpetuo, si commenti 
fuerint, aut de sancto aliquo uiro fabulam, aut de 
inferis tragoediam, ad quam uetula quaepiam aut delira 




fact that many occasions of necessary expense 
confront us, I could not bear it that the state be 
drained of money by this extra, 7~nnecessary 
expenditure (CW .3.1, 99/23-27). 
83 
Is he the man of principle he pretends to be, or is he simply 
trying to avoid the state's paying out a legitimate reward? The 
main point of his counter-argument follows: 
Besides, since this slaying of the tyrant came 
about only by the mercy of the gods, who, so often 
implored, at last took pity on our calamities and 
pleased to liberate us from the yoke of that 
cruellest of tyrants and restore us to freedom, it 
would in my opinion be intolerable if the city 
withheld homage and gratitude owed to the gods and 
gave them instead to a man 'go does not deserve 
them (CW 3.1, 99/35-101/2). 
He then demonstrates that it is improbable that the claimant's 
case can be sustained and returns to his claim, based on even 
less evidence, that the tyrant's death was the work of the gods. 
More has take~ what was a tentative suggestion of unworthy 
motives and given his speaker equally suspect motives bolstered 
by an appeal to specious reasoning and unprovable assertions. 
Erasmus omits the imputation of unworthy motives to his 
speaker, but includes the claim that the city's liberation is 
owed to the gods (Opera omnia I.1 517/6-10). Certainly both More 
h 1 . d . . 1 . , 76 and Erasmus demonstrate t e 'fa se prem~ses an v~c~ous og~c , 
74. 
75. 
'nempe quum uiderem satis tenues aerarij nostri 
prouentus, & praesentem pecuniam nimis exiguam, tum 
instare multas necessarij sumptus occasiones, non 
ferebam uti ciuitas hoc insuper non necessario sumptus 
mulctaretur' (CW 3 .1, 98/20-23) . 
'Praeterea quum hoc tyrannicidum sola deorum clementia 
prouenerit, qui toties inclamati calamitatum tandem 
nostrarum miserti, crudelissimi nos iugo tyranni 
soluere, ac libertati reddere uoluerunt, non ferendum 
putaui ut ciuitas honorem gratiamque dijs merentibus 
ablatam, homini non merenti tribueret' (CW 3.1, 98/31-
100 .1). 
76. C. R. Thompson, 1940, p.40. 
' ' 
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of the speaker, but their own protagonists --- more so, perhaps, 
in More's case ---exhibit the same faults. 
Apart from this, both replies cover the same ground, so that 
there may be some truth in the notion that the two had decided 
77 
beforehand what points were to be covered. Yet it is notable 
that Erasmus' reply is far longer than that of More, and that he 
makes extensive use of all rhetorical means of amplification. He 
includes a lengthy speech declaring that a praiseworthy end does 
not justify illegal means and that the laws must always be 
obeyed. That there is no such speech in More points again to the 
contrast in the literary method employed by the two men: where 
More dramatises, ironises and, not infrequently, hedges, Erasmus 
is more inclined to be quite explicit if he has something of 
importance to say. As Erika Rummel puts it: 
Erasmus' buffo version with its comic exaggeration 
gives the court performance the character of a 
charade, while More's plain translation preserves 
some of Lucian's deadpan humour, as he a9~lies 
grave arguments to a ludiC:Y.'Qus business. 
The very style of the two replies suggests the same 
conclusion. As Thompson says of Erasmus' style compared to that 
of More: 'It is more florid, more elaborate, more copious, (he) 
adds details, repeats charge, and expands figures of speech. He 
has two or three illustrations where More is content with one. He 
has an abundance of literary and mythological allusions' .
79 
Similarly, Erika Rummel, in comparing the Latin style of the two 
declamations, concludes that Erasmus is the more likely to expand 
on the original text, and to use an elaborate sentence structure; 
77. Ibid., p.40. 
78. Erika Rummel, Erasmus~~ Translator of the Classics 
(Toronto, 1985), p.68. 
79. c. R. Thompson, 1940, p.45. 
Erasmus, she says, is long-winded to a fault, More succinct to 
80 
the point of falling short of the meaning of the Greek. 
85 
Does this suggest anything of importance about their attitude 
to literary matters? Keeping in mind that these pieces were, in 
effect, jeux d'esprit, exercises not intended to be taken 
seriously, it may not be going too far to say that the copious 
fulsomeness of Erasmus' style is paralleled in the elaborateness 
and ornateness of Folly, while More's comparative reticence may 
perhaps be connected to the subtle understatements of his brand 
of irony. Probably not too much should be read into what were, 
after all, pieces of entertainment, but the differences are 
surely not entirely accidental. They can be seen as confirming 
our sense of what each man learnt from Lucian, and as suggesting 
what each would subsequently make of these lessons in his own 
writings. 
80. Rummel, pp.64-65. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE PRESENCE OF LUCIAN IN ERASMUS' 'COLLOQUIES' 
In view of the interest shown by More and Erasmus in Lucian, 
it would be odd if some trace of his influence had not made 
itself felt in their own fictional works. Erasmus' indebtedness 
is clearly seen both in The Praise of Folly and in the later 
Colloquies. His use of Lucian in these works confirms what was 
said in Chapter Two about the way in which he read him. Both The 
Praise Qt Folly and the Colloquies, considered as Lucianic works, 
clearly show the double nature of Erasmus' response to Lucian, 
and to fictional and mimetic literature in general. If he was a 
lover of good literature, we must qualify this by reminding 
ourselves that his natural inclination and preference, even in 
fictional works, was towards the didactic: literature may be both 
utile et dulce, but ultimately its utility is of more importance. 
This is more readily apparent in the Colloquies, where there is 
no attempt at the kind of ironical complexity which makes the 
opening section of The Praise of Folly at the same time Erasmus' 
most brilliant and most atypical piece of fictional writing. It 
is in the Colloquies that we see Erasmus responding to the 
moralistic and satirical elements in Lucian most directly and 
most simply, and for that reason it is easier to consider these 
first before moving on to the far more intractable and complex 
problems raised by The Praise of Folly and its status as a piece 
of complex Lucianic irony. 
The date of the Colloquies lends sanction to this procedure. 
They were conceived in their original form as Latin exercises for 





earliest dialogues are Erasmus himself, Christian Northoff, one 
of his students, and Augustine Caminadius, a friend of both 
master and pupils.
1 
In his preface to the edition of March 1519, 
he speaks of their date as 'ante annos plus viginti' (Allen III, 
909/8). They had never been intended for publication, and the 
edition of 1518 was therefore unauthorised (Allen III, 909/20-
28) . Not until the Froben edition of March 1522 was any new 
2 
material added to the book. 
In this edition and that of August 1522, 'the character of 
the book began to change fundamentally ... The reason for this 
must be that Erasmus had come to take the book more seriously and 
saw its possibilities' .
3 
sets of formulae: 
It now contains dialogues rather than 
No longer a book providing only a collection of 
phrases and idioms for young students of Latin 
speech, the volume now offered dialogues that might 
serve boys as models of speech and writing both, 
and would appeal to men as much as boys; i~ became 
a book of colloquies instead of exercises. 
'Further, 'the colloquies provided Erasmus with an admirable 
medium for commenting freely but informally on any events, 
customs or institutions that interested him' .
5 
This material 
treats themes which recur throughout Erasmus' career, a fact that 
demonstrates the essential consistency and unity of his thought. 
From satire on monks, theologians and soldiers to the full 
expression of the philosophia Christi, the final edition of 1532 
shows remarkable continuity with The Praise of Folly of 1509; 
moreover, it shows these strands of Erasmus' thought free of the 
1. The Colloquies of Erasmus, edited by Craig R. Thompson, 
(Chicago and London, 1965) p.xxii. 
2. Ibid., p.xxv. 
3. Ibid., p.xxv. 
4. Ibid., p.xxv. 
5. Ibid., p.xxvi. 
.. 
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complex structural irony which makes the earlier work much more 
difficult to understand and interpret. Furthermore, we see 
Erasmus working in a literary form -- satirical dialogue -- which 
had hitherto been almost exclusively used by Lucian, so that 
comparison of the dialogues of the two will lend substance to our 
interpretation of Erasmus' reading of Lucian. When we see that 
his response to Lucian over a period of some twenty-five years 
was consistently straightforward and non-ironical,it will make 
the far more complex response of The Praise of Folly that much 
more enigmatic. 
There is, in fact, a remarkable continuity of tone between 
the prefaces to Erasmus' translations of Lucian and his defence 
of the colloquies in The Usefulness of the .'Colloquies'. It was 
added to the edition of 1526 as a defence against attacks on the 
book, and makes it clear that his purpose was primarily didactic. 
The form of dialogue has been adopted to 'allure the young' and 
Eramsus cares not how 'childish' it seems so long as it is useful 
(CE 625) . His purpose in this defence is to illustrate the common 
utility of the Colloquies (CE 134) and he goes on to expound the 
meaning of many of the dialogues. He says also that 'this little 
book, if taught to ingenuous youth, will lead them to many more 
useful studies: to poetry, rhetoric, physics, ethics, and finally 
to matters of Christian piety' (CE 239) . 6 This explicit 
didactic intent is consistent with all of Erasmus' remarks on 
literature, and marks him as having intentions different from 
those of Lucian. 
It is true and it would be strange if it were otherwise 
that several of the Colloquies show the direct influence of 
Lucian, although none utilise his particular brand of complex 
irony. Of these, some -- Echo, Non-sequiturs and The Imposture 
are linguistic jeux d'esprit in the manner of Pseudosophista, & 
Slip of the Tongue in Greeting and others, but others have a more 
6. 'Atqui hie libellus, si tenerae pubi praelegatur, tradet 
illos ad multas disciplinas magis habiles, ad poeticen, ad 
rhetoricen, ad physicen, ad ethicen, demum ad ea quae sunt 
pietatis Christianae' (Opera omnia I.3, 749/283-285). 
,-,..!. 
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serious content. Pseudodocheus and Philetymus reminds one of The 
Lover of Lies in its subject matter, although this particular 
piece shows none of Lucian's talent for comic invention, and of 
The Parasite in its talk of an 'art of lying' (CE 134) . Both The 
Cheating Horse-dealer and The Ignoble Knight deal with the type 
of brazen charlatan met in Alexander. In both, the thrust of the 
satire is clear and there is no hint of ironic ambiguity. 
Similar considerations apply to Alchemy and to Exorcism. 
There is, of course, no dialogue on alchemy in the works of 
Lucian, but Erasmus' view of the alchemist as charlatan is 
similar to the view that Lucian takes of such figures as 
Alexander of Abnoteichos and Peregrinus Proteus, although Erasmus 
is not exposing a particular individual and lacks Lucian's savage 
denunciation. There is no pretense that this is a study of 
alchemy or the issues raised by it: from the outset, interest in 
it is labelled as 'a notorious disease' (CE 239) . The bulk of the 
dialogue is taken up with the exposure of the alchemist's 
imposture and the matching gullibility of Balbinus, while the 
alchemist is significantly linked with sexual immorality. 
On a similar theme -- imposture and gullibility -- is the 
dialogue Exorcism, or The Spectre. Its Lucianic source is the 
dialogue translated by More, The Lover of Lies, but in Erasmus' 
piece the imposture is a practical joke played on an exorcist. 
The matter of the dialogue is narrated, not exhibited directly, 
in a way which allows Erasmus to predetermine the reader's 
attitude. In the introductory talk, Anselm says: 'I've just heard 
the most delightful story. You'd swear it was a comic fiction if 
I weren't as familiar with the characters and the setting and the 
whole affair as I am with you' (CE 231) .
7 
Polus is 
characterised as 'naturally fond of playing tricks on people's 
stupidity' (CE 231) 8 and the dialogue consists of a lengthy 
7. 'Audiui modo fabulam lepidissimam, quam iures esse comicum 
figmentum, nisi mihi locus, personae totaque res esset tam 
nota, quam tu notus es mihi'. (Opera omnia I. 3, 417 /10-12). 
8. 'gaudet huiusmodi commentis ludere stultitiam populi'. 
(Opera omnia I.3, 418/35-36). 
' ' . 
-. 
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narration of one of these tricks. The narration is vivid and 
moves swiftly, with Erasmus showing a considerable talent for 
comic invention, but we are never in doubt as to what attitude we 
are to take to the events narrated. This is broad comedy 
presenting no perplexing intellectual problem; nor is it as 
overtly concerned with exposing a contemporary evil as many of 
the other dialogues certainly are. The possible identification of 
9 
Polus and More lends an added interest, but its primary 
purpose, apart from the general exposure of superstition, is 
entertainment, and as such it succeeds brilliantly. 
The two other dialogues which can be termed 'Lucianic' 
require to be discussed at greater length since, in their 
subject-matter, they are more closely aligned with the principal 
satirical and ethical tendencies of the Colloquies. Charon is 
10 
'plainly Lucianic in form and manner', and its attack on the 
military life was a life-long preoccupation of Erasmus. Unlike 
its Lucianic prototype, there is no ambivalence about the subject 
matter, although the strong vein of irony and realistic humour 
catches much of the tone of Lucian. Yet when Charon launches into 
an attack on 'the three rulers of the world' and their wars that 
have embraced all Christendom (CE 391), it is apparent that 
Erasmus' satire is more pointed and particular than that of 
Lucian. He feels none of Lucian's ambivalence about his material, 
and for that reason the satire is more vital while the element of 
ironic ambiguity is completely missing. The direct statement of 
satire is more congenial to Erasmus than the obliquity of complex 
. 11 
~rony. 
A Pilgrimage for Religion's Sake also owes a debt to 
Menioous. It has three friends meeting after a long separation; 
the narrator is dressed in a fantastic costume: 'You're ringed 
9. C. R. Thompson, p.230. 
10. Ibid., p.388. 
11. Sr. G. Thompson, Under Pretext of Praise: Satiric Mode in 




with scallop shells, choked with tin and leaden images on every 
side, decked out with straw necklaces, and you've snake's eggs on 
your arms' (CE 287) .
12 
If his appearance is kept in mind, we are 
unlikely to place much credence in anything he might say. His 
interlocutor, Ogygius, keeps up a string of ironically deflating 
comments, as do several of Lucian's characters; and the idea that 
devotion has grown cold, with St. James receiving fewer offerings 
than before, recalls the plight of the gods in, for example, Zeus 
Rants: it is not impossible that Erasmus intended to equate the 
two types of worship as similar forms of superstition. Ogygius is 
a na1f of the Lucianic type who, on his visit to the tomb of St. 
Thomas, fails to understand the irony of his companion Gratian. 
The latter, commenting on the wealth of the shrine, suggests that 
the saint 'would rejoice that, even after death, too, he could 
relieve the wants of the poor by his riches' (CE 307) .
13 
When the 
custodian becomes angry, Ogygius assures him that Gratian was 
only joking, whereupon Menedemus explicitly points the moral 
about the wealth of the church. The discussion springs from a 
clearly ironical comment, then modulates into a non-ironical 
statement in which Menedemus may be taken as representing the 
point of view of Erasmus. 
As we should expect, the didactic intent is taken up in The 
Usefulness of the 'Colloguies': pilgrimages may be 'conceded, of 
course, to men's whims, but for these people to arrogate holiness 
to themselves from all this is intolerable (CE 631) .
14 
In spite 
of the presence of a large number of Lucianic elements, the 
dialogue lacks Lucian's characteristic double focus: in the 
12. 'obsitus es conchis imbricatis, stanneis ac plumbeis 
imaginibus oppletus vndique, culmeis ornatus torquibus, 
brachium habet oua serpentum'. (Opera omnia I.1, 470/11-13). 
13. 'Ego, inquit, plane confide sanctissimum virum etiam 
gauisurum, quod mortuus quoque suis opibus subleuaret inopiam 
pauperum'. (Opera omnia I.3, 489/696-698). 
14. 'Dentur haec sane, dentur affectibus hominum, at non 





direct satiric attack and the more oblique questioning of the 
mode of attack. It lacks, that is, ironic ambiguity, so that 
although it possesses real dramatic qualities and robust humour, 
both its purpose and effect are ultimately didactic. 
If Lucian's ironic ambiguity is not found even in those 
dialogues which owe him a specific debt, it is certainly not to 
be expected in those in which the influence is more general. 
Among these we may class those which use satire to correct the 
vices of the age, of which the majority are on religious topics. 
Three early dialogues, too short to allow much scope for 
artistry, are of interest for their elaboration of views treated 
at greater length in other works. Military Affairs is one of 
Erasmus' frequent criticisms of war and its unchristian 
character. A soldier who has gone to war has come back laden with 
sins rather than booty, and is convinced that 'Nothing's more 
wicked or ruinous' than a soldier's life' (CE 13). He follows a 
calling that involves him in 'burning houses, looting churches, 
violating nuns, robbing poor people, murdering homeless ones!' (CE 
14) .
15 
Views such as these had been elaborated more fully in the 
earlier Complaint of Peace, The Praise Q[ Folly, and Dulce bellum 
inexpertis; they were discussed again in later colloquies such as 
The Soldier and the Carthusian and Charon. 
Rash Vows and In Pursuit of Benefices are also short and 
artistically uncomplicated. The latter of these is somewhat 
marred by an overlong opening section which appears only 
obliquely related to the real subject of the dialogue. This 
subject was stated in The Usefulness of the 'Colloquies': 'I 
reprove those who rush off to Rome to hunt for livings, 
frequently with serious loss of money and morals both' (CE 627) .
16 
Rash Vows concerns pilgrimages, and the tone is set early with 
15. 'incendere domos, diripere templa, violare sacras virgines, 
spoliare miseros, occidere innoxios'. (Opera omnia I.3, 
156/1005-1006). 
16. 'taxo eos, qui Romam cursitant, venantur sacerdotia, crebro 




Arnold saying that people are drawn to pilgrimages by folly (CE 
5) . Cornelius, disillusioned by his experience on a pilgrimage, 
supports him, saying that in Jerusalem, 'some monuments of 
antiquity are pointed out, every one of which I thought faked and 
contrived for the purpose of deceiving naive and credulous folk' 
(CE 5) .
17 
The dialogue ends with Arnold saying that on a 
pilgrimage of his own, one of his fellow pilgrims had a purse 
bulging with indulgences: 'he pinned his whole hope of salvation, 
so to speak, on a piece of parchment instead of on a moral life' 
(CE 7) .
18 
The dialogue is sketchy, but since it includes no 
criticism of the views of either speaker, they can be taken as 
being identical with those of Erasmus. 
In The Usefulness of the 'Colloquies', Erasmus devoted a 
long defence to this short dialogue, an indication, perhaps, that 
he felt keenly about the message conveyed. He says that in it 'is 
exhibited the superstitiousness and shameful fancy of some folk 
who think the essence of holiness is to have visited Jerusalem' 
(CE 625) .
19 
Further, 'the name of religion is used as cover for 
superstition, faithlessness, foolishness, and recklessness' (CE 
626) .
2° Finally, he writes: 
Therefore, considering the irresponsibilty, 
ignorance or superstitiousness of many folk, I 
thought I should do well to warn youth on this 
subject, and I don't see who could be offended by 
17. 'Ostenduntur quaedam monumenta vetustatis, quorum mihi nihil 
non videtur commenticium, et excogitatum ad alliciendos 
simplices et credulos'. (Opera omnia I.3, 147/715-717). 
18. 'salutis suae proram, vt aiunt, ac puppim in membrana 
collocarit, potiusquam in correctis affectibus' . (Opera omnia 
I.3, 150/800, textual note). 
19. 'cohibetur superstitiosus et immodicus quorumdam affectus, 
qui summam pietatem esse ducunt vidisse Hierosolymam' . (Opera 
omnia I.3, 742/36-37). 
20. 'et interim superstitioni, inconstantiae, stultitiae, 
temeritati praetexitur religionis titulus ... ' (Opera omnia 
I.3, 742/42-43). 
., 
the warning, except perhaps t~~se who put profit 
above righteousness (CE 627). 
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Here again, we find Erasmus stating explicitly that the purpose 
of the Colloquies was didactic. This is, in any case, readily 
apparent in these examples from the edition of 1522; they form, 
perhaps, a transitional stage between the Latin exercises which 
the Colloquies originally were, and the later dialogues which 
have more aesthetic merit without being less didactic and 
expository in intent and execution. 
Two further dialogues need to be considered before we pass 
on to those in which satire plays no part. These are The Soldier 
and the Carthusian and The Shipwreck, both initially published in 
1523. The former of these two dialogues is, in part, an attack on 
the military life with the monk saying, in characteristically 
Erasmian fashion, that the soldier was 'hired for a trifling wage 
to cut men's throats' (CE 131) . 
22 
Aspects of the monastic life are also brought into 
question, and the Carthusian ably defends it against the 
soldier's charge of unworldliness. Indeed, the picture of the 
monastic life here given is idealised to an extent unusual in 
Erasmus. This may be by way of contrast with the life of the 
soldier, or it may be because Erasmus respected the Carthusians 
above other monastic orders. It is notable that one of the main 
attractions of the monastic life is the opportunity for study (CE 
130), and, as c. R. Thompson notes, 'The monk in the colloquy 
virtuous as he undeniably is, is a Carthusian of Erasmian 
23 
principles and tastes'. This contrast of two modes of life is 
21. 'eoque considerata multorum vel leuitate vel ignorantia 
vel superstitione, visum est super ea re monere 
iuuentutem, neque video quos offendere debeat haec 
admonitio, nisi forte quosdam istos, quibus charier est 
quaestus quam pietas'. (Opera omnia I. 3, 743/84-86) . 
22. 'profisceris in militiam vili salario conductus ad 
iugulandos homines ... ' (Opera omnia I.3, 317/104-105). 
23. C. R. Thompson, p.128. 
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not intended to make us suspend judgement in our valuation of 
them; the life of the Carthusian is undoubtedly to be preferred. 
Even in this dialogue, where there is room for some complexity in 
the point of view, it is not introduced. In spite of Erasmus' 
later writing that the life of a Carthusian was 'inevitably 
gloomy and dismal unless accompanied by devotion to studies' (CE 
629), 24 it is less subject to criticism than the military life. 
Again, the didactic purpose does not allow Erasmus the freedom to 
develop his dialogue in the direction of complex irony. 
The Shipwreck is markedly satirical, being another attack on 
religious superstition. The account of a shipwreck and the 
reaction of the passengers and sailors to their situation 
provides the material for Erasmus' satire. He describes 
the sailors singing Salve Regina, praying to the 
Virgin Mother, calling her Star of the Sea, Queen 
of Heaven, Mistress of the World, Port of 
Salvation, flattering her with many other titles 
the s~gred Scriptures nowhere assign to her (CE 
141) . 
Other passengers promise to go the Virgin of Walsingham and 
other shrines; some promise to go on pilgrimages. Adolphus, who 
says 'I don't make deals with saints' (CE 142),
26 
prayed 
directly to God, since 'no saint hears sooner than he or more 
willingly grants what is asked' (CE 142) .
27 
As a piece of 
dramatic literature, this has been deservedly popular, and is all 
the more effective for having its points presented dramatically 
24. 'quae sine studiorum amore non potest non esse tristis et 
inamoena'. (Opera omnia I.3, 745/157-158). 
25. 'Nautae canentes: Salue regina, implorabant matrem 
Virginem, appellantes earn stellam maris, reginam coeli, 
dominam mundi, portum salutis, aliisque multis titulis 
illi blandientes, quos nusquam illi tribuunt sacrae 
literae'. (Opera omnia I.3, 327/71-74). 
26. 'Quia non paciscor cum diuis'. (Opera omnia I.3, 329/119). 
27. 'Nemo diuorum illo citius audit aut libentius donat, quod 




and emphasised with brief comments. Nevertheless, the intention 
and the artistic methods of even the best Erasmian dialogues are 
far removed from those of Lucian. That is not to say that either 
type of dialogue is inferior to the other, but where the 
intention is different the dramatic means must differ 
accordingly. 
In all the satirical dialogues, even in those specifically 
indebted to Lucian, Erasmus makes no use of ironic ambiguity. In 
dialogues whose avowed intention was the teaching of a lesson, 
irony, however skilfully employed, could be no more than a means 
to an end. Accordingly, it is no real surprise that some of the 
colloquies employ no irony at all, but are straightforward 
expositions of Erasmus' views on religious questions. Yet this 
group contains some of the best colloquies, considered purely in 
dramatic and artistic terms. They represent the positive pole of 
Erasmus' thought and treat of subjects which were, perhaps, too 
serious and too important to be treated with any admixture of 
irony and satire. 
The Profane Feast was one of the earliest pieces, and bears 
unmistakeable traces of its origin as a piece designed to teach 
good Latin. Much of the conversation consists of variations on a 
phrase, such as we find under the heading 'It makes no difference 
what colour it is' (CE 595) . The pedagogic origin of the 
Colloquies is here clearly evident, although there is in it 
material which Eramsus considered sufficiently important to be 
mentioned in The Usefulness of the 'Colloquies'. Here he says: 
I do not condemn the ordinance of the Church 
concerning fasts and choice of foods, but I expose 
the superstition of certain persons who attach 
excessive importance to these matters while 
neglecting those that contribute more to godliness 
... If, now, one will consider what a blight on 
true godliness this produces among mankind, one 
will grant that scarcely any o~~er admonition is 
more urgently needed (CE 628) . 
28. 'non damno constitutiones Ecclesiae de ieiuniis ac 
delectum ciborum, sed indico superstitionem quorundam, 
qui his plus tribuunt quam oportet, negligentes eorum, 
' ·\-, 
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Since the material here referred to occupies only a small 
part of the dialogue, we can see how Erasmus' conception of the 
purpose of these dialogues changed after their original 
publication. 
The theme of the appropriate type of religious observance is 
taken up again in the longest of the colloquies, A Fish Diet, 
whose theme is the Pauline one of Christian liberty against 
Judaic legalism, or the contrast between Law and Gospel, letter 
and spirit. The length at which these matters are discussed is an 
indication of the importance Erasmus attached to them, just as 
the character of the two speakers -- one a butcher, the other a 
fishmonger -- is a constant reminder of his view that theological 
matters were, at heart, simple enough to be discussed by all 
manner of people, not just learned and over-subtle specialists. 
It is stated that Christ's new covenant abrogated the Jewish 
distinction of foods, so 'the Jews were not so much emancipated 
as weaned from the superstitious reverence of the law' (CE 321) . 29 
In spite of this, Christians now have more laws on fasting than 
did the Jews (CE 322). Further, 
there are a great many who take places, vestments, 
foods, fasts, gestures, and chants to be the 
essence of religion and judge their neighbour bSO 
these, contrary to gospel commandment (CE 324') . 
quae magis faciunt ad pietatem, ... Hie si quis reputet 
quanta verae pietatis lues hinc nata sit inter mortales, 
fatebitur vix aliam admonitionem esse magis necessariam, 
sed hac de re copiosus alias respondebimus' . (Opera 
omnia I.3, 744/112-118). 
29. 'Itaque non tam manumissi sunt Iudaei, quam a legis 
superstitione ... depulsi'. (Opera omnia I.3, 502/240-242). 
30. 'Rursus audio videoque plurimos esse, qui in locis, 
vestibus, cibis, ieiuniis, gesticulationibus, cantibus, 
summam pietatis constituunt, et ex his proximum iudicant 
contra praeceptum Euangelicum'. (Opera omnia I.3, 
505/343-346) 0 
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Much later in the dialogue, it is said that the 'world is full 
of pharasaical men who can prove their holiness only by such 
trivial observances' (CE 342) .
31 
Erasmus said of this colloquy that he was trying to persuade 
those with different views on human ordinances to exercise 
moderation and to enquire as to the origin and status of such 
ordinances. 
These topics I have treated at some length to 
provide learned men with an opportunity of writing 
on them more correctly; for what they have 
publ~~hed to date does not satisfy inquirers (CE 
631) 
Whatever his motivation in writing this dialogue, it is clear 
that when he was engaged in setting out his views on a matter of 
such importance, as distinct from attacking various forms of vice 
and corruption, he found no use for irony of any form, let alone 
the complex irony that suspends judgement on the issue in 
question. 
The same characteristics are found in The Godly Feast, which 
in setting and characterisation is one of the real dramatic 
achievements of the Colloguies. The combination of Christian and 
classical themes marks it as an excellent document of Christian 
humanism; yet in spite of the occurrence of the famous phrase 
'Saint Socrates', the tone of the dialogue is much more Christian 
than classical. No real dialogue between the two positions takes 
place, and Erasmus' practical, ethically-oriented Christianity 
simply subsumes the best ethical precepts of the classical 
writers. Of course, ethical philosophy was a strong undercurrent 
of the classical tradition; but it is curious that in culling 
31. 'deinde mundus est plenus pharasaicis hominibus, qui non 
alia re sibi possunt vindicare sanctimoniam, nisi talibus 
obseruatiunculis ... ' (Opera omnia I. 3, 522/988-990). 
32. 'Haec ideo quoque tractaui copiosius, quo doctis 
suppeditarem occasionem accuratius hisce de rebus 
scrib~ndi. Nam quae adhuc prodierunt non satisfaciunt 
curiosis'. (Opera omnia I. 3, 747/228-230. 
·t 
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these precepts, and in works such as Adagia, Erasmus was making a 
highly selective use of classical tradition. The Christian-
humanist fusion could be achieved only by abandoning many of the 
strands that made up classicism. 
In Erasmus' case, this led him to a type of dialogue that 
was more indebted to Cicero than to Lucian. If his dramatic 
talents are higher than those of Cicero, he, no less tha~ the 
Roman, uses dialogue as a means of persuading us to a particular 
point of view, as a method of exposition that is more congenial 
to the young than a serious scholastic treatise. Fortunately, his 
literary merits are such that this is never felt as crude 
propagandising. He has chosen a medium well-adapted to his 
purpose and his audience, and in view of his belief that theology 
should be accessible to all, it is a medium in which his 
religious convictions and artistic instincts mesh perfectly. 
In The Godly Feast, as c. R. Thompson says, the 'blending of 
classical and Christian themes offers us an unequalled 
illustration of the spirit of Christian humanism in literature' .
33 
The garden setting has respectable classical antecedents in 
Cicero and Horace; the door to the house carries a portrait of 
St. Peter and Biblical injunctions in Latin, Greek and Hebrew; 
the chapel carries similar inscriptions. The fountain and even 
the herbs in the garden are given typological significance. After 
all this, it is not surprising that the dinner to which the 
guests are invited should be an allegory of the Last Supper, and 
that the conversation at the table should consist of exegesis of 
a text of St. Paul. Eusebius sums up the spirit of Christian 
humanism when he says: 
33. 
34. 
Sacred Scripture is of course the basic authority 
in everything; yet I sometimes run across ancient 
sayings or pagan writings -- even the poets' -- so 
purely and reverently and admirably expressed that 
I can't help believing their author~4 hearts were 
moved by some divine power (CE 65) . 
C. R. Thompson, p.47. 






There is more of this combination of Christianity with the 
best classical precepts in The Epicurean, the last dialogue to be 
written. More had earlier made the attempt to reconcile 
Christianity and Epicureanism in Utopia, although the ironic 
context of that work makes it difficult to disentangle his views 
from those of Hythloday. The identification of the higher 
pleasures of Epicureanism with those of Christianity had also 
been suggested in Erasmus' early work De contemptu mundi, and the 
final section of the The Praise of Folly had mingled Christian 
and nee-platonic views on the ultimate reality. As C. R. Thompson 
says of this dialogue: 'the colloquy is an example of how, 
according to the convictions of Erasmus and all other Christian 
humanists, the teachings of ancient philosophy are immeasurably 
. h d b h dd' . f h . . . . h 35 enr~c e y t e a ~t~on o C r~st~an ~ns~g ts'. 
We can also accept his statement that 
The real interest of the proposition Hedonius 
purports to demonstrate lies in its representative 
character as an argument that Christian and 
classical values are not mutually exclusive or 
totally irreconcilable, but that classical values 
must be tested and refined by Christian knowledg~ 
before their full potentiality can be realised. 
Perhaps the significant difference between Erasmus' treatment of 
this subject and that of More lies in their respective literary 
strategies: by placing the debate in a context of complex irony, 
More treats it in a double fashion, as an assumption on the part 
35. 
36. 
sed tamen ego nonnunquam offendo quaedam vel dicta a 
veteribus vel scripta ab Ethnicis, etiam poetis, tam 
caste, tam sancte, tam diuinitus, vt mihi non possim 
persuadere, quin pectus illorum, quum illa scriberent, 
numen aliquod bonum agitauerit'. (Opera omnia I.3, 
251/615-619). 
C. R. Thompson, p.535. 
Ibid., p.536. 
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of Hythloday, and as a subject for inquiry on the part of author 
and reader. More merely suggests the possible identification; 
Erasmus states it as a positive conviction. Again, this is due to 
their differing use of the dialogue form. More was utilising the 
complex irony he had learnt from Lucian; Erasmus was using the 
form, in the fashion of Cicero, for exposition. 
These 'Ciceronian' dialogues are far removed from anything 
that is recognisably Lucianic, yet Erasmus' use of Lucian has not 
left us totally unprepared for a development along these lines. 
Both in the translations he made from Lucian and in the prefaces 
he wrote for them, and in his use of Lucian in the Colloquies we 
see him responding to the moralistic and satirical elements and 
neglecting the more subtle element of ironic ambiguity. In his 
defence of the Colloquies he drew attention consistently to their 
didactic elements, and although this is no doubt partly 
attributable to the need to defend himself and his book as best 
he could, it nevertheless represents a strong and consistent 
element in Erasmus' thinking about literature. What irony is 
employed is largely confined to those colloquies in which he is 
attacking vice and corruption; when it comes to putting forward 
the positive views of The Godly Feast and The Epicurean irony is 
dropped in favour of direct exposition, albeit still in the form 
of dialogue. Evidently, the philosophia Christi was felt to be 
too serious a matter to be laid open to misinterpretation. 
It would be going too far to identify completely the 
philosophia Christi with the folly of the final pages of The 
Praise of Folly, but it can be said that The Godly Feast and The 
Epicurean stand in the same relation to the satirical pieces as 
the section on Christian folly stands to the account of the 
followers of Moria. They express the positive ideal for which one 
ought to strive, while the satire shows the consequences of 
neglecting to strive for it. 
The Colloquies repeat matter already touched upon in the 
earlier work. In The Praise of Folly, all of these matters are 
introduced in a unified work of fiction and one suffused with 
I 
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irony. Since the Colloquies represent Erasmus speaking directly, 
without disguise or artifice, our knowledge of the opinions and 
attitudes expressed there may be of considerable help in guiding 
us through Moria's labyrinth. Finally, what has been already said 
about Erasmus' response to Lucian in other works must be kept in 
mind when considering the more complex response exhibited in The 
Praise of Folly. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
'THE PRAISE OF FOLLY' : THE IRONY OF A CHRISTIAN SOLDIER 
1 
The Praise of Folly is rightly regarded as the most 
sophisticated and complex work of iro~y of the early sixteenth 
century. Commentators have laboured to explain the relationship 
between the dazzling paradoxes of the opening section, the bitter 
satire of the middle section, and those final, somewhat 
2 
mysterious pages on the Folly of the Cross. Erasmus himself 
points out the analogue with Lucian, but what we have seen of his 
use of Lucian in other works, and of his general attitude to 
literature, suggests that, regarded as a Lucianic work, The 
Praise of Folly will be problematic. 
In fact, the internal coherence of The Praise Q( Folly can 
best be demonstrated by regarding it in the light, not just of 
the influence of Lucian, but also of the Enchiridion militis 
Christianae. This little book, published in 1503, was intended as 
a guide to Christian living, and the point of view expressed here 
can be regarded as one pole of Erasmian thought, the other being 
1. Ooera omnia Erasmi Desiderii Roterodami, Ordinis quarti, 
Tomus tertius, Moriae encomium id est stvltitiae laus, edited 
by Clarence H. Miller, (Amsterdam and Oxford, 1979) . Erasmus 
of Rotterdam, Praise of Folly and Letter to Martin Dorp 1515, 
Translated by Betty Radice. With an introduction and notes by 
A. H. T. Levi, (Middlesex, 1971). All quotations are taken 
from these editions. 
2. Walter G. Kaiser, Praisers of Folly (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts,1963); Richard Sylvester, 'The Problem of Unity 
in "The Praise of Folly'", English Literary Renaissance 6 
(1976), 125-139; Wayne Rebhorn, 'The Metamorphoses of Moria's 
Structures and Meaning in "The Praise of Folly"', PMLA 89 
(1974), 463-476; Sr. Geraldine Thompson, Under Pretext of 
Praise: Satiric Mode in Erasmus' Fiction, (Toronto, 1973); 
Leonard F. Dean, 'The Praise of Folly and its Background,'in 
Twentieth Century Interpretations of 'The Praise of Folly', 





his love of classical literature. It is Erasmus' attempt to 
reconcile the Christian and humanist strands of his thought which 
results in that amalgam known as Christian humanism. It finds 
expression in the doctrine of the philosoohia Christi, the idea 
that Christ is to be regarded as an ethical teacher, comparable 
but vastly superior to the pagan philosophers.
3 
Considered in 
this light, The Praise of Folly can be seen less as Lucianic than 
as the outcome of the tension between two aspects of Erasmus' 
personality. From a generic point of view, much of its interest 
resides in Erasmus' success, or lack of it, in creating a perfect 
fusion of the Christian and the humanist. 
The genesis of the work is itself uncertain. In the 
prefatory letter to Thomas More, Erasmus gives an account of its 
origins which has not been universally accepted. He says he 
conceived the idea of writing a praise of folly while returning 
from Italy to England on horseback in 1509. Although Kaiser 
claims that this is a lie
4 
Erasmus, as Miller points out, ~ays 
only that it was on this journey that the idea occurred to him,
5 
not that this was when he wrote the book. Further information was 
given in a letter to the Louvain theologian Martin Dorp in 1515, 
a letter subsequently prefixed to all editions of the work. 
Erasmus says that after his return from Italy, he stayed wih More 
in England, and was without his books. Since illness prevented 
him from undertaking more serious studies, 
I began to amuse myself with a eulogy of folly, 
with no idea of publication but simply as a 
distraction from the pain of my complaint. Once 
started, I let some friends have a close look at 
what I'd done, so as to
6
add to my amusement by 
sharing the joke (218) . 
3. This idea is perhaps most simply expressed in Paraclesis, 
LB.V.139D, 141F. 
4. Kaiser, pp.31-32. 
5. Opera omnia, IV.3, p.14, n.2. 
6. 'Coepi per ocium Morias encomium ludere, nee in hoc 






They enjoyed it and urged him to do more: 'I did as they asked, 
and spent a week, more or less, on the job: too long, I'm sure, 
for such a lightweight subject' (218) .
7 
His friends then 
published it in France, but from a faulty and incomplete copy. It 
went through seven reprints, with the first authorised edition 
8 
being published in Paris in July 1512. 
This edition, however, did not represent the final state of 
the text. Extensive additions were made in the Strasbourg edition 
9 
of November 1514, while Froben's Basel edition of 1515 
included, as well as some 54 new sidenotes, the commentary of 
10 
Listrius, itself partly written by Erasmus. The Froben edition 
of 1516 was the first to contain the letter to Dorp, as well as 
11 
the last long added passage. It can be regarded as 
representing Erasmus' final intentions. Any study of The Praise 
of Folly must take account not only of this final text, but also 
of its differences from the text of the first authorised edition. 
The alterations in the text, plus the content of Listrius' notes, 
can yield valuable information about which sections of the text 
he wished to revise and emphasise. 
In the letter to Dorp, Erasmus not only explained the 
circumstances of the work's composition and original publication, 
but replied to a number of specific criticisms made by Dorp, and 
went on to explain how The Praise of Folly was related to his 
other works: 
auocamento leuarem. Operis incoepti gustum amiculis 
aliquot exhibui, quo iucundior esset risus compluribus 
communis' (Allen II, 337 /130-4) . 





impendi; qui sane sumptus mihi pro argumenti pendere nimius 
etiam videbatur' (Allen II, 337 /134-6) . 
OQera omnia IV.3, p.42. 
Ibid., p.43. 
Ibid., p.45. 
Ibid., p. 46. 
10 6 
My aim in Folly was exactly the same as in my other 
works. Only the presentation was different. In the 
Enchiridion I simply outlined the pattern of Christian 
life. In my little book The Education of the Prince I 
offered plain advice on how to instruct a prince. In my 
Panegyric I did the same under the veil of eulogy as I 
had done elsewhere explicitly. And in Folly I expressed 
the same ideas as those in the Enchiridion, but in the 
form of a joke. I wanted to advise, not to rebuke, to do 
good, not injY2Y' to work for, not against the interests 
of men (215) ~ 
It is most unlikely that the whole of The Praise of Folly has 
struck any reader as saying the same thing as the Enchiridion. 
Erasmus, it seems, is attempting to draw our attention to what he 
considered to be the most important elements in the work, and, in 
terms of the comparison with Enchiridion, these are most 
obviously the platonised Christianity of the final section 
although, as we shall see, there are other parallelS~ that are 
equally significant. The importance of this view of the work to 
Erasmus is confirmed by its placement in his list of his works. 
It is assigned to a fourth volume of works 'quae faciunt ad morum 
institutionem' (Allen I, p.39/33), and is listed thus: 'The 
Praise of Folly, a book which jokes so that it may treat serious 
d 't d 't b . . 1 d d . th' 1 
13 
matters, so on won er at ~ s e~ng ~nc u e ~n ~s vo ume'. 
Erasmus clearly regarded its didactic element as constituting the 
work's raison d'etre. 
If Erasmus regarded the work as being one of instruction, 
then what is the purpose of the opening section? The prefatory 
12. 'Nee aliud omnino spectauimus in Moria quam quod in caeteris 
lucubrationibus, tametsi via diuersa. In Enchiridio 
simpliciter Christianae vitae formam tradidimus. In libello 
De principis institutione palam admonemus quibus rebus 
oporteat esse instructum. In Panegyrico sub laudis praetextu 
hoc ipsum tamen agimus oblique quod illic egimus aperta 
fronte. Nee aliud agitur in Moria sub specie lusus quam actum 
est in Enchiridio. Admonere voluimus,non mordere; prodesse, 
non laedere; consulere moribus hominum, non officere' (Allen 
II, 337 /86-94) . 
13. 'Morias encomium, qui libellus sic nugatur vt seria doceat, 





letter to More confuses matters further, since the statements 
there as to the character of the work are peculiarly pertinent to 
the first section. It should be noted also that this letter is 
dated 1518 -- that is, three years after the date of the first 
authorised edition. Miller suggests plausibly that, since this 
date was first added in the Froben edition of 1522, Erasmus' 
memory was faulty when he supplied the information to his 
publisher.
14 
He further concludes that the 'hypothesis that Erasmus sent 
to More a manuscript copy of the Moria, with the dedicatory 
letter prefixed, from some residence in the English countryside 
. 1510 . 1 'bl d . 1 ' 15 h h d . 1n 1s p aus1 e am s1mp e . W atever t e correct at1ng 
of this letter, it still stands as an introduction to Erasmus' 
view of what he has done in The Praise of Folly, so that an 
examination of its contents may usefully preface an examination 
of the work as a whole. As Miller says of this letter: 'the 
conventional explanations and defenses given in this letter are 
intended for the public, not for Thomas More ... ',
16 
a 
consideration which serves to make more interesting the letter's 
failure to account for the work as a whole. 
Erasmus tells us how he came to conceive of his jeu 
d'esprit, and anticipates criticism of its frivolousness and 
sarcasm (68/23;57). He invokes the analogies of Lucian, Old 
Comedy, Homer, Virgil, Ovid and others (68/24-33;57). He says 
that learning, like other walks of life, needs its relaxation and 





Jokes can be handled in such a way that any reader 
who is not altogether lacking in discernment can 
scent something far more rewarding in them than the 
crabbed an~7 specious arguments of some people we 
know (59) . 
Opera omnia IV.3, p.l5. 
Ibid., p.15. 
Ibid., p.13. 








Nothing is so trivial as treating serious subjects 
in a trivial manner; and similarly, nothing is more 
entertaining than treating trivialities in such a 
way as to make it clear th~~ you are doing anything 
but trifle with them (59) . 
108 
Notably in this letter, Erasmus does no more than hint that 
his work contains a serious message, concealed beneath all the 
joking; nowhere does he give any indication of what this message 
might be. He does, to be sure, draw attention to the satirical 
passages, but the problematic nature of the letter stems from the 
list of analogues provided. Commenting on this, Miller writes 
that many of the examples cited belong neither to paradoxical 
. t 't h 'd . t' . 19 s encom~um or even o ~ s genus, t e ep~ e~c ~c orat~on. r. G. 
Thompson notes that the list of precedents co~•rrtses no work as 
I . 
complex as his own 'which contains all the qualities of all the 
works Erasmus lists' .
20 
He combines and fuses them with each 
other and with his critical purpose so that they become satire.
21 
Erasmus has described his work as a paradoxical encomium, 
and the triple pun of the title lends support to this. But if we 
accept the definition of that genre offered by Arthur S. Pease as 
a species of oration in which 'the legitimate methods of the 
encomium are applied to persons or objects in themselves 
obviously unworthy of praise, as being trivial, ugly, useless, 
frugis referat lector non omnino naris obesae, quam ex 
quorundam tetricis ac splendidis argumentis?' (ibid., 
68/37-39) . 
18. 'Vt enim nihil nugacius, quam seria nugatorie tractare, 
ita nihil festiuius quam ita tractare nugas, vt minus 
nihil quam nugatus fuisse videaris' (ibid., 68/42-44). 
19. Opera omnia, IV.3, p.18. 
20. Thompson, p.53. 
21. Ibid., p.55 . 
·~ . . 
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ridiculous, d~ngerous or vicious• 22 , then we may legitimately 
question whether such a description is applicable to the whole of 
The Praise of Folly. It certainly applies to the first section, 
but Erasmus is misleading in his implication that the whole work 
can be so described. Whether he is deliberately misleading the 
reader in order to arouse expectations that he will later 
undermine, or whether he is using the term rather loosely to 
describe, not so much the content of his work as its apparent 
looseness of structure, is a question which cannot be fully 
answered until the whole work has been examined. 
In order to see how the tripartite structure and the irony 
work in practice, it is necessary to analyse the content of The 
Praise of Folly. We need to know what constitutes Moria's 
original point of view; how, when and why her mask is allowed to 
slip; and what the transitions are between the various sections. 
The title of the work is what first commands attention. 
~IAL ErKOMION, ID EST, STVLTICIAE LAUS, ERASMI ROTERODAMI 
DECLAMATIO (71/1-3). As it has been explained by Walter Kaiser, 
Erasmus' great originality ... was to make 
Stultitia both the author and the subject of her 
encomion, and to conceive of ''Moriae'' as being 
simultaneously both objective and subjective 
genitive. Thus ''The Praise of Folly'' only 
translates half of the title; it might be more 
23 
accurately rendered as ''Folly's Praise of Folly''. 
Further, 'the: praise of folly being a mock praise, is, in fact, 
the censure of folly; but if Folly is thus censuring folly, 
wisdom would presumably praise folly.•
24 
In the final section, 
this is precisely what happens. 
22. Arthurs. Pease, 'Things Without Honour', Classical 
Philology 21 (1926), 27-42 (pp.28-29). 
23. Kaiser, p.36. 





The dazzling paradoxes of folly make it necess~ry, as Wayne 
25 
Rebhorn notes, to modify the view of H. H. Hudson and Walter 
26 
Kaiser that the book follows an elaborate rhetorical pattern. 
In a formal sense, this is true enough. It is after all, cast in 
the form of a piece of extempore rhetoric, and must therefore 
make structural and logical use of the formal parts of a speech. 
But to grasp this aspect of the book is not to understand the 
book as a whole, since the actual content of the speech is of 
much more importance than literary analogues of any sort. In this 
sense, Kaiser provides a useful way into The Praise of Folly with 
his detailed analysis of the first sentence. A speech designed to 
destroy illusions opens with 'Vtcunque de me vulgo mortales 
loquuntur' (71/5), placing Moria in opposition to common opinions 
which are 'stultissimos' (71/6). Moria insists on her 
intelligence: 'neque enim sum nescia' (71/5); her uniqueness: 
'hanc, inquam, esse vnam' (71/6-7); her popularity: 'hunc coetum 
frequentissimum' (71/8); and her superiority: 'meo numine deos 
atque homines exhilaro' (71/7) . The argument is clinched with a 
dubious proof which yet has some validity -- the audience is 
' h' h h 1 h' 27 obv~ously laug ~ng at er, yet t ey are aug ~ng. 
We have at once been made aware of Moria's slippery logic, 
her use of classical allusions to bolster her position, and her 
boastfulness -- all characteristics that mark the first part of 
her speech. Erasmus next has her associate herself with sunshine, 
vernality and pleasure -- associations that are maintained 
consistently, just as her opponents are associated with their 
opposites. 
Moria also outlines the general character of her speech, 
setting it off from academic exercises: 
25. Rebhorn, p.463. 
26. Desiderius Erasmus, The Praise of Folly, translated from the 
Latin, with an Essay and commentary, by Hoyt Hopewell Hudson 
(Princeton, 1951), 'Commentary', passim.; Kaiser, pp.39-50. 
27. Kaiser, pp.41-42. 
From me you're going to hear a speech which is 
extempore and quite un~9epared, but all the more 
genuine for that (66). 
None of you need expect me to follow the usual 
practice of ordinary rhetoricians and explain 
royse~~ by definition, still less by division (66-
67). 
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Such a procedure would limit her divinity and would be 
superfluous: 'when I am here before you, for you to look at with 
your own eyes: (67) .
30 
Again, she employs ambiguity and paradox. 
On one level, what she is doing is a game not worth a serious 
answer; on another level, she positively claims value in 
naturalness and truth in spontaneity. Furthermore, although 
Moria's tone here may be jocular, later attacks on the schoolmen 
and their rhetoric are much more in earnest. Erasmus is 
introducing themes that he will later develop in more detail. It 
is these levels of ambiguity in much of what Moria says that make 
her speech so elusive. 
Having thus attacked the rhetoricians, she goes on to 
announce herself as 'the true bestower of good things, called 
STULTITIA in Latin, MORIA in Greek' (67),
31 
adding that the mere 
sight of her prevents her from being taken for wisdom. This 
stressing of her foolishness serves Erasmus' purpose of 
overturning accepted definitions of wisdom and foolishness. Once 
overturned, they can be redefined on a new, more transcendent 
level. The existence of a strategy such as this seems to be 
confirmed by another attack on philosophers 'who lay special 
28. 'A me extemporariam quidem illam et illaboratam, sed 
tanto veriorem audietis orationem' (74/50-51). 
29. 'At ne quis iam a nobis expectet vt iuxta vulgarium 
istorum Rhetorum consuetudinem meipsam finitione 
explicem, porro vt diuidam, multo minus' (74/57-58). 
30. 'cum ipsam me coram praesentes praesentem oculis intueamini' 
(74/62). 
31. 'vera illa largitrix, ~~v quam Latini Stulticiam, Graeci 
/ 






claim to be called the personification of Wisdom ... However hard 
they try to keep up the illusion, their ears stick up and betray 
the Midas in them' (67-68) .
32 
Erasmus seems, then, to be heading towards a relatively 
simple reversal of terms, in which 'wisdom' would become 
'foolishness' and vice versa. But at this point he complicates 
the matter by introducing doubts as to the trustworthiness of his 
persona. He has Moria embark on a digression to attack 
rhetoricians who 
think it a splendid feat if they can work a few 
silly little Greek words, like pieces of mosaic, 
into their Latin speeches, however out of place 
they are. Then if they still need something out of 
the ordinary, they dig four or five obsolete words 
out of mouldy manuscrip~~' with which to cloud the 
meaning for the reader. 
But this is a fair description of much of her own procedure, as 
the digression ends with her quoting two Greek proverbs! 
Is this merely a local witticism, or is Erasmus consciously 
involving Moria in her own irony? If so, to what purpose? He 
could, of course invent an untrustworthy persona as a matter of 
self-protection: from a speaker such as this, who could take 
seriously the later satirical catalogue of followers? 
Alternatively, the use of such a persona might be intended to 
dislocate and numb the reader, so as to prepare him for the later 
radical redefinition of wisdom. Or Erasmus may be inviting us to 
scrutinise closely what Moria is actually saying, lest we get 
carried away by her cheerful manner and genial good humour. In 
32 . 
33. 
'qui maxime Sapientiae personam ac titulum sibi vendicant 
... Quamuis autem sedulo fingant, tamen alicunde prominentes 
auriculae Midam produnt' (74/70-73). 
'praeclarum facinus esse ducunt latinis orationibus 
subinde graeculas aliquot voculas velut emblemata 
intertexere, etiam' si nunc non erat his locus. Porro si 
desunt exotica, e putribus chartis quatuor aut quinque 







fact, Erasmus has invented a persona under whose auspices he can 
throw out suggestions and ideas which he himself does not 
necessarily accept. Through the use of such a persona, he could 
fully explore the paradoxes inherent in human nature; he could 
even raise the possiblity, arrived at not by any definite 
statement, but by a process of cumulative suggestion, that human 
nature is in essence problematical and paradoxical, and that no 
system of philosophy or psychology could fully account for it. 
What, then, does Moria have to say of herself and of human 
nature? In the manner of the classical eulogy, she tells us of 
her parentage and birthplace. We are again reminded that we are 
not to take seriously everything that Moria says when she lists 
her attendants as Philautia, Kolakia, Lethe, Misaponia, Hedone, 
Anoia, Tryphe, Comus and Negretos Hypnos. Since the benefits of 
having such attendants are not immediately obvious, we are 
immediately led into an ambiguous attitude towards the speaker: 
her energy of speech, her good humour, and candour are all 
attractive qualities, but she is also linked with the common 
associations both of her own name and those of her attendants. It 
will be interesting indeed to see how such a goddess can benefit 
mankind. It is her claim that she does benefit mankind: 'why 
shouldn't I rightly be recognized and named the Alpha of all the 
gods, when I dispense every benefit to all alike?' (74) .
34 
As she begins to enumerate these benefits, she is, as Sr. 
h t t d t 1 't t of 14fe,
35 
T ompson no es, presen e as a na ura concom~ an ~ as 
a part of man's estate not crying out for rebuke or remedy, and 
with no element of human choice in it.
36 
She is the begetter of 
life, since 'the propagator of the human race is that part which 
is so foolish and absurd that it can't be named without raising a 
34. 'cur non ego iure deorum omnium ~A$a dicar habearque, quae 
vna omnibus largior omnia?' (80/141-142). 
35. Thompson, p.57. 












Similarly, matrimony owes its existence to Anoia, 
and all advantages throughout life are provided by Folly. What 
would life be without pleasure? That is, without some seasoning 
of folly? She then goes on to demonstrate the existence of folly 
in all ages of life, and concludes: 
But if mortals would henceforth have no truck with 
wisdom and spend all their time with me, there 
would be no more old age and
3
ghey could be happy 
enjoying eternal youth (81) . 
She contrasts this state with that of the philosophers: 
You must have seen those soured individuals who are 
so wrapped up in their philosophic studies or other 
serious, exacting affairs 3~at they are old before 
they were ever young; (81) 
It is at this point that we begin to see something of Folly's 
strategy, and to obtain some hint of what Erasmus is working 
towards: Moria constantly refers to the philosophers by whom 
she means the Stoics -- as upholders of a creed based on sterile 
reason. The life of reason can be made to sound superficially 
attractive, but it is, in their case, based on the suppression of 
all normal human instincts. Yet, as Moria wittily points out: 'In 
fact, if the philosopher ever wants to be a father it's me he has 
37. 'imo ea pars adeo stulta adeoque ridicula, vt nee nominari 
citra risum possit, humani generis est propagatrix' (80/158-
159) . 
38. 'Quod si mortales prorsus ab omni sapientiae commercio 
temperarent ac perpetuo mecum aetatem agerent, ne esset 
quidem vllum senium, verum perpetua iuuenta fruerentur 
felices' (84/236-239) . 
39. 'An non videtis tetricos istos et vel philosophiae 
studiis vel seriis et arduis addictos negociis, 





to call on- yes, me' (76) .
40 
In other words, the Stoic's life of 
reason is an unattainable, not to say undesirable, ideal, a 
species of inhumanity in the guise of wisdom. 
So far we may follow her without difficulty. But what is it 
which she opposes to such a conception? It is, in fact, the so-
called natural life, life lived without any semblance of reason 
at all. Moria:carefully selects examples to illustrate her 
argument, but each is of a situation in which reason would be 
either unnatural -- the baby, the senile old man -- or 
superfluous -- the lover, the mother in childbirth. They are by 
no means representative of the whole range of human activity. In 
arguing for an extreme point of view, she sets up an opposite and 
equally unreal extreme as justification for her position. That, 
of course, is a standard debating trick, but it ignores the 
possibility of a middle course, an estate of man in which reason 
is fully operative but kept in its proper place. 
She expands upon this when she comes to set out explicitly 
the .terms of her argument: 
By Stoic definition wisdom means nothing else but 
being ruled by reason; and folly, by contrast, is 
41 
being swayed by the dictates of the passions (87). 
Stoicism is invoked as the standard against which the benefits of 
folly must be measured. There are, in Moria's logic, only these 
two alternatives: the desiccated life of reason or the pleasures 
of folly, a point upon which she now expands: Jupiter has given 
man more passion than reason, and has set up anger and lust as 
tyrants in opposition to reason: 
40. 'In summa me, me inquam, sapiens ille accersat oportet, si 
modo pater esse velit' (80/154/155) . 
I 
41. 'Etenim cum Stoicis definit~oribus nihil aliud sit 
sapientia quam duci ratione, contra stulticia affectuum 
arbitrio moueri' (88/316-90/318) . 
How far reason can prevail against the combined 
forces of these two the common life of man makes 
quit~ clear. She does the only thing she can, and 
shouts herself hoarse repeating formulas of virtue, 
while the other two have only to bid her go hang 
herself and intensify their hateful opposition 
until at last their ~~ler is exhausted, gives up 
and surrenders (87) . 
116 
Moria is here appealing to that Menippean norm of 'the mean and 
sure estate', the life of the common man, and we can accept that, 
for the moment, Erasmus is content to use this as a standard by 
which he can attack arid philosophers. In the Enchiridion, 
however, Erasmus had utilised this opposition of reason and 
passion and come down in favour of reason. The norms of Menippean 
satire and of;Erasmian piety are divergent, in this sense; yet, 
in another sense, they do converge in their joint opposition to 
abstract speculation. The attempt to fuse the two, then, ought to 
result in a creative tension between them. 
For the moment, though, we pass over the fact that Moria, in 
preferl""l~~j folly to reason, is opposing herself to a doctrine 
which we know Erasmus to have held, and note that the way in 
which her argument makes use of generalisations which are 
manifestly highly questionable is illustrated by her further 
comment that, on her advice, Nature had sweetened man's harsh 
nature by giving him woman: 
For Plato's apparent doubt whether to place woman 
in the category of rational animal or brute beast 
is intended t~3point out the remarkable folly of 
her sex (88) . 
42. 'Aduersus has geminas capias quantum valeat ratio, 
communis hominum vita satis declarat, cum illa, quod 
vnum licet, vel usque ad rauim reclamat et honesti 
dictat formulas, verum hi laqueum regi suo remittunt 
multoque odiosius obstrepunt, donee iam ipse quoque 
fessus vltro cedit ac manus dat' (90/324-328) . 
43. 'Nam quod Plato dubitare videtur, vtro in genere ponat 
mulierem, rationalium animantium an brutorum, nihil 
aliud voluit quam insignem eius sexus stulticiam 
indicare' (90/334-336). 
117 
Moria's view of the nature of woman is yet another example 
of her use of only that evidence which supports her case, since, 
as Miller points out, she has quoted from the Timaeus while 
ignoring a passage in the Republic where Plato insists on the 
44 essential equality of men and women (Tim. 76E; Rep. 452E-456A). 
Having elaborated her basic position in this way, Moria now 
returns to her account of her operation among mankind. She allows 
women to tyrannise over men to give pleasure to the latter 
(90/346-359); she adds spice to drinking parties (91/360-92/376); 
she is the support of friendship, as evidenced by the way in 
which we ignore our friends' faults and build up illusions 
(92/377-391). Again, at this point, she contrasts her benefits 
with those of the Stoics: 'But among these Stoic philosopher-gods 
either no friendship forms at all, or else it is a sour and 
45 
ungracious sort of relationship ... ' (91). She now turns to an 
account of the role of folly in war which has more of a satirical 
tone than anything she has yet said. Wise men are useless in war: 
'The need is for stout and sturdy fellows with all the daring 
possible and the minimum of brain' (96) . 46 And again: 
Besides, it's the spongers, pimps, robbers, 
murderers, peasants, morons, debtors and that sort 
of scum of the earth who provide the glories of 
war, ~9t the philosophers and their midnight oil 
( 9 6) ~ 
44. Opera omnia IV.3, p.91, n.11 
45. 'cum interim inter sapientes istos deos aut omnino non 
coalescit amicitia aut tetrica quaedam et insuauis intercedit 
..• , ( 92/392-393) . 
46. 'crassis ac pinguibus opus est, quam quibus plurimum adsit 
audaciae, mentis quam minimum' (96/470-471). 
47. 'alioque'parasitis, lenonibus, latronibus, sicariis, 
agricolis~ stupidis, obaeratis et huiusmodi mortalium 




Why has the tone suddenly become more serious? Has Erasmus 
let Moria drop her mask? Since this account of war can be 
parallelled in other places in Erasmus, what is the implication 
of putting it,into the mouth of a persona whom we have already 
come to distrust? Moria, of course, is exemplifying her opinion 
that great deeds cannot be performed without the aid of folly, 
but there has been a perceptible shift in tone from the comic to 
the satiric. However, with the next section, which modulates into 
another attack on the philosophers, we are back with Moria's 
jesting banter. Perhaps Erasmus felt himself unable to write 
lightly of war under any circumstances, even to maintain the 
decorum of a fictional character, and this explanation, taken in 
conjunction with the second part of The Praise Q[ Folly surely 
indicates that when his deepest feelings were engaged, the tone 
and idiom of Moria was not his natural mode of expression. 
The new attack on the philosophers is aimed, not at the 
Stoics, but at representative classical philosophers such as 
Theophrastus, Cicero, Quintilian, Plato, Cato and Marcus 
Aurelius. The style and mode of argument are familiar: random 
examples are adduced to show that philosophers are useless for 
any practice in life. Drawing from Aristophanes' Clouds, Moria 
says of Socrates: 
For while he was philosophising about clouds and 
ideas, measuring a flea's foot and marvelling at a 
midge's humrnirng, he learned no~ging about the 
affairs of ordinary life (97). 
Other philosophers have ben equally impotent in practical 
a 
affairs, and we note that Moria is utilisirtjAnow familiar 
technique of selective use of examples -- no mention is made of 
Solon, for example, and no mention is made of the more positive 
side of all those philosophers criticised. The result, too, is 
familiar: Moria defends her own claims against those of the 
48. 'Narn durn nubes et ideas philosophatur, durn pulicis 
pedes rnetititur, durn culicurn vocern rniratur, quae ad 
vitam communern attinent non didicit' (98/485-486). 
\' 
philosophers in a way which increases our scepticism about her 
credibility. And this is so in the generalised denunciation of 
wise men who are gloomy at dinner and morose at the theater; 
unskilled in everyday affairs, they are of no use to anybody. 
119 
Moria, of course, has a vested interest in attacking the 
philosophers, since she has to show that it is she, not they, who 
rules life. She continues this task by showing that she is 
responsible for the foundation of civilised society. Flattery was 
what brought men together, through the lyres of Amphion and 
Orpheus, while fables and childish stories have often been more 
effective than the speeches of philosophers (100/53lff.;100). No 
state has ever modelled itself on the precepts of Plato, 
Aristotle or Socrates. And we note that Moria is making full use 
of an empirical approach to these problems, an attitude that, 
ironically of course, amounts to claiming that whatever is, is 
right. Yet a more serious note creeps in when she says: 
Then there are changes of first and second names, 
divine honours awarded to a nobody, official 
ceremonies designed to raise even the most criminal 
of tyrants to the level of the gods. All this is 
utterly foolish ... Yet from this source spring the 
deeds of valiant heroes to be lauded t~ 9the skies in the writings of eloquent men (102) . 
We can see, in fact, that as the speech develops, it 
becomes, through imperceptible shifts in tone, increasingly more 
serious, until it finally approaches the satirical list of 
followers. This becomes fully apparent when Moria begins to talk 
about prudence. From this point , the debate between Moria and 
the Stoics, always present, becomes fully explicit, and its 
presence once:again raises the primary question of the relative 
validity of the claims of folly and reason to rule man's life. 
49. 'Adde his nominum et cognominum adoptiones, adde 
diuinos honores homuncioni exhibitos, adde publicis 
cermoniis in deos relates etiam sceleratissimos 
tyrannos. Stultissima sunt haec ... Atqui hoc fonte nata 
sunt fortium heroum facinora, quae tot eloqentium 





Naturally, Moria assumes that her audience will find incredible 
her claim to the possession of prud~nce; nevertheless, she 
launches into a lengthy defence of it. Since prudence develops 
through experience, she asks: 
does the honour of possessing a claim to it rightly 
belong to the wise man who attempts nothing, partly 
through his sense of propriety, partly through his 
natural timidity, or to the fool who isn't deterred 
from anything either by the propriety which he 
hasn't got or50he dangers which he doesn't think about? (102). 
Again she makes use of her factitious absolute division between 
the wise man and the fool, so that this central section of her 
argument --and she clearly considers it to be central -- is 
subject to the same strictures as have been applied to previous 
sections. She goes on to say that shame and fear are the two 
chief obstacles to obtaining knowledge of things, and that folly 
liberates us from these. She ignores, of course, the evident fact 
that one needs a certain amount of reason to make sense of 
experience. 
Now she begins to talk of another sort of reason which comes 
from forming opinions on life, a type which is not really 
possessed by those who claim to possess it. In order to explain 
this, Moria introduces the figure of the Silenus -- which Erasmus 
had also used in Enchiridion (LB.V.29B) -- with its two opposite 
faces. The point of the comparison is this: that life, like a 
play, is an illusion, and to destroy the illusion is to destroy 
the whole play. The use of such illusions is a sort of pretence, 
'but it is the only way to act out this farce' . Moria now 
introduces the figure of the wise man from the sky, who 
deliberately shatters a variety of human illusions; such a one 
50. 'in vtrum magis competet eius cognominis hones, in 
sapientem, qui partim ob pudorem partim ob animi 
timiditatem nihil aggreditur, an in stultum, quem neque 
pudor, quo vacat, neque periculum, quod non perpendit, 








would rightly be considered mad: 'Nothing is so foolish as 
mistimed wisdom, and nothing less sensible than misplaced sense' 
(105) .
51 
Man should adapt himself to things as they are, since 
it is a true sign of prudence not to want wisdom beyond one's 
mortal lot, to be willing to overlook things with the rest of the 
' world, and to wear one's illusions with a good grace. 
People say that this is really a sign of folly, and 
I'm not setting out to deny it -- so long as 
they'll admit on their side that this5~s the only 
way to play the comedy of life (105) . 
Much needs to be said about such an important section. It is 
clear that it looks both backwards and forwards, and thus stands 
at a pivotal point in the text. Up to this point, Moria's 
discourse has consisted largely of her defence of the role of 
illusion in the life of mankind. Opposed to this have been the 
views of the philosophers as recounted by Moria, and it is these 
views that culminate in the figure of the sky-man, who uses 
illusion to destroy illusion, stripping the masks off the actors 
to reveal what lies within. 
The image of life-as-a-play comes, of course, from Lucian, 
and is the most important borrowing from that author in The 
Praise of Folly. Lucian's use of the metaphor was discussed in 
Chapter One, where it was argued that it has rather more 
complexity than is at first apparent. Certainly, it is more 
complex than allowed for by Leonard F. Dean in his discussion of 
the passage in The Praise of Folly. He argues that Lucian's use 
of irony 'rarely exceeds the limits set for that device by the 
classical rhetoricians'
53 
-- it is primarily a forensic weapon. 
51. 'Vt nihil est stultius praepostera sapientia, ita peruersa 
prudentia nihil imprudentius' (104/612-106/613). 
52. 'At istud ipsurn, inquiunt, stulticiae est. Haud equidem 
inficias iuerim, modo fateantur illi vicissim hoc esse 
vitae fabulam agere' (106/617-619) • 




In contrast, the irony of Erasmus in the passage under discussion 
is like the irony derived from dramatic literature; it is the 
complex irony of expressing simultaneously several points of 
view, and 'the meaning of the irony ... is not that of any one 
point of view ... but of all of them interacting upon each 
54 
other' . 
Certainly, this stands as a fine description of the working 
of complex irony, but that it is really an account of the 
particular functioning of The Praise Q[ Folly is open to doubt. 
In particular, the potential complexity of the Lucianic metaphor 
is not allowed full development, since Erasmus will cut through 
it with his idealism in the final section. And this idealism is 
itself only an extension of the insistent intrusion upon Moria's 
voice of the voice of reason, as represented, first by various 
anonymous philosophers, and now, by these two crucial metaphors. 
The full elaboration of the metaphor of life-as-a-play in a 
complex irony would have to wait for More's Utopia. 
What Erasmus does with the image is characteristic of his 
use of Lucian in general. That is, he strips away the ironic 
complexity, and reads a Lucianic text as simple moralising. We 
must thus qualify the view expounded by Walter Kaiser, who 
describes Moria's technique up to this point as a transvaluation 
i 
of values. To each Stoic virtue, he says, such as restraint and 
reason, she counterposes an Epicurean opposite. 'Erasmus pretends 
to espouse the outrageous Epicurean licenses in order to show the 
fallacy of their Stoic restraints. He does so, not to advocate 
without qualification the former, but rather to redefine the 
latter' .
55 
In this way, the emblem of the Silenus is emblematic 
of the whole speech -- while seemin~ly trifling, it conceals 
divine wisdom. Further, true prudence consists in not noticing 
h d . . . h ff . 
56 
t e contra ~ct~ons ~n uman a a~rs. 
54. Ibid., p.54. 
55. Kaiser, p.55. 
56. Ibid., p.60. 
l' 
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And Moria herself is a sort of Silenus. 'In a certain sense, 
it is perverse not to accommodate oneself to things as they 
are;in another sense, it is folly to accept the world as it is' .
57 
Values are transmuted by praising their opposites. Similarly, the 
value of wine and self-love are both based on an understanding 
and acceptance of the frailties and cares of human existence. 
Finally, Moria's praise of passion, far from being merely the 
counsel of a fool, seems too deeply-felt to be rejected in those 
terms. The value of passion and reason both represent facets of 
Erasmus' thought, with that in The Praise Qt Folly qualifying 
that in Enchiridion. 
Whether The Praise of Folly does qualify Enchiridion in this 
way is open to doubt. In fact, at this point Moria is making a 
plea for the value of illusion in man's life, a plea which needs 
to be compared with what Erasmus had to say about illusion in the 
Enchiridion. Moria begins by praising her benevolent art of 
deception, and we find this illuminated by the statement in . 
Enchiridion that 'Yet in this matter the great majority of 
mankind is often deceived, for the world, like some deceitful 
magician, captivates their minds with seductive blandishments' .
58 
We are told also that people live in false security, closing 
their minds to reality (29/1A) . Here we find an unequivocal 
statement that helps us place in perspective the opening section 
of The Praise of Folly. Clearly, it could not have been Erasmus' 
intention to accept Moria's valuation of these 'harmless 
follies'. We now have an indication as to why Erasmus so 
consistently undermined Moria's voice in this section: her voice 
is that of the 'deceitful magician' of Enchiridion, praising the 
blandishments of the world. It is true enough that if The Praise 
of Folly were a consistent, thoroughgoing piece of complex irony, 
57. Ibid., p.60. 
58. The Handbook of the Militant Christian in The Essential 
Erasmus, translated by John P. Dolan (New York, 1964), pp.28-
29; nimisque falli vulgus hominum, quorum animos mundus hie 
praestigiator blandissimis ludibriis tenet occupatos 
(LB. V .1A). 
.,' 
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then it would'function in the way Kaiser suggests. But it is not 
consistent precisely because Erasmus was unable to accept the 
logic of complex irony, abandoning it first for satire, then for 
moral exhortation identical with Enchiridion in both tone and 
content. 
The digression on the sky-man completed, Moria moves on to 
her next point, introduced with some solemnity: 
Come, then, for a while, daughters of Jove, while I 
show that no one can approach that perfect wisdom 
which the wise call the ci~~del of bliss unless 
Folly shows the way (105) . 
The emotions belong to folly, reason to the wise man: 
But in fact these emotions not only act as guides 
to those hastening towards the haven of wisdom, but 
also wherever virtue is put into practice they are 
always present to act like spurs ~Bd goads as 
incentives towards success (106) . 
And to strip the wise man of all emotions leaves only a marble 
statue of a man, dull and devoid of all human feeling. But the 
implied alternative is a man devoid of reason, and again we feel 
the partial truth of what she says as well as the inadequacy of 
her own position. 
This attack on the Stoic wise man is elaborated in the 
following pas~age with Moria asking rhetorically: 
Who wouldn't flee in terror from a man like that as 
a monstrous apparition, deaf as he is to all 
59. 'Adeste igitur paulisper, Iouis filiae, dum ostendo nee 
ad egregiam illam sapientiam ac felicitatis, vt ipsi 
vacant, arcem, aditum esse cuiquam nisi stulticia duce' 
(106/ 622-624) . 
60. 'Verum affectus isti non solum paedagogorum vice 
funguntur ad sapientiae portum properantibus, verumetiam 
in omni virtutis functione ceu calcaria stimulique 
quidam adesse solent, velut ad bene agendum 
exhortato:res' (106/628-630) . 
_( 
i 
natural feelings and no mot! moved by love or pity 
or any emotions ... (106). 
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This, she says, is the type of the wise man; most people would 
prefer someone from the ordinary run of fools, who is congenial 
and who thinks nothing human to be alien to himself. Having ended 
this attack on a rhetorical high note, she professes to be bored 
with the wise man and moves on to 'more profitable themes' (107) . 
She moves, in fact, to the characteristically Lucianic 
'episcopic' point of view, considering the life of man from 'a 
great height', and seeing all its disasters. The passage serves 
two functions. It helps to generalise the entire argument up to 
this point, allowing Moria to claim that those whom weariness of 
life drove to suicide were all connected with wisdom, while she 
brings help to men in their miseries. In spite of having no 
evident reason for living, they are still pleased with life, and 
eager to use any number of illusory practices to render it more 
pleasant. 
All this raises a general laugh for what it is --
absolute foolishness; but meanwhile they're pleased 
withithemselves, lead a life of supreme delight 
suffused with sweet fantas~~ and owe all their 
happiness to me (109-110) • 
She characteristically sets up the false, but rhetorically 
effective, opposites of illusion or suicide in this summation of 
the first section of her argument. But while she dwells on 
harmless illusions, Erasmus has also had her prepare us for the 
bitingly satirical account of harmful illusions by introducing 
61. 'Quis enim non istiusmodi hominem ceu portentum ac 
spectrum fugitet horreatque, qui ad omnes naturae sensus 
obsurduerit, qui nullis sit affectibus, nee amore nee 
misericor~ia magis commoueatur ... ' (106/637-640). 
62. 'Ridentur haec ab omnibus, tanquam (vti sunt) 
stultissima, at ipsae sibi placent, et in summis interim 
versantur,deliciis, totasque sese melle perungunt, meo 
videlicet beneficio felices' (108/694-110/697). 
'',1 
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such items as poverty, imprisonment, slander, dishonour, torture, 
treachery, betrayal, insult, litigation and fraud (108) • We are 
being made aware that Moria is really putting the best possible 
gloss on a case that is far more serious than she is prepared to 
admit just how serious becomes apparent when she eventually 
drops her mask completely. 
Again she attacks the philosophers, who protest that it is 
wretched to cling to folly. Nor is understanding of the sciences 
any compensation for what nature has denied to men. They are an 
obstacle to happiness, and are the product of evil spirits. They 
were not needed in the Golden Age, when people were guided solely 
by natural instinct, with no need of grammar, or dialectic, or 
rhetoric, or astronomy. Her account of the origin of the sciences 
is, of course, greatly oversimplified, and as Levi notes, her use 
of the myth of the Golden Age glosses over the problem of 
original sin.
63 
In this she is very close to Erasmian humanism, 
although in the context of her speech it appears as just one more 
of her logical inadequacies. She now asserts that the happiest of 
living creatures are those who are taught by no master save 
nature,and quotes Lucian's The Dream Q£ The Cock to prove her 
point. 
As the argument develops, we can see Erasmus is steering it 
towards a point where he can have Moria drop her mask and adopt a 
' 
directly sati7ical tone. After another summation of her case, she 
enters onto her final, culminating illustration: that the 
happiest people are those popularly called fools. They have no 
fear of death; they do not suffer pangs of conscience; they are 
not terrified by tales of the dead, and are not tortured by dread 
of impending disaster or the hope of future bliss. They are 
untroubled by the thousand cares to which our life is subject 
(117) .
64 
Many more details are adduced to make the same point 
a characteristic rhetorical overkill -- and, inevitably, the fool 
63. p.113, n.61. 
64. 'In summa non dilacerantur milibus curarum quibus haec vita 






' is contrasted:with the wise man. The latter has wasted boyhood 
and youth in acquiring learning, and tastes no pleasure in life; 
I 
he is, in fact, a thoroughly unpleasant and objectionable 
character. 
The Stoics, of course, object to Moria's praise of insanity, 
and must once more be demolished in argument. There are, it 
appears, and as Plato confirms, two,forms of insanity. One is 
sent from hell by vengeful furies, 
whenever they let lose their snakes and assail the 
hearts of men with lust for war, insatiable thirst 
for gold, the disgrace of forbidden love, 
parricide, incest, sacrilege, or some other sort of 
evil, or when they pursue the guilty, conscience-
stricken soul with their avengi~g spirits and 
flaming brands of terror (121) . 
The other type is highly desirable and comes from Moria: 
It occurs whenever some happy mental aberration 
frees the soul from its anxious cares and at the 
same time restot~s it by the addition of manifold 
delights (121) . 
This distinction marks the shift in the argument from the 
complexities of the first section tQ the satirical catalogue of 
Moria's followers. The folly of illusion is the pleasant sort of 
madness. The folly that she will now castigate strenuously is the 
hell-sent form of madness.The voice now adopted by folly is that 
of the sky-man whom she had earlier condemned. Instead of 
I 
defending the role of illusion in human life, she proceeds 
65. '···quoties immissis anguibus vel ardorem belli vel 
inexplebilem auri sitim vel dedecorosum ac nefarium 
amorem vel parricidium, incestum, sacrilegium aut aliam 
id genus pestem aliquam in pectora mortalium inuehunt, 
siue cum nocentem et conscium animum furiis ac 
terriculorum facibus agunt' (116/874-118/877). 
66. 'Id accidit quoties iucundus quidam mentis error simul 
et anxiis illis curis animum liberat et multiiuga 




ruthlessly to strip away all illusions and to reveal the cancer 
at the heart of society. 
How has this transformation been produced? It has been 
variously described by critics. Walter Kaiser demonstrates that, 
as we go on in The Praise of Folly, the 'lambent ironies and 
laughing praise' modulate into tones of high seriousnes and moral 
67 
purpose. For Wayne Rebhorn, folly has a new meaning in each 
section, and the meaning of the work does not reside in any one 
section but in 'a dialectical and dramatic unity generated by 
h . f . . t d d . , 
68 . '1 . s ~ ts ~n att~ u e an mean~ng In a s~m~ ar ve~n, Sr. 
Geraldine Thompson shows how the negative values of one section 
become the positive values of the next, so that the structure 
f h k . f d' d' 1 . 
69 
, o t e wor ~s a type o ascen ~ng ~a ect~c. 
Moria's transformation, however, can also be explained in 
terms of Erasmus' ambivalent attitude to his Lucianic prototype. 
That complex irony which leaves one in a state of uncertainty did 
not finally satisfy Erasmus; he felt the need to make a more 
definite statement, whether by the negative method of satire or 
the positive method used in the final section. Nor is Moria's 
transformation entirely unexpected. As a woman, her essential 
character is mutability, which might help explain her change of 
stance. But the real explanation lies deeper than this. The 
structure of the argument in the first section was based upon her 
setting up of false, rhetorically-inspired antinomies between 
nature and reason, the wise man and the fool. This helped to 
sustain a case that was logically weak, based as it was upon a 
denial of the importance of reason., 
But it did more than this. It set up an implied alternative 
to Moria's point of view. The essence of Moria's case was that 
she fostered harmless illusions that made life more bearable. Yet 
at several points in her argument, Erasmus made us aware that 
67. Kaiser, pp.53 f. 
68. Rebhorn, p.472. 
69. Thompson, p.72. 
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there were in human life not merely these harmless, even 
necessary, illusions, but real vices and evils of whose existence 
Moria can give no adequate account. Paradoxically, as she becomes 
bolder in her assertions, linking folly to both wisdom and 
madness, so the alternative voice also becomes louder, protesting 
the inadequacy of her views, until, finally, the definition of 
the two types of madness shows how superficial her argument 
really is. At this point, Erasmus is able to pass quite naturally 
from folly as illusion and a pleasant form of madness to folly as 
vice and evil and a harmful madness. Thus begins the catalogue of 
followers. The volte-face is achieved only at the expense of a 
break in dramatic consistency. Nevertheless, Erasmus is able 
partially to conceal the extent of his violation of decorum and 
move away from the norms of complex irony by pointing out that 
mutability is a part of Moria's character. Formal consistency is 
maintained but the point-of-view of the work has altered 
substantially. 
The list of those who are subject to harmful illusions rises 
in crescendo, beginning with what may be termed personal vices, 
and culminating in the attack on the vices of the church. As 
Miller points out, this section of the book relies heavily on 
such medieval. literary conventions as the literature of complaint 
and the satire of estates. 70 This technique relies heavily on a 
sense of hierarchical cohesiveness, the obverse of which is a 
society in a state of collapse, because warring classes have 
failed to do their duty. In this section, says Miller, Erasmus' 
voice 'does not entirely replace Folly's, but blends with it, so 
that Erasmus' 'own intellectual and social aims can be 
apprehended more directly' .
71 
Many of the satirical thrusts in 
this section have obvious parallels' in such works as Adagia and 
The Colloquies. 
70. Clarence' Miller, 'Some medieval elements and structural 
unity in Erasmus' "The Praise of Folly", Renaissance 
Quarterly 27 (1974), 499-511, (p.503). 
71. Ibid., p. 507. 
:' 
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The collective force of this sustained attack has a definite 
literary function, noted by Sylvester: 'by descending into the 
depths of moral corruption she has, as it were, created a demand 
for some positive vision which, while restoring the happiness of 
her opening movement, will nevertheless transpose her elation to 
72 
a new and transcendent level'. It has, too, another function, 
also preparatory for the final section: 'This long catalogue of 
Folly's followers compels her auditors to realise that the world 
cannot be redeemed by the folly that destroys it, and that a 
goddess who uncovers the very tragedies she had promised to hide 
hardly merits their trust or their faith' .. 
73 
This change in 
Moria's stance has been thus described by Sr.Thompson: she 
'undergoes a ~ind of conversion as the oration proceeds, first 
moral and then spiritual,and, as she does so, her hold on the 
74 
original line of inverted praise becomes tenuous' . 
The first of the followers are those 'who care for nothing 
but hunting wild game' (118/915;122). The ritual of the hunt. is 
described in detail and with mock solemnity, until Moria 
concludes that the hunters, while thinking they live the life of 
a king, actually degenerate into beasts. This strikes a note 
common to all pursuits and practices described in this satirical 
section, that the following of corrupt and degraded practices 
necessarily entails a measure of personal corruption for those 
involved, and 'that such practices can be carried on only if 
sustained by illusion, that is, folly. Hence the connection with 
the first section is clear: the activities of human life would be 
insupportable if Moria did not cover them with a veil of 
illusion. The' difference is equally clear: the activities 
described in the second section are clearly harmful, both to the 
individual and to society, in a way that those described in the 
first section are not. 
72. Sylvester, p.138. 
73. Rebhorn, p.470 
74. Thompson, p.68. 
_, 
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An insatiable passion for building is the next species of 
folly, followed by the search for the elusive fifth essence. In 
the pursuit of self-delusion, men spend every penny they possess, 
and finally blame the shortness of life for their failure to 
achieve their objective. The thrust of the satire is the same as 
in the two Colloquies Alchemy and Ptocholoqia, showing at the 
outset of this section the continuity of Erasmus' concerns. The 
gamblers, similarly, waste all their resources i~ the hope of 
quick gain, and end by turning to cheating. 
Erasmus turns next to the subject of superstition, one which 
was a recurrent concern for him, not only because it was a 
species of folly, but because it detracted from true religion. He 
attacks here specifically those who delight in hearing or telling 
fabulous lies (120/953-954;125). They listen the more willingly 
to tales that are furthest from the truth -- and, by the way, 
such things are profitable to preachers and demagogues. The note 
by Listrius draws attention to More's translation of Lucian'-s The 
Lover of Lies, and his introductory comments on it. Striking a 
defensive note, he points out that Moria does not condemn 
miracles, 'but the vanity of those who pursue their own gain with 
feigned wonders, and the folly of those who are more moved by 
. . h b d . 75 such ~nvent~ons t an y sacre stor~es' . The parallel with 
what More had written is obvious, as is the connection both with 
such colloquies as Exorcism. The characteristic obliquity of the 
Lucianic dialogue is lacking, and, as was the case with Adaqia 
and The Colloquies, Erasmus' satire is more contemporary, more 
direct, more biting. 
The religious theme is continued in the next attack on those 
who place too:much belief in images of saints, and those who 
'enjoy deluding themselves with imaginary pardons for their sins' 
(122/970-124/971;127) and those who rely on prayers invented by 
some impostor for his own gain. Listrius is at pains to point out 
75. sed illorum vanitatem, qui fictis miraculis quaestui 
suo consulunt, et eorum stulticiam, qui talibus figmentis 





that Erasmus is mocking, not real indulgences, but, again, those 
invented for gain by impostors (123/970h note. He goes on to 
point out that the efficacy of indulgences is guaranteed because 
it was promised by Christ, not by men, and the practice was, in 
any case, of comparatively recent date (123/970, note). The 
elaborateness of Listrius' notes at this point is surely an 
indication not only that Erasmus was seeking to defend himself 
against the possible charge of heresy, but that he considered the 
content of this part of The Praise of Folly important enough to 
warrant full explication, such as had not been provided in the 
first section. 
To drive the point home, he uses the example of those who, 
by giving coins, hope to expiate a life of sin (124/979-981;128). 
Similar superstitions are the belief that the repetition of seven 
short verse of the Psalms ensures heavenly bliss; the cultivation 
of district saints, each with peculiar powers; the cult of the 
Virgin Mary -- a comment made, as Listrius notes, because 'It is 
wonderful how.the mob of men seeks everything from her, as if 
Christ were less approachable by prayer than Mary, or less 
76 
powerful' . 
The origins of The Praise of Folly in irony are remembered when 
Moria asks: 
But what do men seek from these saints except what 
belongs to folly? Amongst all the votive offerings 
you see covering the walls of certain churches 
right up to the very roof, have you ever seen one 
put up for an escape from folly 97 for the 
slightest gain in wisdom? (129) . 
76. 'Mirum est autem quam vulgus hominum ab hac omnia petat, 
perinde quasi Christus aut minus sit exorabilis quam Maria, 
sit minus possit' (124/996, note). (My translation) . 
77. 'Verum ab his diuis quid tandem petunt homines nisi 
quod ad stulticiam attinet? Agedum inter tot anathemata, 
quibus templorum quorundam parietes omnes ac testudinem 
ipsam refertam conspicitis, vidistisne vnquam qui 








Such offerings record thanks given for escape from various 
physical calamities; none give thanks for being rid of folly. In 
summing up her attack on religious follies, Moria says: 
The ordinary life of Christians everywhere abounds 
in these varieties of silliness, and they are 
readily permitted and encouraged by priests who are
78 
not unaware of the profit to be made thereby (130) . 
She then repeats, in a religious context, the image of the 
wise man: if, he says, change of mind accompanies outward signs 
of penitence, sins will be redeemed. But 'if ... your wise man 
starts blurting out these uncomfortable truths, you can see how 
he'll soon destroy the world's peace of mind and plunge it into 
confusion (130) .
79 
The image this time occurs in a context of 
activity of which we are clearly meant to disapprove, so that its 
use here raises interesting questions. Is this wise man identical 
with the one met earlier -- at least in spirit if not in person? 
If so, are we meant to approve the attitude of this one and 
disapprove of the other? Or does the fact that, on his second 
appearance, he is obviously voicing sentiments with which we are 
supposed to a~ree mean that he was also doing this on his first 
appearance? This latter reading is consistent with our reading of 
Moria's volte-face in attitude as a consequence of Erasmus' 
fictional strategy. 
She now passes to the question of knowledge. It is sad not to 
be deceived, since man's happiness depends not on facts, but.on 
opinions. 
For human affairs are so complex and obscure that 
nothing can be known of them for certain ... 
78. 'Vsqueado omnis omnium Christianorum vita istiusmodi 
delirationibus vndique scatet, quas ipsas tamen 
sacrifici;non grauatim et admittunt et alunt, non ignari 
quantum hinc lucelli soleat accrescere' (126/14-16) . 
I 
79. ' ... id·genus alia si sapiens ille obganniat, vide a quanta 
felicitate repente mortalium animas in quem tumultum 
retraxerit' (126/20-22). 
Alternatively, if anything can be known, more often 
than not it is something
0
which interferes with the 
pleasure of life (135) . 
1.34 
It is quite in character for Moria to adopt a sceptical approach 
to the problem of knowledge; indeed, her whole case depends upon 
it. She defends life as it is, asserting that attempts by 
philosophers and wise men to understand and interpret it lead 
only to unhappiness and confusion. She is not now speaking in the 
voice of Erasmus, since the drive underlying the final section is 
based on the possibility of definite knowledge being attainable 
about human affairs. Indeed, the assumption underlying the 
philosoohia Christi is that it is possible to obtain certain 
knowledge about how one should order one's life and conduct one's 
affairs. It is a point of view quite in accord with the opinions 
I 
of the author of Enchiridion~ 
Moria goes on to say that 'man's mind is so formed that it 
is far more susceptible to falsehood than to truth' (130/100-
101;135). For example -- and we note that the examples given have 
quite a different effect from those given in similar arguments in 
the first section -- church-goers yawn during a serious sermon, 
but take notice of preachers ranting about old wives' tales; 
legendary saints receive far more attention than Peter and Paul 
and even Christ himself (130/106-109;135-136). These satirical 
asides serve to remind us that the argument is taking quite a 
different turn from that of the first section, where folly was 
largely harmless. Here, it is harmful, vicious and sinful. So we 
' 
suspect that Erasmus is not in agreement with Moria's argument 
that even unimportant facts take trouble to acquire, whereas 
opinions are easily formed and even more conducive to happiness 
(130/110-113; 136). 
The examples adduced in support of this argument are wholly 
trivial, and she clinches this section of the argument by 
80. 'Nam rerum humanarum tanta est obscuritas varietasque, 
vt nihil dilucide sciri possit, ... Aut si quid sciri 




claiming that between those who stay in Plato's cave and marvel 
at the shadows, and the philosophers who see the real thing, 
there is no difference: both are happy in their way, and the 
fools are actually better off, since their happiness costs them 
so little (132/127-132;137). This image is used again in the 
closing pages of the work with quite different intent. In the 
later context (190/176-181;202-203), it is the man who leaves the 
cave who is closer to the truth. As Clarence H. Miller observes, 
the change in attitude pinpoints 'how the irony of the first part 
81 is both like and unlike the irony of the third part'. The 
introduction of this Platonic myth again helps prepare us for the 
Platonism of the final section, where the context of the 
reference to the myth of the cave makes it clear that Erasmus was 
not in agreement with the interpretation given here by Moria.
82 
Indeed, it seems that the reversion to the mode of ironic praise 
is intended to show its inadequacy for a full conception of human 
life. This would account for the discrepancy in the qualities of 
the activities so praised. It also serves as a preparation for 
the final sustained outpouring of Erasmian eloquence, which 
includes both the catalogue of followers, and the praise of 
Christian foolishness. After being lulled so deceptively by a 
voice which had earlier had at least a superficial 
attractiveness, we are devastated to see the consequences of 
Moria's point of view. 
Moria now comes to the real turning-point of the argument: 
In case anyone thinks I'm presuming too far. and not 
speaking the truth, let's take a brief look at the 
way men live, and it will then become clear how 
much they owe me and how much they app33ciate me, 
whether great men or humble (140-141). 
81. Clarence H. Miller, 'The Logic and Rhetoric of Proverbs in 
Erasmus' Praise of Folly', in Essays Qn the Works of Erasmus, 
edited by Richard L. De Molen (New Haven and London, 1978), 
83-98, (p.85). 
82. Below, p.147. 
83. 'Atqui si cui videor haec audacius quam verius dicere, 
She promises to pick out outstanding examples of her admirers 
from which to judge the rest, and claims: 
It's hardly believable how much laughter, sport and 
fun you poor mortals can provide the gods every 
day .... Heavens, what a farcg 4it is, and what a motley crowd of fools! (141). 
136 
The section that follows is avowedly Lucianic in its 
satirically episcopic overview of the foolish activities of 
mankind, and in keeping with the movement of the work as a whole, 
moves from mere foolishness to actual viciousness, from hopeless 
love, theatrical mourning and vain search for profits, to the 
corrupt meanness of merchants, the sycophancy of friars, to 
useless pilgrimages, a topic familiar from the Colloquies. The 
whole is summed by an explicit reference to Lucian's 
Icaromenipous. 
To sum up, if you could look down from the moon, as 
Menippus once did, on the countless hordes of 
mortals, you'd think you saw a swarm of flies or 
gnats quarrelling amongst themselves, fighting, 
plotting, stealing, playing, making love, being 
born, growing old and dying. It's hard to believe 
how much trouble and tragedy this tiny little 
creature can stir up, shortlived as he is, for 
sometimes a brief war or an outbreak of plague can 
85 carry off and destroy many thousands at once (143) 
agedum paulisper ipsas hominum vitas inspiciamus, quo 
palam fiat, et quantum mihi debeant et quanti me faciant 
maximi pariter ac minimi' (134/185-187). 
84. 'Quin etiam incredibile sit dictu, quos risus, quos 
ludos, quas delitias homunculi quotidie praebeant 
superis ... Deum immortalem, quod theatrum est illud, 
quam varius stultorum tumultus!' (134/193-136/200). 
85. 'In summa si mortalium innumerabiles tumultus e luna, 
quemadmodum Menippus olim, despicias, putes te muscarum 
aut culicum videre turbam inter se rixantium, 
bellantium, insidiantium, rapientium, ludentium, 
lasciuentium, nascentium, cadentium, morientium. Neque 
satis credi potest, quos motus, quas tragoedias ciat 
137 
The first of the classes surveyed is the schoolmasters, who 
would be the most wretched of mankind if Moria did not mitigate 
the hardships of their profession by a pleasant kind of madness 
(138/242-244;144). Their schools are akin to torture chambers, 
full of stench and filth, yet they gain a compensatory 
satisfaction by thrashing their pupils; in short, their pitiful 
servitude seems like sovereignty (138/253-254;144). Their belief 
in their own learning makes them even happier, so that they think 
themselves greater than the Roman grammarians Palaemon and 
Donatus. They are given to pedantic searches for archaic words, 
and turn out feeble verses. They mutually complement one another. 
The tedious production of pedantic grammars is either madness or 
folly. This attack on the grammarians was one of the most 
frequent themes of the humanists, and was taken up in detail in 
More's Letter to Dorp, written in defense of The Praise of Folly. 
Poets are dealt with briefly as people 'whose sole interest 
lies in delighting the ears of the foolish with pure nonsense and 
86 silly tales' (147) . Orators come next, as they belong not, as 
they imagine, to philosophy, bt't to folly; they have written 
treatises on joking. Those who court immortal fame by writing 
books are also in folly's camp; even the most learned, 
painstaking writers -- and here Erasmus is surely making a 
personal reference -- wreck their health and suffer all manner of 
ills, all for the sake of the approval of other scholars. Those 
writers who explicitly belong to Moria are far happier. They lose 
no sleep and write whatever takes their fancy -- the more trivial 
the piece, the wider the audience. The plagiarists are equally 
fortunate in gaining satisfaction while doing little to deserve 
it. 
The classes so far mentioned -- with the exception of the 
schoolmasters -- have been relatively harmless, but with the 
introduction of the lawyers, the satire begins to darken 
tantulum animalculum tamque max periturum. Nam aliquoties vel 
levis belli seu pestilentiae procella multa simul milia rapit 
ac dissipat' (138/231-237). 
86 '···quorum omne studium non alia pertinet quam ad 
demulcendas stultorum aures, idque meris nugamentis ac 
ridiculis fabulis' (140/289-291) . 
' l 
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appreciably. They are 'the most self-satisfied class of people' 
(150), piling up opinions and glosses to make their profession 
seem difficult. Like the sophists, they are garrulous and 
quarrelsome. Next come the philosophers, 'who insist that they 
alone have wisdom and that all other mortals are but fleeting 
shadows' (151) .
87 
In their madness, they turn to astrology and 
meteorology, 'as if they'd access to the secrets of Nature, 
architect of the universe, or had come straight to us from the 
council of the gods' (151) . 88 However, their mutual quarrels 
show their total lack of certainty. 
Ignorant of themselves and the things nearest to them, they 
still boast that they can see ideas, universals, separate forms, 
prime matters, quiddities, ecceities (152). •89 This attack is 
similar to that found in such Lucianic works as Menioous and 
Icaromenippus, and such a sceptical attitude to claims about the 
possibilty of attaining certain knowledge is part of the 
ideological underpinning of Menippean satire. Yet it is an 
attitude that Erasmus found uncongenial, possibly even dangerous, 
and which he dropped when he came to the final section. We can 
see here quite clearly that, while he was attracted to the 
Menippean satirist's view of the world, and found in that genre a 
useful weapon for lashing vice, he yet shied away from its 
ultimate implication. The pietist of the Enchiridion could not be 
happy with an acceptance of the impossibilty of certain 
knowledge. 
The philosophers are followed by the theologians, and the 
attack now moves to the plane of religious perversions, a topic 
familiar from the Colloquies, and which takes us, step by step, 
87. qui'se soles sapere praedicant, reliquos omnes mortales 
vmbras volitare' (144/361-362) . 
88. ' ... quasi naturae rerum architectrici fuerint a secretis 
quasiue e;deorum consilio nobis aduenerint!' (144/366-367). 
89. ' .•. tamen ideas, vniversalia, formas separatas, primas 
materias, quidditates, ecceitates, formalitates, instantia 
videre se praedicant' (144/372-373). 
139 
closer to the,Erasmian doctrine of the philosophia Christi in the 
final section. Moria, of course, is aware that they respond by 
attacking her as a heretic (146/384;153), although they are 
heavily in her debt for their self-love, which enables them to 
look on the rest of mankind with pity (146/388-390;153). They are 
fortified by the weapons of scholasticism, and interpret hidden 
mysteries to suit themselves (146/395;154). They discuss absurd 
questions such as the exact moment of divine generation. Erasmus 
probably has his tongue in his cheek at this point, since some of 
the questions are of genuine religious importance. The general 
point, however, is that the theologians are more interested in 
abstruse speculation than in cultivating religious piety, a 
message that is at the very heart of evangelical humanism. Gospel 
sanction for Erasmus' view is quoted by Listrius, who refers to 
several places in St.Paul (147/400, note). 
We next come to one of the extensive passages added in the 
edition of 1514, extending from 148(407 to 154/484 (156-161) .. 
90 
Its length indicates that it was no mere afterthought, and the 
occurrences of other extensive additions in this part of the work 
surely shows that Erasmus considered that what he was saying here 
was of more than usual importance. In the present section, Moria 
says that the theologians are over-fond of subtle paradoxes; and 
what is worse, 'These subtle refinements of subtleties are made 
still more subtle by all the different lines of scholastic 
argument ... ' (156) .
91 
Erasmus now explicitly contrasts these 
endeavours with those of the Apostles, who would need the help of 
another holy spirit in order to dispute with them. Paul's famous 
definition of faith is unscholastic (150/425;157); the Apostles 
consecrated the eucharist without being aware of subtle disputes 
as to its true nature; they baptised without teaching the four 
causes of baptism; they taught grace without distinguishing 
between actual and sanctifying grace; and so on. The learned Paul 
90. Opera omnia IV.3, p.31. 
91. 'Iam has subtilissimas subtilitates subtilliores etiam 
reddunt tot scholasticorum viae ... ' (148/416-417). 
. ) 
would not hav~ so often condemned 'logomachiae' had he been 
versed in these subtleties. 
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Nor are theologians averse to 'interpreting' the Scriptures 
if they are not written correctly. The Apostles refuted pagan 
philosophers and the Jews by their way of life and their miracles 
rather than by syllogisms (154/464;160) and dialectic is proof 
against heathens, who would either fail to understand it, 
understand and scorn it, or refute it. Erasmus now draws back a 
little to emphasise that some theologians regard these minutiae 
as frivolous or even sacrilegious; those whom he criticises are 
too busy even:to look at the Gospel, and fondly believe that 
'they support the entire Church on the props of their syllogisms 
and without them it would collapse' (161/162) .
92 
They fashion 
and re-fashion the scriptures at will, demand recantation of 
anything which disagrees with their propositions, and think 
themselves nearest to the gods when they are addressed as 'our 
masters'. 
With this lengthy and biting attack on the theologians, the 
mask has been completely dropped. Moria makes no pretence to 
speak ironically, and her voice merges completely with that of 
Erasmus. The sweeping condemnation of the theologians and other 
social orders serves to show both the limitations of Moria's 
earlier point1of view, and to prepare us for Erasmus' alternative 
view. She now goes on to attack those 
who are popularly called "Religious" or "Monks". 
Both.names are false, since most of them are a long 
way removed from religion, and wherever you go 
these so-called solit~3ies are the people you're 
likely to meet (164). 
92. 'sese vniversam ecclesiam, alioqui ruituram, non aliter 
syllogismorum fulcire tibicinibus' (154/488-489). 
93. '···qui se vulgo religiosos ac monachos appellant, 
vtroque falsissimo cognomine, cum et bona pars istorum 
longissime absit a religione, et nulli magis omnibus 





In spite of being loathed, they are self-satisfied. They are 
illiterate, repeat psalms by rote, make a living out of squalour 
and beggary, and do everything according to rule so as to feel 
superior to one another. They are interested, not in being like 
Christ, but in being unlike one another(160/550-552;165). A great 
deal of their happiness depends on their name. They rely too much 
on ceremonies and man-made traditions, unaware that Christ 
enforces only the rule of charity. 
Their sermons also come in for sustained attack. They 
observe the traditional rules of rhetoric, using invocations 
borrowed from the poets, absurd exordia -- the better for being 
wholly unconnected with the subject -- and an exposition that is 
merely a hasty interpretation of a Gospel passage, an aside, so 
to speak. They then propound some absurd theological question, 
supported by scholastic rubbish, and end by interpreting some 
anecdote allegorically, tropologically, and anagogically. Moria 
concludes: 
Now I think you must see how deeply this section of 
mankind is in my debt, when their petty ceremonies 
and silly absurdities and the noise they make in 
the world enables them to tyrannise over their 
fellow men, 9~ach one a Paul or an Antony in his own eyes (173). 
Moria's next target is kings and their courtiers. If one 
considered the burdens of sovereignty, no-one would want to 
exercise it. One must think only of public, not personal affairs, 
and one must not deviate from the laws one has promulgated. All 
look to the ruler, whose fall from honesty corrupts his entire 
people; he has many seductions to lead him from the path of 
virtue, and must continually fear plots against him. All this 
should rob the prince of all his pleasure, but with Moria's help, 
94. 'Videtis, opinor, quantopere mihi debeat hoc hominum 
genus, qui cum ceremoniolis et nugis deridiculis 
clamoribusque tyrannidem quandam inter mortales 
exerceant, Paulos atque Antonios sese credunt' (168/670-
672). 
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they leave th~se concerns to the gods (168/697;168). They are 
concerned only with the soft life, listen only to flatterers, 
devote themselves to hunting, sell magistracies at a profit, 
devise new methods of taxation -- all under suitable pretexts so 
as to preserve a facade of justice. They are ignorant of the law, 
an enemy to their people's advantage while intent on their own 
convenience, haters of learning, freedom and truth -- yet their 
insignia of office symbolise all the virtues. 
As for the courtiers, they are mostly obsequious, servile, 
stupid and worthless, but wish to appear foremost in everything. 
They know how to flatter the kings; they sleep till midday, hear 
a quick mass from a hired priest, spend the day eating, gaming, 
gambling and drinking. The practices of princes have been adopted 
by popes, cardinals and bishops -- they know nothing of the 
meaning of their vestments or insignia of office; they look after 
themselves, delegating the care of their flock to others: 
They don't even remember that the name Bishop, 
which means "overseer", indicates work, care and 
concern. Yet when it comes to netting their 
revenues into the bag they can play the overseer 
95 well enough - no 'careless look-out' there (177). 
The cardinals are supposed to follow the apostles, and if they 
asked themselves about the discrepancy between the symbols of 
their office ~nd their worldly wealth and power, they would 
either renounce their worldly ambitions, or lead a life akin to 
the original apostles (172/765-767;178). 
Similarly, the popes would be utterly cast down if they 
attempted to imitate the life of Christ. One grain of the salt 
Christ spoke would rid them of all their pomps and pleasures, 
replacing them with vigils, fasting, prayers, studies, and other 
hardships. As it is now, they leave all their work to Peter and 
95. 'Neque vel nominis sui recordantur, quid sonet episcopi 
vocabulum, nempe laborem, curam, solicitudinem, verum in 
irretiendis pecuniis plane episcopos agunt, ou5' 
b.A.a.ocrx:o1tt ~, ( 170/7 50-172/7 52) . 
143 
Paul, so as to save their time for pleasure. No class of men has 
fewer cares, since they believe they do enough for Christ by 
overseeing rituals and ceremonies; miracles and hard work are out 
of date, as is teaching and interpreting scripture and praying. 
They are fond of issuing anathemas and excommunications --
especially against those who seek to nibble away at Peter's 
patrimony! They will fight to preserve their wealth and power, 
while believing they are defending the Church -- in fact, they 
are enemies of Christ, fettering himn with noxious ways of life. 
They manage Church affairs by the sword. In spite of the deadly 
madness of war, they devote themselves to this alone, having 
their sycophants call it zeal, piety and valour (172/768ff.;178-
181) . 
Their example, of course, is followed by martial priests and 
bishops, who are concerned about their worldly rights and 
privileges, while paying only perfunctory attention to their 
religious duties. The different Church orders, from the pontiff 
downwards, pass their burden down to the next rank, making a 
mockery of their vows. And at this point, Moria stops herself: 
But it's not my purpose here to go into details of 
the lives of pontiff or priest. I don't want to 
look as though I'm writing satire when I should be 
delivering a eulogy, nor anyone to think that in 
praising bad princes I mean to censure good ones. I 
touched briefly on these matters only to make it 
clear that no mortal can live happily unless he is 
initia~~d in my rites and is sure of my favours 
(183) . 
In a formal sense, she realises that this indictment of the 
various social orders has been a breach of decorum, and she must 
now revert to the ironical praise of folly. But it had never been 
96. 'Verum nbn est huius instituti pontificum ac sacerdotum 
vitam excutere, ne cui videar satyram texere, non 
encomium recitare neue quis existimet bonos principes a 
me taxari, dum malos laudo. Sed haec ideo paucis attigi, 
quo palam fieret nullum esse mortalem qui suauiter 
viuere possit, nisi meis initiatus sit sacris meque 
propiciam habeat' (176/856-860). 
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Erasmus' purpose to maintain the consistency of his persona. 
Indeed, the chief advantage in utilising Folly as a persona was 
her mutability -- it was relatively easy for Erasmus, under this 
mask, to move,from one section of his work to another. And now, 
having shown why Moria's original position was so inadequate, and 
having destroyed false religious ideas and practices, Erasmus can 
lift his argument to a new plane and move to the praise of 
Christian folly. 
Moria begins by making familiar points. Fortune favours the 
injudicious and venturesome, while wisdom makes men apprehensive; 
the wise are poor, the foolish wealthy and in charge of affairs 
of state. This brief section forms a bridge to the main argument, 
in which Moria promises to show that many great authors have 
mentioned her in their works (178/888-889;185). She begins in a 
light-hearted tone, citing popular proverbs, Horace, Homer and 
Cicero to show the existence and blessings of folly, and then 
proceeds to invoke Christian authorities (178/904-906;186-187). 
After calling for aid on the Muses and the spirit of Scotus, she 
begins her demonstration. Ecclesiastes wrote 'the number of fools 
I 
is infinite', thus embracing all mankind. She goes on to cite, in 
her support, Jeremiah, Ecclesiasticus, Augustine, Matthew, 
Solomon -- all to establish the pervasive existence of folly 
among mankind. She then turns to a sophistic proof of her thesis: 
it is better to hide away things that are rare and valuable than 
those which are common and cheap (178/952-953), so 
isn't it obvious that the wisdom which 
Ecclesiasticus forbids to be hidden is worth less 
than the folly he orders to be kept concealed? Hear 
the evidence of his own words: "Better is a man who 
hides ~~s folly than a man who hides his wisdom" 
(190). 
97. ' nonne palam est sapientiam, quam vetat abscondi, 
viliorem esse stulticia, quam recondi iubet? Iam ipsius 
testimonii verba accipite. Melior est homo qui abscondit 






This 'proof' depends upon the false syllogism that all things 
which are hidden are more valuable than those which are not: the 
conclusion follows logically from the false premise. At this 
point, Erasmus is using such reasoning, not to raise doubts about 
the validity ,of Moria's arguments, but to prepare us for the 
spiritual paradoxes which will follow. 
Similarly, she indulges in a tendentious interpretation of 
Ecclesiastes 10: 3, and points out that neither Solomon nor Paul 
was afraid of calling himself a fool: since she is now citing 
Scriptural references rather than the classical ones of the 
preceding sections, we are obviously being prepared for the 
redefinifiot)of folly which Erasmus is about to undertake. 
After attacking the way in which certain theologians 
misinterpret Scripture to suit their own purposes, she returns to 
citing Paul's praise of folly, saying that he openly advocated it 
as a necessity and a benefit (186/70-71;196). And Christ himself 
acknowledged his own foolishness in Psalm 78.6. Then, too, fools 
have always given pleasure to God, and Christ always condemns 
those who trust in their own intelligence (186/84-84;197) -- a 
clearly transcendentalised reading of Moria's own contempt for 
sophists and philosophers. Various texts are cited to establish 
God's honouring of folly and fools. Just as Moria had delighted 
in women, children and naturals, so she now tells us of Christ: 
But Christ seems to have taken special delight in 
little children, women and fishermen, while the 
dumbanimals who gave him the greatest pleasure 
were'those furthesg
8
removed from cleverness and 
cunning (197-198) . 
Christ himself was something of a fool in assuming man's 
nature and being seen in man's form, and wishing to be redeemed 
only through the folly of the Cross. He taught his apostles to 
98. ' at paruulis, mulieribus ac piscatoribus potissimum 
delectatus esse videtur. Quin et ex animantium brutorum 
genere ea potissimum placent Christo, quae a vulpina 
prudentia quam longissime absunt ... ' (186/93-187/96). 
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shun wisdom, pointing to the example of those things which live 
by instinct alone (188/112-113;199). Eating of the tree of 
knowledge was forbidden, and St. Paul openly condemns knowledge 
as harmful (188/119-120;199). Folly is used by men as an excuse 
for sinfulness, and Christ's plea for forgiveness of his 
crucifiers was based on their ignorance. 
With folly ~ow taking its place as something akin to a 
Christian virtue, Erasmus is ready to embark on the final and 
most exalted section of his argument. Moria undertakes to prove 
that 'it is quite clear that the Christian religion has a kind of 
kinship with folly in some form, although it has none at all with 
wisdom' (201) .
99 
The very old and the very young, women and 
simpletons, take delight in religion, led by their natural 
instincts. The founders of the faith were lovers of simplicity, 
enemies of learning. Those possessed by zeal for Christian piety 
are the biggest fools of all: 
They squander their possessions, ignore insults, 
submit to being cheated, make no distinction 
between friends and enemies, shun pleasure, sustain 
themselves on fasting, vigils, tears, toil and 
humiliations, scorn life and desire only death - in 
short, they seem to be dead to any normal feelings, 
as if their spirit dwelt elsewhere than in their 
100 
bodies. What else can that be but madness? (201). 
Further, Moria argues, the happiness of Christians is nothing 
other than a sort of folly (190/156-158;202) and it is at this 
point, when folly has finally been redefined to mean not the 
99. videtur omnino Christiana religio quandam habere cum 
aliqua stulticia cognationem minimeque cum sapientia 
conuenire' (189/141-143) . 
100. '··· adeo sua profundunt, iniurias negligunt, falli 
sese patiuntur, inter amicos et inimcos nullum 
discrimen, voluptatem horrent, inedia, vigilia, 
lachrymis, laboribus, contumeliis saginantur, vitam 
fastidiunt, mortem vnice optant, breuiter ad omnem 
sensum communem prorsus obstupuisse videntur, perinde 
quasi alibi viuat animus, non in suo corpore. Quid 




natural, unimproved instincts of man, but something close to the 
spirit of religion in its contempt for the ordinary estimation of 
man's behaviour, it is at this point that we begin to understand 
why Erasmus should have written that The Praise of Folly taught 
the same lesson as Enchiridion. In the earlier work, the vices 
and sins of the world are delineated, and opposed by a kind of 
Platonised piety. Those two tendencies in Enchiridion are 
represented here as opposing definitions of folly. 
In the first place, Christians come close to agreeing with 
Platonists that the soul is bound down by the body and that 
philosophy is a preparation for death (190/159-162;202). This 
conception of the soul agrees precisely with that found in 
Enchiridion, although in The Praise of Folly the argument is 
given an apparently ironic twist: 
! 
And so long as the mind makes proper use of the 
organs of the body it is called sane and healthy, 
but if it begins to break its bonds and tries to 
win freedom, as if it were planni~g1an escape from 
prison, men call it insane (202) . 
This leads to a discussion of Plato's myth of the cave: the man 
who returns to the cave deplores the insanity of his companions; 
they, in their turn, consider him crazy: the common herd of men 
feels admiration only for the things of the body, whereas the 
pious scorn whatever concerns the body and are wholly uplifted 





ear ~er, .this second use of the myth gives it an 
interpretation exactly the obverse of the original, so that we 
101. 'Itaque quamdiu animus corporis organis probe vtitur, 
tam diu sanus appellatur. Verum;vbi ruptis iam vinculis 
conatur in libertatem asserere sese quasique fugam ex eo 
carcere meditatur, tum insaniam vacant' (190/163-166) . 
102. 'Itidem vulgus hominum ea quae maxime corporea sunt maxime 
miratur eaque prope sola putat esse. Contra pii, quo quicque 
propius accedit ad corpus, hoc magis negligunt totique ad 
inuisibilium rerum contemplationem rapiuntur' (190/181-184) . 
103. Above, p~135. 
I' 
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can see quite clearly how far folly has been transformed and how 
the character of the work has changed. 
This thought is elaborated by considering those things to 
which the ordinary man and the pious direct their attention, and 
by consideration of the nature of the soul, whose power depends 
on its inclinations. According to the nature of that to which it 
is attracted, so shall its own nature be better or worse. As 
Moria goes on, the full extent of the transformation in the work 
becomes apparent. In the opening section, Moria had consistently 
opposed the inclinations and activities of the ordinary man to 
those of the philosophers and wise men who would destroy our 
illusions; in the middle section, she herself destroyed those 
illusions; in the final section, she is metamorphosed into a 
Christian/Platonic wise man of the type she had earlier scorned. 
She now opposes herself irrevocably to the actions and beliefs of 
the ordinary man. The ironic comple~ity which took a benignly 
tolerant view of the infirmities in human nature is now replaced 
by an insistence that those infirmities should be overcome by a 
single-minded devotion to the things of the spirit rather than 
those of the body: 'in fact the pious man throughout his whole 
life withdraws from the things of the body and is drawn toward 
what is eternal, invisible and spiritual' (205-206) . 104 
The epithet 'mad', though, is best applied to the pious man, 
since man's supreme reward is a kind of madness (192/232;206). 
Using the Platonic analogy of the madness of lovers being the 
highest form of happiness, since the lover moves out of himself, 
Moria says that the soul that is leaving the body is regarded as 
mad. So in heavenly life the spirit will conquer the body, and 
will itself be absorbed by the Supreme Mind. Thus perfect 
happiness can be experienced only when the soul is outside the 
body, and has been granted immortality; those who are granted a 
foretaste of this, experience something akin to madness 
(194/259ff.;206-207). 
104. '··· in omni vita refugit pius ab his quae corpori cognata 
sunt, ad aeterna, ad inuisibilia, ad spiritalia rapitur' 
(192/227-228;205-206). 
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Suddenly, as she had done at the end of the second section, 
Moria breaks 9ff, apologising for her garrulousness: 'you must 
remember it's Folly and a woman who's been speaking' (208) . 105 
This final re-adoption of the ironic mask serves to remind us of 
why it was dropped in the first place -- that is, because its 
inadequacy had been comprehensively demonstrated. Its brief 
reappearance after such a spell of religious eloquence 
demonstrates again its inadequacy, and suggests that Erasmus had 
never had any intention of sustaining the ironic mode in which he 
began. His real interest was not in the complex irony of the 
opening section, but in the later sections of satire and 
religious exaltation. 
A genuinely complex irony would not, as Erasmus did, have 
finally rejected the attempt to understand the world as it is in 
favour of the exalted idealism of the peroration. Both the folly 
of the world and the folly of the Cross would need to be included 
in an all-emb~acing irony in which neither was regarded as . 
uniquely capable of explaining the whole life of man. Perhaps, 
given the nature of his subject, such an implied limitation on 
Erasmus' brand of Christianity would have been too much to ask; 
but then, would a genuine Menippean.satirist, who felt the full 
force of complex irony, not simply as a literary tool, but as an 
objective correlative for the problematic nature of man and his 
society, would such a satirist have chosen such a subject? 
Probably not. Certainly, as will be shown in the following 
chapters, Thomas More consciously chose subjects inherently more 
suited to the genius·of complex irony. 




'RICHARD III': AN EXPERIMENT IN LUCIANIC METHOD 
~-­
< ·' 
If Encomium moriae was only partially Lucianic, finally 
rejecting complexity for a platonised Christianity that admits no 
doubts, the same can be said of More's The History of King 
Richard III
1 
but in a radically different sense. The sense of 
ironic ambiguity so subtly expressed in the preface to his 
translations of Lucian is carried over into the composition of 
both The History of King Richard III and Utopia. The Lucianic 
nature of the latter has been increasingly recognised in recent 
scholarship; what has not often been realised is the extent to 
which the History is a Lucianic treatment of the subject of 
Richard's usurpation. 
More has provided us with his reflections on the meaning of 
history, raising such questions as the role of providence in 
history; the nature of tyranny; and how the ordinary citizen can 
recognise tyranny for what it is. More's use of a complex irony 
derived, in part, from Lucian, is designed to allow the writer 
the flexibility to pose such questions without committing himself 
to a definitive answer. He does so by strategically undermining 
the expectations aroused by his chosen fictional mode. Rather 
than making direct statements, he works by suggestion and 
implication, often utilising a persona through which he can make 
suggestions and statements that can then be attributed to the 
persona rather than to the author himself, and whose reaction to 
the events being described is itself one element of the work's 
meaning. 
1. The Complete Works of~- Thomas More, vol.2, The History of 
King Richard III, edited by RichardS. Sylvester (New Haven 





This is not to say that in the History More had attained 
that mastery of ironic complexity that characterises Utopia. 
Indeed, the style of the History is clearly experimental, and it 
is More's inexperience in handling the new fictional mode that 
accounts for much of the uneven tone and apparent uncertainty of 
purpose that can be seen in this work. 
Considerations of dating bear out the contention that the 
experience of working with complex irony which More gained in the 
composition of the History allowed him to perfect the same mode 
in Utopia. Although we can accept Rastell's statement that it was 
begun in 1513, and was continued over a period of some years, it 
is not possible to state with any real certainty when the bulk of 
the material was written and when More finished working on the 
manuscript. It must have been completed after 1514, the year in 
which Thomas Howard was made Earl of Surrey (3/13), and a number 
of textual references point to the years 1517/1518 as possible 
dates for part of the composition.
2 
It is possible that the English continuation, ending with 
the origins of the Morton/Buckingham conspiracy, may have been 
worked on as late as 1521, the date of the judicial murder by 
Henry VIII of the Third Duke of Buckingham, son of the character 
in More's history and possessor of a claim to the throne. It has 
been suggested that More, when he came to this section, broke off 
the writing, disturbed at its contemporary implications. 3 It is 
at least as likely that it was just those events and their 
implications that prompted him to add this section. The year 
1521, then, seems to be a likely date for More's final work on 
the text, although it should be noted that since More refers to 
Shore's wife as still living, and since she died only in 1527, 
writing could, in theory, have continued until that date. The 
likely period of composition, then, was 1513 to 1521, but a 
reasonable conjecture can be made as to the date of the 
composition of the bulk of the text. 
2. CW 2, p.lxiv. 
3. Alistair Fox, Thomas More: History and Providence (Oxford, 
1982) pp.106-I07. 
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It is known that More composed Utopia in 1515/1516, and that 
work is generally now regarded as a polished piece of complex 
irony. If the History is regarded as an attempt at complex irony 
which does not fully succeed, then it is reasonable to suggest 
that at least the main outline of this was probably composed 
before More began work on Utopia. The continuity between the two 
works is a matter of artistic as well as philosophical 
development. 
These ironic intentions bring into question the extent to 
which More was writing a humanist history exemplifying the evils 
of tyranny, and both Sallust and Tacitus have been pointed to as 
models. This point has been most recently made by Richard.Marius, 
who writes: 
This is history in the classical mode of Thucydides 
or Tacitus; it is the first true work of 
Renaissance historiography done by an Englishman, a 
lean, fast-moving narrative intended not only to 
teach the major lessons More has in mind about 
tyranny and public office, but also to instruct his 
readers in t~e vagaries of fortune and the evils of 
presumption. 
Such influence is certainly there, but no classical model and no 
contemporary historical writing can fully account for More's 
procedure. 
More's seeming affinity with other humanist historians has 
been noted by Patrick J. Sullivan who cites, among others, Caxton 
and Berner to show that the humanists regarded history as 
didactic, a source of knowledge about the past, and a means of 
5 
moral persuasion to good action in the present. History was 
regarded as a species of rhetoric, and, following Quintilian, it 
4. Richard Marius, Thomas More: A Biography (London, 1985) 
p.101. 
5. Patrick J. Sullivan, "The painted processe": A Literary 
Study of Sir Thomas More's 'History of King Richard III', 
(Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of California, 




was also regarded as a literary artefact, designed to instruct 
by moving and pleasing the reader. More, says Sullivan, moves and 
delights by his dramatic power.
6 
Such a reading of More, by 
attempting to fit him into a known category, is unnecessarily 
Procrustean, and overlooks the work's elements of structural 
irony. It is quite true that there is much dramatic power in the 
History and Sullivan excellently analyses this, but this dramatic 
power does not tell us everything about the work as More 
conceived and wrote it. 
Leonard F. Dean also draws attention to the classical models 
for the History and discusses its relation to rhetoric.
7 
He 
makes extensive reference to Lucian's How to write history, 
saying that More must have had this in mind while writing the 
History. Of the precepts which Dean cites from Lucian, all could 
have been found in other classical writings on rhetoric; nor does 
Lucian's treatise contain anything that is not innate in the man 
of good literary taste. 
The Lucianic element in the History is more fundamental than 
the possible influence of a hackneyed treatise on the principles 
of historical writing -- a fact acknowleded by Dean himself when 
he talks of More's natural bent for irony being strengthened 'by 
his study of the practice of Tacitus and Thucydides, and 
particularly by his intimate knowledge of Lucian and the Encomium 
moriae' .
8 
He then goes on to draw a distinction between Lucianic 
irony and the Erasmian irony of complexity. It has, however, been 
the argument of this study that Lucian's irony is more complex 
than allowed for by Dean, and that Erasmus' ironic complexity was 
not applied consistently in The Praise of Folly. Nor, as this 
chapter will demonstrate, is the complex irony of the History 
6 . Ibid. , p. 7 4 . 
7. Leonard F. Dean, 'Literary Problems in More's Richard III', 
PMLA 58 (1943), 22-41, (p.23). 





limited to 'an attitude towards life which is comprehensive and 
flexible without being irresponsible' .
9 
The critic who has come closest to recognising More's true 
purpose in the History is Alison Hanham, who notes that as 
straightforward historical writing, it is uneven and its purpose 
seemingly unsure.
10 
It is, she writes, a Lucianic, irreverent 
h h 1 f f h . 11 d' h commentary on t e w o e era t o ~story. More paro ~es t e 
kind of argument advanced by contemporary 'Richard' experts, and 
mocks credulity in Lucianic fashion, using signals to alert the 
12 
reader. This is undoubtedly an important part of the History, 
but it does not account for all of it. It has a more serious 
purpose than mere mockery and, moreover, the Lucianic elements 
are not limited to the mocking of credulous historians; nor can 
it be said that all of the work is Lucianic. The precise extent 
of the Lucianic influence on the work is the subject of this 
chapter. 
13 
Heath correctly notes that the work has a literary structure 
but fails to comment on either the local ironies or the 
structural irony. Arthur Kincaid writes of it: 
The structure of the work is essentially founded 
upon a dramatic conceit, and it is subtly through 
this dramatic structure that Mof~ makes clear the 
moral intention of the History. 
The primary movement, he writes, is from the order and harmony of 
the reign of Edward IV to rebellion and death, and the final re-
establishment of the state of natural order postulated at the 
9. Ibid., p.32. 
10. Alison Hanham, Richard III and his early Historians, 1483-
1535 (Oxford, 1975), p.153. 
11. Ibid., p.155. 
12. Ibid., pp.157-159. 
13. T. G. Heath, 'Another Look at More's Richard III', Moreana, 
19-20 (1968), 11-19, (passim). 
14. Arthur Kincaid, 'The Dramatic Structure of Sir Thomas 
More's History of King Richard III', Studies in English 
Literature 1500-1900, 12 (1972), 223-242, (p.223). 
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beginning of the work.
15 
Within this, the metaphor of the stage 
defines Richard's relationship to both the reader and the 
population of London. The reader beholds the progress of ambition 
and its results; Richard is watched by other characters and by-
the general public. 
The subtle shifts of the audience's attitude 
towards Richard define his gradual downfall. The 
extent to which the responses of the internal 
audience (the populace) and the external audience 
(the reader) combine and verge adds a further 
dimension to the w~;k and can be manipulated for 
mood and emphasis. 
Irony is used to undercut Richard's talk and actions, becoming 
more frequent as the work progresses. It is, however, 
questionable whether the History does end with the re-
establishment of the natural order, and whether the irony is 
directed solely against Richard, as Kincaid seems to assume. 
This disagreement about the primary movement in the work 
bears upon one of the major difficulties concerning the 
transmission of the text, that of the rearrangement of the order 
of the opening paragraphs in the various English versions. The 
earliest printed English versions of the work are those found in 
the chronicles of John Harding and Edward Hall, both published by 
Richard Grafton. Harding's chronicle appeared in 1543, Hall's in 
1548 with a reprint in 1550. There are textual differences 
between these versions, but what is of more interest is the 
common readings which both share against the version printed in 
the collected works of More, published by William Rastell in 
1557. In particular, the Harding/Hall texts open with an account 
of the character of Richard of Gloucester; Rastell's text opens 
15. Ibid., p.231. 
16. Ibid., p.232. 
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with an account of the children of Edward IV, recounts the events 
of the king's last illness, and fully portrays Gloucester only on 
page six. 
This is of some consequence for the way the story is 
developed, for, as Sylvester puts it: 'By the time we meet the 
bad king-to-be we have seen enough of the good king-that-was to 
k h . 1 1 'k' 
17 . f h' d rna e t e contrast s~ngu ar y str~ ~ng' . In v~ew o t ~s an 
other transpositions, Sylvester is led to suggest that it is 'a 
reasonable probability that the arrangement of the sequence of 
events in the H group goes back to an original draft of the 
History which More composed before making the fair copy 
18 
eventually printed by Rastell'. 
Against this, Hanham suggests that the bulk of the changes in 
the H texts were made by More himself.
19 
She suggests that the 
changes were made in order to put the events in chronological 
20 
order, and concludes that 'If More did not furnish these 
alterations to his own text, someone else was taking remarkable 
l 'b . ' 21 ~ ert~es . It seems that this was exactly what did happen. 
Sylvester tells us that the H versions are 'edited' texts, 'that 
is, they consciously attempt to adjust More's narrative to the 
historical details related elsewhere in their volumes, and they 
endeavour to supply the names and dates which Rastell, presumably 
following More's autograph, so conspicuously left blank in his 
text' .
22 
In other words, it can reasonably be conjectured that 
chroniclers who were prepared to make some alterations in the 
name of historical accuracy were equally prepared to make others 
for the same reason. There seems no reason to look further for an 
17. CW 2, p.xxv. 
18. Ibid., pp.xxvii-xxviii. 
19. Hanham, p.205. 
20. Ibid., p.211. 
21. Ibid., p.212. 
22. CW 2, pp.xxiii-xxiv. 
explanation of the most significant variations between the H 
texts and that of Rastell. 
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The account of the opening sections given by Fox seems close 
to More's intentions. He writes that the function of the work's 
irony is 'to intimate an underlying reality in events that belies 
23 
their superficial appearance' The example gi~en is that of 
Polydore Virgil's account of Richard's destruction of Edward's 
ideal order; in More, a second perspective undermines the first.
24 
There are discordant notes in the portrait of Edward, and it is 
implied that Richard does nothing that Edward did not do; Edward, 
however, got away with it, while Richard did not.
25 
In exposing the 'ideal' conditions of Edward's 
reign as a_contrived illusion, More was seeking to 
prepare his readers for the real import of the 
History: a realization that Richard's reign merely 
manifests in extreme form circumstan~~s that 
pertain in all political situations. 
While this view accounts for the ambiguity of much of t.he 
History, it does not account for the wide range of ironic devices 
used by More; nor does it fully explain their effect. In order to 
understand what More was doing, and the place of the History in 
his works, we must turn to an examination of the text. 
The work opens with an idealised description of the reign of 
Edward IV, 
A Kinge of suche gouernaunce and behauioure in time 
of peace ... that there was neuer anye Prince of th 
is lande attaynynge the Crowne by battayle, so 
heartely beloued with the substaunce of the people: 
nor he hymselfe so speciallye in anye parte of his 
life, as at the time of his death (3/20-26) . 
23. Fox, p.78. 
24. Ibid., p.78-79. 
25. Ibid., p.S0-81. 
26. Fox, p.81. 
,' 
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Yet even here, irony intrudes. What weight are we to put on the 
27 
phrase 'attaynynge the Crowne by battayle'? Is the method of 
his attaining the crown mentioned so as to qualify the praise 
given to him? What of the parenthetical phrase 'for in war eche 
parte muste needes bee others enemye'? Even on the first page of 
the text, the apparently idyllic nature of Edward's reign is 
being set against a harsher reality. Not only that which is of 
importance for the ostensible subject of the History, but the 
tradition of classical and humanist panegyric is being undercut 
by insistent reference to that same reality. This ironic purpose 
is surely what is behind the decision to dislocate the 
chronological order of the narrative; we expect a contrast of the 
ideal reign of Edward with the villainy of Richard, but get 
something more complex. 
More goes on to make it clear that a considerable part of 
the reputation of Edward's reign as 'golden' was occasioned by 
nostalgia as a result of what followed. 
Which fauour and affeccion yet after his decease, 
by the crueltie, mischiefe, and trouble of the 
tempestious worlde that folowe2s highelye towarde 
hym more increased (3/26-4/3). 
There follows an idealised portrait of Edward's virtues and of 
his physical appearance which, however, ends by saying: 
howe bee it in his latter dayes wyth ouer liberall 
dyet, sommewhat corpulente and boorelye ... hee was 
of youthe greatelye geuen to fleshlye wantonnesse 
(4/18-20). 
27. More may, of course, be referring to the idea that victory 
in battle is a sign of divine favour, an idea used, for 
example, to legitimise Henry Tudor's otherwise dubious claim 
to the throne; but this does not seem to be the primary 
reference here. 
28. The Latin stesses the contrast between Edward and 
Richard: inuisus parricidae sequentis principatus 
auctiorem fecit (4/1). 
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Again we observe the tendency to undercut the idealised portrait 
of Edward. England was not, under his reign, as idyllic as the 
panegyricist would have us believe, nor was Edward of quite such 
spotless character. 
The idealisation of Edward's reign continues, but again in a 
way which is curiously qualified: 
And all bee it that all the tyme of his raygne, hee 
was wyth hys people, soo benygne, courteyse and so 
familyer, that no parte of hys vertues was more 
estemed (5/7-9) . 
More then tells the story of his hunting at Windsor with the 
Mayor and Aldermen of London, and his sending venison into the 
City so freely 
that no one thing in manye dayes before, gate hym 
eyther moe heartes or more heartie fauoure amonge 
the common people, whiche oftentymes more esteme 
and take for greatter kindenesse, a lyttle 
courtesye, than a great benefyte (5/18-21). 
The Latin adds the phrase 'ac pro maioris in se amoris argumento 
ducitur' (5/17-18), making more explicit the implication that his 
gift to the City of London was given not from benevolence, but 
from more politic considerations. 
More now makes the transition from Edward IV to Richard of 
Gloucester, introducing him in colours as black as those in which 
Edward were portrayed were bright. Edward's children had been 
committed to the care of their uncle, and More now gives an 
initial brief character of his chief protagonist. 
For Richarde the Duke of Gloucester, by nature 
theyr Vncle, by office theire protectoure, to 
theire father beholden, to themselfe by othe and 
allegyaunce bownden, al the bandes broken that 
binden manne and manne together, withoute anye 
respecte of Godde or the worlde, vnnaturallye 
contriued to bereue them, not onelye their 
dignitie, but also their liues (6/2-8). 
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He passes to a brief account of Richard's background. His father, 
Richard, Duke of York, raised rebellion against King Henry VI, 
and his three sons -- and we observe that this description again 
qualifies the earlier portrait of Edward -- were 'greate and 
statelye of stomacke, gredye and ambicious of authoritie, and 
impacient of parteners' (6/26-28) . Edward attained the Crown by 
usurpation; George, Duke of Clarence, led by ambition to oppose 
his brothers, was attainted of treason and drowned in a butt of 
Malmsey: 'whose death kynge Edwarde, (albeit he commaunded it) 
when he wist it was done, pitiously bewailed and sorowfully 
repented' (7 /13-15) . 
Such being the family of Richard of Gloucester, we expect 
him to be portrayed as a consummate villain -- however, given the 
ambiguities which More has built into his portrait of Edward, we 
might also expect that his treatment of Richard will be similarly 
qualified. He is described as 
little of stature, ill fetured of limmes, croke 
backed, his left shoulder much higher than his 
right, hard fauoured of visage, and suche as is in 
states called warlye, in other.menne otherwise. He 
was malicious, wrathful, enuious, and from afore 
his birth, ever frowarde (7/19-23). 
These details, although based on other accounts, are not 
necessarily historically accurate, and More goes on to give 
absurd details about Richard's birth: 
It is for trouth reported, that the Ouches his 
mother had so muche a doe in her trauaile, that 
shee could not bee deliuered of hym vncutte: and 
that hee came into the worlde with the feete 
forwarde ... and (as the fame runneth) also not 
vntothed (7/23-27). 
The ambiguity' of 'for trouthe' and 'as the fame runneth' is 
amplified when More goes on to say of this strange birth: 
whither menne of hatred reporte aboue the trouthe, 
or elles that nature chaunged her course in hys 
beginninge, which in the course of hys lyfe many 
things vnnaturallye committed (7/27-30). 
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Already, More is drawing back, distancing himself from his 
sources of information, questioning their veracity, and stressing 
the large amount of sheer rumour surrounding the figure of 
Richard. Clearly, at this point his narrating persona is being 
portrayed as someone of considerable literary and intellectual 
sophistication, capable of seeing that the legend of Richard has 
been greatly oversimplified, and capable also of using a 
sophisticated irony to correct those distortions. 
More now moves to a character of Richard as politician: 
Free was hee called of dyspence, and sommewhat 
aboue hys power liberall, with large giftes hee geb 
him vnstedfaste frendeshippe, for whiche hee was 
fain to pil and spoyle in other places, and get him 
stedfast hatred. Hee was close and secrete, a deepe 
dissimuler, lowlye of counteynaunce, arrogant of 
heart, outwardly c Gl.l'MPinable where he inwardely 
hated, not letting to kisse whome hee thoughte to 
kyll: dispitious and cruell, not for euill will 
alway, but after for ambicion, and either for the 
suretie or encrease of his estate (8/3-11) . 
The stress on Richard's consummate hypocrisy is of the essence of 
the work. Not only is it the major element in his character, but 
his dissimulation about his intentions creates the atmosphere of 
uncertainty that abounds among the citizens, and makes it so 
difficult for them to distinguish appearance from reality in 
political events. 
To complete the picture, Richard is charged with slaying 
King Henry in the Tower. This statement, however, is first 
qualified by the narrator's adding 'as menne constantly 
saye' (8/15-16), and then undermined by the savagely ironical 
statement 'and that without commaundemente or knoweledge of the 
king, whiche woulde vndoubtedly yf he had entended that thinge, 
haue appointed that boocherly office, to some other then his owne 
borne brother' (8/18-21). We are told also that 'Somme wise men 
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also weene' (8/22) that he killed his brother Clarence, so that 
he should stand closer in the line of succession. More now adds 
the statement that throws all his sources of information and all 
his vilification of Richard into doubt: 
But of al this pointe, is there no certaintie, & 
whoso diuineth vppon coniectures, maye as wel shote 
to farre as to short (9/5-7) . 
In spite of this warning, he goes on to say 'haue I by credible 
informacion learned' (9/7) that on the night of King Edward's 
death, a servant of Richard's, being told the news, said 'then 
wyll my mayster the Duke of Gloucester bee kynge' (9/13) . Again 
the insinuation is heavily qualified by ambiguity: 
What cause hee hadde soo to thynke harde it is to 
saye, whyther hee being toward him, anye thynge 
knewe that hee suche thynge purposed, or otherwyse 
had anye inkelynge thereof: for hee was not likelye 
to speake it of noughte (9/13-17). 
The Latin gives an explanation of More's source: 
quem ego sermonem ab eo memini, qui colloquentes 
audiuerat, iam tum patri meo renuntiatum, cum adhuc 
nulla proditionis eius suspicio haberetur (9/18-
20) •. 
Thus the evidence for any such conversation having taken place, 
much less its having any significance, is heavily qualified by 
More himself -- and this as he sets out to establish that Richard 
plotted his usurpation quite deliberately from the moment of 
Edward's death. He now .states explicitly that whatever the reason 
may have been, Richard decided upon the destruction of his 
nephews and the usurpation of the Crown -- and this is given on 
no better authority than the phrase 'certayn is it' (9/25). 
With this intention in mind, Richard set out to exploit the · 
division between 'the Quenes kindred and the kinges blood' 
(9/28). We are now taken back to the reign of Edward, who, we are 
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told, was irked by this dissension between the two parties. He 
attempted to reconcile them on his deathbed, and his lengthy 
speech sets out the conditions of peace and concord in the 
kingdom after his death. It is underpinned by a tragic awareness 
of what is likely to happen. He gives a disquisition on the evil 
of ambition, that 'pestilente serpente' (12/21-22), and reminds 
his hearers of what it has lately done in England. He then goes 
on to say, in yet another statement that qualifies the initial 
picture of him: 
Whiche thinges yf I could as well haue forsene, as 
I haue with my more payne than pleasure proued ... 
I woulde neuer haue won the courtesye of mennes 
knees, with the losse of soo many heades (13/3) . 
Because of the danger of civil discord, he begs those around his 
bed to henceforth love each other, 'Whiche I verelye truste you 
will, if ye any thing earthly regard, either godde or your king, 
affinitie or kinred, this realme, your owne countrey, or your 
owne surety' (13/21-24) . The lords present join hands together, 
and the king dies. 
This speech has a double purpose. First, it deals in a 
straightforward way with More's views on the running of a 
kingdom, 'and, as such, ought to be considered in relation to 
that perennial topic of the humanists, the education of the 
prince. It touches, of course, on matters more practical than 
education, but the central idea that, as the ruler of the kingdom 
is responsible for maintaining justice, truth, peace and 
religion, he ought to be well- educated and well- advised in his 
role, is obviously related to this complex of concerns. The 
proper government of the kingdom was the theme that was to serve 
as occasion for Utopia, and More is here explicitly setting out 
the standards and ideals by which all following events in his 
treatise are to be judged. It is, however, a mistake to think 
that More is making a simple contrast of this standard to the 
behaviour of Richard. That is part of his purpose, but it must be 




noted that the speech is put in the mouth of a king who tells his 
hearers that he himself gained the throne by methods which he 
exhorts them to abjure. We have an implied contrast not simply 
between Richard and the ideal of government, but a standard by 
which all historical actors are judged and found wanting. With 
Edward deceased and the story of Richard's usurpation about to 
open, we shall find that there is no one character of sufficient 
moral stature to serve as a foil to Richard. 
Following Edward's death, More moves on to show us Prince 
Edward's progress to London from Wales, accompanied by the 
Queen's kinsmen. More notes explicitly that the Queen's attempts 
to plant her brother and uncle in the Prince's affections earned 
them the enmity of Gloucester, '& vpon that grounde set the 
foundacion of all his vnhappy building' (14/18-19). Richard was 
able to exploit the old nobility's latent jealousy of the upstart 
Woodvilles who in Edward's reign had been concerned only with 
'the immoderate aduauncement of them selfe' (15/7-8) . He is also 
sceptical about the death-bed reconciliation between the 
factions, 'in whyche the kinges pleasure hadde more place than 
the parties willes' (15/20-21) . Richard concludes with a 
sentiment that is, in the circumstances, less Machiavellian than 
realistic: 
Nor none of vs I beleue is so vnwyse, ouersone to 
truste a newe frende made of an olde foe, or to 
think that an houerly kindnes, sodainely contract 
in one houre, continued yet scant a fortnight, 
shold be deper setled in their stomackes: then a 
long accustomed malice many yeres rooted (15/21-
25).' 
However cynical this may sound when compared with Edward's hopes 
in the death-bed scene, it is no more than would have been 
passing in the minds of the Woodvilles themselves, and given what 
we have already noted of More's treatment of Richard, it is 
probably not intended to indicate that he was any more of a 




In the following paragraph, More stresses the expedient 
nature of political alliances by saying that both Buckingham and 
Hastings supported Richard, and commenting: 'These two not 
bearing eche to other so muche loue, as hatred bathe vnto the 
Quenes parte' (15/31-32). Again we see that the background 
colouring of the History qualifies the foregrounding of Richard's 
villanies. Similarly, More notes that the Woodvilles had so 
arranged matters that Richard, although he had been appointed 
Protector in Edward's will, could not gain control of the young 
Prince without seeming to raise rebellion. It is this that drives 
him to the stratagem now described. The Queen is persuaded that 
the force the Woodvilles have gathered might be easily 
misinterpreted; she writes to the Welsh party so that they, 
'nothynge Earthelye mystrustynge' (17/5-6), brought the Prince on 
unguarded. 
With Edward and his kinsmen thus separated, Gloucester and 
Buckingham set about entrapping Rivers and Woodville at Stony 
Stratford. A coup is carried out against the Queen's party, 
resulting in their arrest and eventual execution at Pomfrait. The 
news of the arrests provokes the Queen and her children to seek 
sanctuary in Westminster Abbey, where the Chancellor delivers to 
her the Great Seal. The portrait of the break-up of the Queen's 
household and the desolation of the Queen is full of pathos, 
evoking sympathy for her situation. The sanctuary is immediately 
surrounded, and the Chancellor sees 'all the Temmes full of 
bootes of the Duke of Gloucesters seruantes, watchinge that no 
manne should go to Sainctuary, nor none coulde passe vnserched' 
(22/14-16). More now first introduces the theme of the attitude 
of the people to these events: 
Then was there greate commocion and murmure as well 
in other places about, as specially in the city, 
the people diuerselye diuininge vppon this dealinge 
(22/16-18) . 
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The Latin is more detailed, dwelling, as Sylvester notes, more on 
the common people than on the nobles.
29 
Iam continuo res dispargi, toti populo in ore esse, 
stupere omnes, ira, metu, ac merore compleri, 
conglobari alij alibi in armis, turmatim volitare 
diuersi, atque inuicem minitantes, prout quosque 
partium studium aut periculi formido copulauerat 
(22/16-19) . 
This emphasis on the reactions of the people will assume more 
importance as the work progresses; as the narrator comes to 
identify himself ever more closely with them, his attitudes 
become coloured by theirs until he eventually forgets his 
original sophisticated and balanced treatment of the subject and 
ends in simple condemnation of Richard. 
It was seen in Chapter Two that More found in Lucian the 
elements of a narrator whose statements may point to an 
underlying meaning at variance with the ostensible significance 
of his words. This was particularly the case in The Tyrannicide 
and in More's reply to it. He also found in Lucian the elements 
of a complex dramatic irony in which meaning is contained not 
solely in the statements made, but in the combination of these 
with the chosen literary form. Lucian's rather stereotyped 
scepticism was enlivened by the use he made of the dialogue form; 
in the History, More's full meaning resides, not in the 
statements made about Richard, but in the form in which those 
statements are cast. More's use of the device is more complex 
than that of Lucian: where the latter's dramatic irony was 
static, serving principally to raise questions about a specific 
philosophy and the language in which it is presented, More's is 
dynamic, dramatising the process of questioning, as well as 
presenting the conclusion reached. 
The uncertainty exhibited in this section permeates much of 
the remaining account of Gloucester's actions. On one level, it 
is what gives him his opportunity; on another level, it is what 
makes it difficult to state his motives with certainty. 
29. CW 2, p.187. 
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At a meeting of the Council in London, Hastings assures the 
I 
Lords of Gloucester's good intentions, and of the incipient 
treason of the Woodville faction. He further advises them to 
beware 'they iudged not the matter to farrefoorth, ere they knewe 
the trueth' (23/16-17), and warns them not to disturb matters 
before the Coronation. As the Dukes approach London, 'colourable 
proofe' (24/3) is given of the plans of the Woodville faction, in 
the shape of a wagon full of arms taken from the 'conspirators' . 
The narrator comments: 
This deuise all be it that it made the matter to 
wise men more vnlykely, well perceyuying that the 
intendours of suche a purpose, wolde rather haue 
hadde theyr harneys on theyr backes, then taue 
bounde them vppe in barrelles, yet muche part of 
the common people were therewith verye well 
satisfyed, and said it wer almoise to hange them 
(24/10-15) . 
Sylvester quotes Mancini as noting the actuality of this, and as, 
noting also that the arms had been in place in the city since 
before the death of Edward IV, in preparation for the war against 
30 
the Scots. 
This is the first of a number of farcical episodes in which 
Richard and his associates support their actions with such 
brazen-faced trickery that one is driven to ask why others 
allowed him to succeed as he did. Such episodes are reminiscent 
of the exposure of charlatans in such Lucianic works as Alexander 
and The Death of Peregrinus. They introduce into the History the 
theme of why men fail to act against apparent and obvious evil. 
Already we can see that More has had recourse to a range of 
ironic devices in order to convey his meaning. He has used verbal 
irony against Edward IV; he has used the device of an apparent 
praise that is undercut by facts; he has set Edward's pious 
death-bed speech against the facts of his character and actions; 
he has used the classical device of the contrasting portraits of 





the hero and the villain in a way quite different to what the 
reader expects. Here, he uses farce to suggest the absurdity 
inherent in Richard's conspiracy. Other devices will be used 
later, and the impression given is partly that of a writer 
experimenting with the full range of ironic devices available to 
him. 
The next section of the work raises the issue of whether 
More, true to his claim that he feels free to exaggerate the 
facts, was deliberately suppressing some facts in order to 
blacken the character of Richard. The arrival of the young King 
in London provides the occasion for some further reflections on 
Richard: 
But the Duke of Gloucester bare him in open sighte 
so reuerentlye to the Prince, with all semblaunce 
of lowlinesse, that from the great obloquy in which 
hee was sao late before, hee was sodainelye fallen 
in sao great truste, that at the counsayle next 
assembled, hee was made the only manne chose and 
thoughte most mete, to bee protectoure of the king 
and hys realme, so (that were it destenye or were 
it foly) the lamb was betaken to the wolfe to kepe 
(24/23-25/1) . 
As Sylvester's note here makes clear, More chooses to omit the 
fact that Richard had been named as Protector in Edward's will. 31 
It seems that More is using artistic licence to suppress a fact 
of which he can hardly have been unaware in order to blacken 
Richard's name. He has already warned the reader that not 
everything he says is to be taken as truth, and this same warning 
should be applied to the following section in which he explicitly 
accuses Richard of a conscious plot to,usurp the crown: 
Nowe all were it sao that the protectoure so soore 
thyrsted for the finyshynge of that hee hadde 
begonne, that thoughte euerye daye a yeare tyll it 
were atchyeued ... (25/10-12). 
31. CW 2, p.190. 
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This assigning to Richard of a conscious intention of usurpation 
is, of course, only an interpretation of events and, as Pollard 
makes clear, probably an incorrect one.
32 
Richard's next move is to gain control of the younger 
prince, who was with his mother in sanctuary. He decides on this 
course, says More, 
well wittinge that yf hee deposed the one brother, 
all the Realme woulde fall to the tether, yf hee 
either remayned in Sainctuarye, or should happelye 
bee shorte133 conuayde too hys farther libertye 
(25/14-17). 
He claims to the assembled Lords that the Queen's keeping the 
Duke of York in Sanctuary makes it appear that the Lords were not 
to be trusted with him, although they have charge of the King, 
who, says Richard, needs the familiar conversation of those of 
his own age and status. Further, if the Duke remained in 
Sanctuary, it would be to the dishonour of the King and those 
around him, 
For euerye manne wyll weene, that no manne wyll so 
dooe for noughte. And suche euyll oppinyon once 
fastened in mennes heartes, harde it is to wraste 
oute, and maye growe to more grief than anye manne 
here canne diuine (26/20-24). 
Since More has explicitly stated that Richard intended to usurp 
the crown, this speech appears as sophistical reasoning; but if 
we keep in mind that More has given himself licence to 
exaggerate, then it can be argued that it is the attribution of 
evil motives to Richard that we are to treat with suspicion. In 
this speech, then we have a local irony -- the seemingly specious 
speech by Richard cancelled out, or at least qualified, by an 
over-riding structural irony. 
32. A. E. Pollard, 'The Making of Sir Thomas More's Richard III' 
in Historical essays in Honour of James Tait edited by J. G. 
Edwards, V. H. Galbraith and E. F. Jacob (Manchester, 1933), 
223-238, (p.235). 









It is now decided to send the Archbishop of Canterbury to 
parley with the Queen; if she proves obstinate, Richard says they 
may bring him out by the King's authority. The Archbishop demurs 
at the use of violence to break Sanctuary: 'And therefore 
Godde forbydde that anye manne shoulde for anye thynge earthlye 
enterpryse to breake the immunitee, and libertye of that sacred 
Sainctuary, that hath bene the safegarde of so many a good mannes 
life' (28/9-12). 
His speech provokes a lengthy reply from the Duke of 
Buckingham, the length of which may indicate that, in part, More 
was giving expression to a vexing contemporary problem, but it 
also serves to characterise Buckingham as possessed of a violent 
disposition, unscrupulous, and, most notably, having considerable 
ability at sophistical reasoning. The Queen, he says, well knows 
that no harm is meant to the Duke of York, 'Whose honoure if shee 
as muche desyred as oure dishonoure, and as muche regarde tooke 
to his wealthe, as to her owne will, she woulde bee as lothe to 
suffer him from the kinge, as anye of vs bee' (28/29-32) . He 
claims that the reason for her refusal to release the Prince is 
not fear, but obstinacy. But suppose her motive is fear, then 
'the more she feareth to delyuer hym, the more oughte wee feare 
to leaue him in her handes' (29/13-14) . If she fears his being 
taken by force -- which, of course, we are told that Richard has 
planned -- she might then send him out of England. To prevent 
this, force should be used at once. 
Buckingham's reasoning now becomes yet more specious. Such 
an action, he argues, would not be a breach of Sanctuary, which 
is a privilege reserved for genuine cases, not for thieves and 
murderers, and he speaks at length about abuses of Sanctuary. 
This eloquent speech is irrelevant to the issue of the Duke of 
York's situation. Whatever can be said about murderers and 
thieves, the Duke of York is in neither of these categories. 
Buckingham's purpose in mentioning them is the hope that, by 
It 
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impugning the inviolability of Sanctuary, he will nerve his 
followers up to breach it if necessary. 
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He concludes with a series of specious analogies: If a wife 
takes Sanctuary so as to run from her husband, surely her husband 
can take her out? If a child takes Sanctuary because he does not 
wish to go to.school, can his master not take him out? There is 
even less reason in this case. In the case of the schoolchild, 
there is an element of fear; in this case, none at all. Finally, 
he jokes: 
And verelye I haue often heard of saintuarye menne. 
But I neuer heard erste of saintuarye chyldren 
(33/8-9). 
Such is Buckingham's speech on Sanctuary. Eloquent and 
forceful though it is, its purpose is given away by its slippery 
logic, its false analogies, and its final reductio ad absurdum in 
the case of the truant schoolboy. We are forced to ask ourselves: 
if he relies on such devices, while bearing such an obvious 
animus against the Queen, what are his real motives? Why does he 
feel himself constrained to conceal them behind this parade of 
specious arguments? More obviously intends to imply that 
Buckingham's plans for the Duke of York were at variance with 
what he here expresses. A speech that conceals the speaker's real 
motivation while revealing him as untrustworthy is thus one more 
of More's ironic devices. A similar device was used by several of 
Lucian's personae -- for example, in such works as The Cynic, The 
Tyrannicide, and Phalaris -- and we will will later find it used 
in Utopia by Raphael Hythlodaeus, although not all these examples 
include the conscious attempt at deception. 
More now states: 
When the Duke hadde done, the temporall menne 
whole, and good part of the spirituall also, 
thinking none hurt erthly ment towarde the younge 
babe, condescended in effecte, that if he were not 








This is the first example of that weakness of will that allows 
tyranny to prosper and progress. As the Cardinal departs for 
Westminster, More gives another example of that multiplying of 
possible motives that, on one level, indicates that men do indeed 
act out of mixed motives, and, on another level, reinforces the 
ambiguity that surrounds the events described. The Cardinal, More 
says, 
departed into the saintuary to the Quene, with 
diuers other lordes with him, were it for the 
respecte of hys honoure, or that she shoulde by 
presence of so manye perceyue that this erande was 
not one mannes minde, or were it for that the 
protectour entended not in this matter to trust 
anye one manne alone, or els that if she finally 
wer determined to kepe him, somme of that company 
had happely secret instruccion incontinent magry 
her minde to take him and to leaue her no respite 
to conuaye hym, whiche she was likely to mind after 
this.matter broken to her, yf her time would in any 
wyse serue her (33/28-34/5) . 
Only one of these motives reflects at all badly on the Protector, 
while the Queen's supposed motives make the manoeuverings of the 
Dukes seem like necessity rather than malignity. After verbal 
fencing between the Queen and the Cardinal, the Queen makes a 
veiled insinuation against the Protector: 
I merueile greatly that my lord protectour is so 
disirous to haue him in his keping where if the 
child in his sicknes miscaried by nature, yet might 
he runne into slaunder and suspicion of fraude 
(35/34-36/2) . 
The English text here omits a section of some thirteen lines in 
which the Queen attacks the Protector in words which, as 
Sylvester notes, increase the pathos of her situation, and so add 
. 34 
yet another dramatic element to More's text. 
Following her speech, an anonymous Lord asks if she knows 
any reason why the princes should be in jeopardy. 'No', she 








replies, 'But it is I trow no great maruaile though I fere, lest 
those that haue not letted to put them in duresse with out 
colour, wil let as lytle to procure their distruccion without 
cause (36/28-31) . She clearly has no illusions as to what she 
thinks the Pr~tector's motives might be, and so the Cardinal 
silences the other Lord, giving assurances which the Queen 
refuses to accept. 
The Cardinal mentions Buckingham's doubts as to the validity 
of Sanctuary in this case, and the consequent legitimacy of the 
use of force. The Queen denies any intention of removing the 
young Duke, pointing out that no place is as safe for him as the 
Sanctuary, 'whereof, was there neuer tiraunt yet so deuelish, 
that durste presume to breake' (37/31-38/1). She refutes 
Buckingham's false analogies by saying of Richard 'Forsoth he 
hath founden a goodly glose, by whiche that place that may defend 
a thefe, may not saue an innocent' (38/3-5) . She then sums up her 
attack on the Protector: 'Troweth the protector ... that I 
parceiue not whereunto his painted processe draweth?' (38/8-10) . 
The phrase 'painted processe' may be seen as, in part, a 
summation of ithe entire work. The Queen is in no doubt of its 
literal truth as applied to Richard, while the work as a whole · 
treats it ambiguously, simultaneous~y bringing forward supporting 
evidence and questioning its reliability. 
In reply to further arguments by the Queen, the Cardinal 
gives his personal pledge for the safety of the Duke and his 
estate, and refuses to use force if she will not give him up: 
for he neuer entended more to moue her in that 
matter, in which she thought that he and all other 
also saue herselfe, lacked either wit or trouth. 
Wit if they were so dul, that they coulde nothing 
perceiue what the protectour entended: trouthe if 
they should procure her sonne to be delyuered into 
his handes, in whom thei shold perceyue toward the 
childe any euil intended (40/18-23). 
She is the only character who so explicitly condemns the 
Protector, and so uncompromisingly accuses him of evil 
J· 
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intentions. Such recognition must be the first condition of 
resistance to tyranny, for unless one recognises evil for what it 
is, one cannot act against it. But the Queen is not the person to 
resist Richard: she fears that her son will be taken from her by 
force; she has made no preparations to convey him out of the 
kingdom; she trusts the Cardinal and others of the land with him, 
since they may be more inclined to look after her son if she 
gives him up freely. Her resistance collapses. In spite of all 
her fears and suspicions, she delivers her son into the hands of 
the Protector and even as she does so, she rehearses arguments 
as to the danger to both her sons, handing over the Duke of York 
with the warning: 'that as farre as ye thinke that I fere to 
muche, be you wel ware that you fere not as farre to little' 
(42/6-8). The whole episode, more than any other in the work, 
humanises the arguments on tyranny. The Queen's dilemma is acute, 
with no satisfactory answer available to her. Fully cognisant of 
what she regards as Richard's intentions, she must yet yield to 
them, since she is unable to resist effectively for fear of 
bringing about the very consequences she most fears. 
The Queen's fears are now reinforced by More's description of 
Richard's reception of his nephew. He welcomes him gladly 
while a marginal note says '0 dissimulacion' (42) -- but 
'Thereupon forthwith they brought hym to the kynge his brother 
into the bishoppes palice at powles, & from thence through the 
citie honourably into the tower, out of which after that day they 
neuer came abrode' (42/19-23). 
The point of the episode is clear; what is not so obvious iS 
!, why it should be dwelt on at such length. More may have been 
indulging his talent for dramatic representation of a scene 
without fully considering how it would fit into his plan for the 
whole work, or he may have been exercising the humanist love of 
rhetorical elaboration. More importantly, the apparent lack of 
structural balance may be due to the composition of the History 
in blocks, and the lack of final revision. Such a view has 
important consequences for a consideration of the role of the 
narrator, since it is possible that the sudden alternations in 
<' 
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tone which mark the work may be the result, not of authorial 
intention, but of the circumstances of composition. It is notable 
that, in the episodes which immediately surround the debate on 
Sanctuary and the story of the Queen, the stance adopted by the 
narrator has a consistency of tone which suggests the possibility 
of the intervening episodes being an interpolation. Both the 
debate on Sanctuary and the story of the Queen's dilemma are 
fully worked up pieces, one of rhetoric and the other of drama, 
which are inserted into the chronologically appropriate place in 
the text without much thought for artistic decorum. 
More is now fully launched on an account of Richard's 
single-minded usurpation, and the rest of the History is given 
over to an account of how he brought this about. We first have an 
account of the motives of the Duke of Buckingham, which has been 
translated by Rastell from the Latin, although it occurs again 
later in the English, at 87/24f. Sylvester says of this apparent 
clumsiness: 
It seems likely that Rastell included both accounts 
because, although they do overlap, they 
nevertheless reinforce each other. Only the Lt. 
(43/Bf.) gives the subtle arguments used to 
persuade Buckingham that he was already so far in 
he could not withdraw even if he wished to, and it 
alone preserves the account of the agreement 
(44/1f.) reached between the two conspirators. The 
En., on the other hand, concentra~5s primarily on 
the causes of their disagreement. 
We are told that after Richard had imprisoned the Queen's 
kinsfolk and had her sons in his hands, he then took Buckingham 
into his counsels through the agency of 
suttell fo1kes, and such as were their crafte 
maisters in the handling of such wicked deuises: 
who declared vnto him, that the yong king was 
offended with him for his kinsfolkes sakes, and 
that if he were euer able, he would reuenge them 
(43/9-13). 
35. cw 2, p.210. 
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Nor is it any use to repent, since the Protector has had spies 
set on Buckingham to ensure his loyalty, and More adds, 'For the 
state of thinges & the dispocions of men wer than such, that a 
man could not wel tell whom he might truste, or whom he might 
feare' (43/26-28). Thus the Duke, like Macbeth after him, was 
brought to that pointe, 'that where he had repented the way that 
he had entered, yet wolde he go forth in the same: & since he had 
ones begon, he would stoutly go through/ (43/29-31) . So an 
alliance was formed between the two Dukes, after which 'they went 
about to prepare for the coronacyon of the yong king as they wold 
haue it seme' (44/9-11). More now stresses that Richard had 
decided upon usurping the Crown, for while he and Buckingham have 
sundry bishops and nobles plan the Coronation, 'as fast were they 
in an other place contryuing the contrary, & to make the 
protectour kyng' (44/19-21). 
At length, even some of the lords begin to have suspicions 
as to Richard's intentions, particularly in the matter of the two 
councils. The passage on Catesby, the double-dealing servant of 
Lord Hastings, reveals the extent to which men as trusting as 
Hastings aided Richard's designs. Catesby, present in the council 
of Richard and Buckingham, was bringing false information to his 
master: 
For his dissimulacion onelye, kepte all that 
mischeyfe vppe. In whome if the lord Hastinges had 
not put so speciall trust, the lord Stanley and he 
had departed with diuerse other lordes, and broken 
all the daunce, for many il signes that hee sawe, 
which he nowe construed all to the beste (45/29-
46/3). 
Episodes such as this tend towards tragedy, while some of those 
that come later savour more of farce. This mixture of tones is 
one indication of the changes in the attitude of the narrator; as 
•. 
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Richard appears as both stage-manager and chief actor in his own 
play, his performance is so outrageously overplayed that it 
becomes a source of wonder why no move was made against him. It 
becomes clear that it is not merely the history and actions of 
Richard that we are witnessing but, albeit in an extreme form, a 
fable of the condition of all political action. 
Farce soon follows when More moves on to write of the 
Council in the Tower, where the lords assemble to discuss the 
Coronation. This episode displays Richard's marvellous stage-
managing of the scene. Arriving late, he dispatches Morton, 
Bishop of Ely, to Holborn for strawberries -- was this to be rid 
of one whom he knew would oppose his plot against Hastings? --
departs for an hour and returns 'al changed with a wonderful 
soure angrye countenaunce, knitting the browes, frowning and 
froting and knawing on hys lippes' (47/15-17). His changed mood 
prepares the lords for his accusations of treason. He accuses 
first the Queen and Shore's wife of sorcery, showing his withered 
arm as proof; More notes 'as it was neuer other' (48/11). More's 
presentation of this historically accurate scene is dramatic, and 
he characteristically uses it to show how the lords failed to 
oppose Richard: 'And thereupon euery mannes mind sore misgaue 
them, well perceiuing that this matter was but a quarel' (48/11-
13) . Richard immediately accuses Hastings of treason, and has him 
arrested and executed without benefit of trial -- and this 
without any mention of resistance, although More makes it clear 
that those present know the charge to be false. Indeed, it is 
hard to say at this point whether More is more critical of 
Richard's charlatanry or the lords' acceptance of it. 
The Council scene is rounded off by a series of anecdotes 
concerning Hastings' having ignored omens about his death. Lord 
Stanley had dreamt of himself and Hastings being ~ased by a bore, 
the symbol of the Protector (50) . Hastings refuses to flee London 
with him, regarding such belief in dreams as 'trifles' and 
'witchcraft' (50/10;50/12). The events surrounding the death of 
Hastings are used as an opportunity for moralising. Hastings and 
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a man sent by Richard to ensure his appearance at the Council 
encounter a priest. Hastings' companion tells him 'you haue no 
nede of a prist yet' (51/8-9); Hastings suspects nothing sinister 
in the remark~ 
& so little mistrusted, that he was neuer merier 
nor neuer so full of good hope in his life: •.. But 
I shall rather let anye thinge passe me, then the 
vain sureti of mans mind so nere his deth (51/11-
14). 
A conversation of Hastings with an old comrade on the fate of the 
Queen's kinsmen is reported, in which Hastings says: 'And lo how 
the world is turned, now stand mine enemies in the daunger ... & 
I neuer in my life so mery, nor neuer in so great suerty' (52/10-
13). This elicits the comment: 
0 good god, the blindnes of our mortall nature, 
when he most feared, he was in good suerty: when he 
rekened him self surest, he lost his life, & that 
within two howres after (52/13-16) . 
The simple moralising of the narrator at this point makes it seem 
as though he has abandoned the attempt to make sense of the 
remorseless logic of events, and is taking refuge in convenient 
and conventional explanations. From now on, he will stress the 
outright cynicism with which the population of London receive 
Richard's justifications of his usurpation -- cynicism, but 
resignation too, as though these are matters in which ordinary 
people have no right to interfere, a point implied in the later 
use of the metaphor of life-as-a-play. 
More again stresses the naked charlatanry by which Richard 
conducted events when he has the Protector and Buckingham don old 
mail-coats, such as they would have worn only in a case of sudden 
necessity, and expound the conspiracy to diverse assembled lords. 
He further comments, again underlining the lack of resistance to 
Richard, 'Eueri man answered him fair, as though no man 




Richard then sends out a herald to read a proclamation 
concerning Hastings' treason and his execution, a proclamation 
containing a multitude of charges against Hastings, including the 
accusation of.adultery with Shore's wife. On this the narrator 
comments that.it was so well-written, and so lengthy and 
detailed, 'that eueri child might wel perceiue, that it was 
prepared befo~e. For al the time betwene his death & the 
proclaiming could scant haue suffised unto the bare wryting 
alone, all had it bene but in paper & scribled forth in hast at 
aduenture' (54/6-9). And so it appears to the schoolmaster and 
the merchant who comment upon it. 
Richard now puts Mistress Shore to public penance for her 
supposed part in the 'conspiracy', and for her adultery with 
Hastings -- and the narrator ironically adds of Richard that he 
was 'a goodly continent prince clene & fautles of himself, sent 
oute of heauen into this vicious world for the amendement of mens 
maners' (54/24-26) . A lengthy description of Mistress Shore leads 
to mention of her affair with Edward IV, and thus to mention of 
Edward's concubines, a further incidental reminder that the early 
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description of the golden reign of Edward was a piece of literary 
fiction. 
The narrator's final comments on Mistress Shore show 
awareness of the human indivdual behind the manoeuvres of high 
politics: 
I doubt not some shal think this woman to sleight a 
thing, to be written of & set amonge the 
remembraunces of great matters: ... But me semeth 
the chaunce so much the more worthy to be 
remembred, in how much she is now in the more 
beggerly condicion, vnfrended & worne out of 
acquaintance, after good substance, after as gret 
favor with the prince, ... Her doinges were not 
much !esse, albeit thei be muche lesse remembred, 
because thei were not so euil (56/26-57/4). 
In political terms, Mistress Shore can be placed alongside the 
Protector's nephews as one of the few characters who is entirely 
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innocent. Her fate thus calls for our unqualified sympathy, 
something that is so rarely called for in this work that we are 
reminded by the contrast of the extent to which most of the other 
characters have compromised themslves. Doubtless this is part of 
the reason why so much attention is paid to such an insignificant 
character. In its evocation of sympathy it is similar to the 
portrait of the Queen, while its awkward place in the narrative 
possibly results from the method of composition in blocks with 
the attendant lack of proportion between episodes. The narrative 
disjunctions that result from this lack of final revision tend 
again to obscure the extent to which More is struggling to create 
a persona to control the tone of his work. 
This touching portrayal of Shore's wife completed, More 
returns to his tale of political machinations. He deals first 
with the execution of the Woodvilles, stressing the lawlessness 
of the proceeding. This is undercut by the phrase 'to nigh to the 
quene' (58/2-3), since whatever one may think of Richard's 
actions, the Woodvilles can hardly be regarded as innocent, 
guileless victims -- and this specifically because of their 
relationship to the Queen. In his stress on the depravity of 
Richard, the narrator is occasionally, as here, naive and 
credulous. 
It is now stated that 'while no man wist what to thinke nor 
whome to trust, ere euer they should haue space to dispute & 
digest the mater & make parties' (58/6-8), Richard seized the 
opportunity to promote his plot of usurpation. The next sections 
tell of his attempts to explain it it the people, 'in such wise 
that it might be wel taken' (58/12) . Certain divines were 
suborned to make specious pleas on Richard's behalf. As a pretext 
for the deposition, bastardry was to be alleged against Edward, 
his children,, or both. Because of the imputation against 
Richard's mother, the matter was to be broached 'not euen fully 
plain & directly, but that the matter should be touched a slope 
craftely, as though men spared in yt point to speke al the trouth 
for fere of his displeasure' (59/29-31) . The bastardry of 
Edward's children was to be declared openly. 
J· 
\ > . 
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The history of Edward'~ marriage negotiations contains the 
final ironic undercutting of his original portrait. More gives 
us, for instance, his coarse reply to his mothers's objection to 
the proposed marriage with Elizabeth Grey: 
That 1 she is a widow & hath alredy children, by gods 
blessed Ladye I am a batcheler & haue some to: & so 
eche of vs hath a profe that neither of vs is lyke 
to be barain (64/10-12). 
The complicated history of the marriage leads to war with the 
Earl of Warwick, and More tells us that at the Battle of Barnet, 
Edward 
slewe the Erle of warwik with many other great 
estates of that partie, & so stably attained the 
crowne againe, that he peassybly enioyed it vntil 
his dieng day: and in such plight left it, that it 
could not be lost, but by the discorde of his verye 
frendes, or falshed of his fained frendes (66/3-8) .. 
The placement of this comment is of strategic importance, coming 
as it does as Richard begins to make his own definite moves 
towards the crown. The narrator tells us that the purpose of this 
lengthy digression has been to show 'vpon how slipper a grounde 
the protectour builded his colour, by which he pretended king 
Edwardes children to be bastardes' (66/10-12). This seems to be a 
reversion to the tone of the work's opening, with the narrator 
indulging in an urbane and sophisticated irony; it thus lends 
further support to the thesis of composition in blocks written at 
different periods and to a lack of that final revision that might 
have given the work more artistic coherence than it now posssses. 
The attempts by Richard's allies to gain support for his 
usurpation co~stitute another series of episodes of broad farce. 
First, Dr. Shaa preaches a sermon on bastardry at St. Paul's. He 
imputes illegitimacy to the Duke of Clarence, Edward IV, and 
Edward's children, claiming that only Richard is a legitimate 
child of the Duke of York. As he entered on his peroration, the 
\ ) 
182 
Protector was to have entered the church so that the people might 
acclaim him, 'that it might haue bene after said, that he was he 
was specially chosen by god & in maner by miracle' (68/5-6). The 
timing was wrong, however, and Richard entered after the words 
had been spoken, whereupon Shaa broke off what he was saying and 
repeated his declaration of Richard's legitimacy: 'But the people 
wer so farre fro crying king Richard, that thei stode as thei had 
bene turned into stones, for wonder of this shameful! sermon' 
(68/24-26). Shaa later hid himself,and, according to the 
narrator, died of shame within a few days (68/26-34). 
Shortly thereafter, Buckingham attempted to extort a 
declaration of loyalty to Richard from the aldermen and commons 
of London, assembled in the Guildhall. In another magnificently 
specious oration, Buckingham promises the citizens surety of 
their own bodies, the peace of their wives and daughters and the 
safety of their goods, which, he claims, they had not previously 
had for certain, because of Edward's extortionate taxes. 
Resistance to those taxes had caused the downfall of such London 
citizens and officials as Burdet, Markham, Coke and others. He 
cites other crimes committed by Edward IV, whose civil wars had 
ruined the land and its citizens.· (The speech is replete with 
ironic echoes of Edward's death-bed speech on the same subject). 
He was insatiable in his appetite for concubines, and in all 
this, the city of London was particularly vexed, 'as for that you 
were nereste at hande, sith that nere here about was comonly his 
most abyding' (72/20-21) . 
Finally, Buckingham says he need not rehearse the tale of 
Edward's illegitimacy, since the citizens heard it in Shaa's 
sermon the previous Sunday -- and here, in spite of previously 
saying that he will not mention the matter, he does so in some 
detail. Consequently, the title of King must devolve on the only 
legitimate heir, Richard, Duke of Gloucester. So, he says, the 
nobles and commons of the realm, mindful of Richard's virtues, 
have decided to ask him to accept the crown. He, loth to accept, 





spite of this lengthy and eloquent speech, the citizens, supposed 
to have been primed by the Mayor, refuse to acclaim Richard. 
Buckingham repeats his speech, 
so wel and ornately, & natheles so euidently and plaine, 
with voice gesture and countenaunce so cumly and so 
conuenient, that euery man much meruailed that herd him, 
and thought they neuer had in their liues heard so euill 
a tale so well tolde (75/10-12) . 
Still the citizens say nothing, whereupon the Mayor suggests that 
the Recorder may be able to persuade them; he does so 
unwillingly, and to no effect. On being ordered by Buckingham to 
give their answer, the citizens begin to murmur among themselves, 
and some of the Duke's servants, together with a few press-ganged 
apprentices, raise the cry of 'King,Richard', which the Duke 
takes for assent. 
At this point, the rapidly changing point of view of the 
narrator collapses into complete cynicism. He has, in the course 
of the work, begun with an extremely sophisticated point of view, 
informed as much by literary models as by the actual events he is 
narrating. As the work progresses, he himself becomes affected by 
the content of his narration, expressing great sympathy for the 
fate of people caught up in events beyond their control. As he 
does so, he loses his sophistication and drops his reliance on 
literary models; he relates the bare facts of events, and takes 
up the point of view that Richard was an exceptional villain 
whose single-minded ambition is the sole cause of the tragedy he 
is narrating. This, of course, belies his earlier effort to 
stress not the uniqueness but the continuity in Richard's 
behaviour. The sheer pressure of events proves too much for him, 
and he progressively sheds the point of view of the sophisticated 
literary historian in favour of that of the ordinary citizen. His 
perplexity re-enacts that of More: what is the truth about 
Richard? And what is the larger relevance of that truth to the 















This process climaxes in his presentation of the scene of 
Richard's acceptance of the crown. Richard, of course, feigns 
ignorance of the purpose of the crowd's coming to Baynard Castle; 
civilities are exchanged between Buckingham and Richard, and 
Buckingham asks him to accept the crown; Richard claims to have 
too much honour for King Edward and his family to accept the 
offer -- he does not wish to be accused to be accused of 
ambition; Buckingham repeats the request, and then, More adds 
ironically, 
These wordes muche moued the protectoure, whiche 
els as euery man may witte, would neuer of 
likelyhoode haue inclyned thereunto (79/25-27). 
Richard then accepts the crown. 
Richard having accepted the offer, the people talk of it 
among themselves. Richard's reluctance is compared to that of a 
Bishop at his'enthronement, and More now introduces the central 
metaphor of the work, that of life as a play. It is drawn from 
Lucian's Menipous, and had previously been elaborated by Erasmus 
in The Praise of Folly; here, however, it is given a quite 
different interpretation. 
And in a stage play all the people know right wel, 
that he that playeth the sowdayne is percase a 
sowter. Yet if one should can so lyttle good, to 
shewe out of seasonne what acquaintance he hath 
with him, and calle him by his owne name whyle he 
standeth in his magestie, one of his tormentors 
might hap to breake his head, and worthy for 
marring of the play. And so they said that these 
matters bee Kynges games, as it were stage playes, 
and for the more part plaied vpon scafoldes. In 
which pore men be but the lokers on. And thei that 
wise be, wil medle no farther. For they that 
sometyme step vp and play with them, when they 
cannot play their partes, they disorder the play & 
do themself no good (80/31-81/10). 
The narrator here seems to have all but abandoned any attempt to 






quietist resignation. As he has progressively abandoned his 
initial role of the sophisticated, literate historian and adopted 
the point of view of the common man, this attitude of resignation 
and despair h~s become more pronounced. More, it seems, has 
adopted the use of such a persona partly in order to emphasise 
the difficulty of finding any sense of order behind the workings 
of history. 
On the following day, Richard, accepting the crown, 
'declared the dyscomoditie of discorde, and the commodyties of 
concorde and vnitie' (81/27-29), pardoned all his enemies and all 
offences committed against him. The tragic train of events, 
however, has not yet ended: the Coronation over, 'Now fell ther 
mischieues thick' (82/13) . At this point the Latin text ends; it 
may be that the post-coronation section of the work was a late 
addition, which More never managed to translate into Latin. Death 
and slaughter'marked Richard's reign, particlarly the murder of 
his nephews -- although More reminds us 'that some remain yet in 
doubt, whither they wer in his dayes destroyede or no' (82/20-
21) . He goes on to stress the uncertainty surrounding events in 
those days, then proceeds with a highly circumstantial account of 
the deaths of the Princes, an account which agrees in many 
details with those given in Polydore Virgil and the Great 
h ' 1 36 C ron~c e. 
After this deed, we are told, Richard never had peace of 
mind, and More here enters on a graphic description, based partly 
on Tacitus' description of Tiberius, of the troubles of tyrants 
(87). Since the narrator has returned to his early technique of 
using literary analogues to give added point to his comments, 
this may be an indication that this section was added some time 
after the writing of the main narrative. Such a break in the 
i 
writing would account for the break in the continuity of the 
portrayal of the narrator. Such a speculation is supported, 
perhaps, by the remainder of the History dealing with the genesis 
of the conspiracy between Buckingham and Morton. If, as suggested 
36. cw 2, pp.261-262. 
' ' 
earlier, this:section was added as a response to Henry VIII's 
judicial murder of the Third Duke of Buckingham, then it is 
probably to be dated circa 1521. 
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The reasons which Morton urges on Buckingham are as 
insinuating as any of those used earlier by Buckingham himself, 
and although the probable late date for this additon makes it 
difficult to use the passage in considering More's artistic 
purpose in the History, the character given of Morton and the 
subtlety of his reasoning form obvious parallells with the 
already published Utopia. Morton,. says More, 
by the long & often alternate proofe, aswel of 
prosperitie as aduers fortune, hadde gotten by 
great experience the verye mother & maistres of 
wisdom, a depe insighte in politike worldli driftes 
(91/18-21). 
Perceiving Buckingham's pride injured by Richard's glory, he 
decides to prick him on to rebellion. He tells Buckingham that, 
although he had been a supporter of Henry VI, he did not oppose 
Edward IV, and would have been glad to see him succeeded by his 
son: 
Howbeit if the secrete iudgement of god haue 
otherwise prouided: I purpose not to spurne against 
a prick, nor labor to set vp that god pulleth down 
(92/12-14). 
Morton, in effect, is enunciating the idea of Providence 
which eluded the narrator earlier. There is a divine purpose 
behind all these events, even if we cannot comprehend it, and the 
best policy in the circumstances is accommodation to the state of 
things. This is a doctrine similar to that which had already been 
elaborated in Utopia. Here, though, Morton seems to announce the 
idea only to ignore it, for he goes on to add: 
And as for the late protector & now kyng. And euen 
there he left, saying that he had alredy medled to 











with his boke and his beedes and no farther (92/14-
17) . 
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Naturally Buckingham encourages him to continue. Morton then 
repeats Aesop's fable of the lion w~o said no beast with horns 
should dwell in the wood; an animal 'that had in his forehed a 
bench of flesh' (93/3-4) asked: 'But what & he cal it an horn, 
wher am I then?' (93/9-10) -- this being a warning against 
careless political speech. The text ends with Morton saying he 
does not dispute Richard's title, as he is 'king in possession': 
But for the weale of this realme, ... I was about 
to wish, that ... it might yet haue pleased Godde 
for the better store, to haue geuen him some of 
suche other excellente vertues mete for the rule of 
a realm, as our lorde hath planted in the parsone 
of youre grace (93/19-25). 
This subtle encouragement to rebellion is far from the cynical 
resignation expressed by the narrator as Richard accepts the· 
crown, yet it is equally distant from the type of constructive 
engagement in politics that More urges on the wise man in Utopia, 
I 
and which is at least implied in Morton's earlier comments. It is 
likely that in having Morton express these contradictory views, 
More was giving voice to the felt paradox that tyranny may, on 
the one hand, be the expression of Providence and yet must be 
resisted. This suggests that he may have been struggling to show 
that a benign Providence was at work when all the evidence 
suggested otherwise. 
The History can be said to be relatively successful in 
achieving its purpose. Ostensibly an account of the history of 
the usurpation of Richard III, More's chosen literary mode, 
arrived at, in part, from a study of Lucian, allows him to admit 
a complexity of viewpoint that would have been difficult to 
achieve with a straightforward chronological narrative method. 
Assumptions about the unique evil of Richard are consistently 
undermined; the emphasis throughout is on the continuity, both 








Edward IV. What is stressed is the universality of the events of 
which the reign of Richard as Protector and King is a heightened 
and concentrated example, and that universality raises the 
question which, in this work is left unresolved, of the role of 
Providence. 
The chief method by which More achieves his aim is the use 
of a narrating persona, through whose changing reactions to the 
events he describes we can sense his creator's own radical 
uncertainty. Faced at every turn with ambiguity of both events 
and motivations, how is the historian to find sense and meaning 
in what he is describing? Intellectually, More understood that 
ambiguity itself may constitute meaning. Artistically, his task 
was to find a literary form that would enable him to dramatise 
this ambiguity. Accordingly, his persona is initially introduced 
as one who is certain of what he wants to say. His intention is 
to record the events of Richard's usurpation so as to show that 
the Protector was in essence neither better or worse than hi~ 
predecessor. ~s his narration proceeds, however, the sheer 
malignancy of,what he is describing defies his attempt to provide 
a reasoned and balanced explanation for it. He comes more and 
more to accept the premise that Richard was uniquely evil, even 
when this interpretation is at odds with his own account of what 
actually happened. 
The ironic poise of the opening sections disintegrates as 
the narrator comes to feel sympathy for Richard's victims, and 
amazement at the ease with which the Protector was able to pursue 
his ambitions with little resistance. More is thus able to 
attribute to his persona his own uncertainty as to how best to 
understand these events. If Richard's villainy is so manifestly 
obvious, why does he meet so little opposition? Even more 
disturbing is the sense that evil is so heavily predominant, and 
so little counterbalanced by an opposing good. Where is the 
presence of a Providence that would bring good out of evil? More 
believed strongly in the reality of Providence, but the events of 







of a persona who finds it difficult to see the workings of 
Providence in what he is describing, More can dramatically 
project the sceptical, doubting side of his personality. The 
notion of a persona is one of the things which More adopted from 
Lucian, although it exists there only in embryonic form, without 
any of the complexity which More gives to it. Lucian used his 
personae not to objectify an inner conflict, but to dramatise an 
argument; unlike the personae of More, those of Lucian are 
static, so that there is no need to interpret them as characters. 
More saw that the idea was capable of dramatic development, and 
the History is his first attempt to utilise such a device for is 
own complex purposes. 
The element of experimentation in the History is one of the 
reasons for the work's unevenness of tone and for the apparently 
disproportion~te attention paid to some episodes. As well as 
this, the length of time which More spent on the composition of 
the work makes it likely that he did not work on the narratiye 
consecutively. He is more likely to have composed it in blocks, 
and then to have inserted each section into its appropriate place 
in the whole. Although the work retains a coherent design as a 
whole, it cannot be said to be perfect in its parts. A 
combination of the circumstances of composition and a sometimes 
tentative search for a dramatic correlative for his intellectual 
uncertainty led More to produce a work which, while its 
intentions are clear, shows him groping towards that intellectual 
and artistic poise which he attained in the chronologically 









THE FINAL ACHIEVEMENT: 'UTOPIA' 
In The History of King Richard III, More was seen to be 
searching for a use of the role of persona that would be fully 
adequate to conveying the complexity of his vision. "Official" 
versions of history could be called into question; the 
problematic role of providence could be examined; a variety of 
problems inherent in the notion of history could be explored 
all this without More's needing to commit himself to any one 
point of view. If all these ideas could be reflected in the 
complex consciousness of a persona, the work could be given at 
least a provisional unity. However, the extended period of 
composition and the lack of final revision meant that the 
presence of such a persona was only fitfully evident. 
The attempt to create such a unifying persona was inspired, 
at least in part, by More's reading of Lucian, a reading which 
stressed the presence in the Greek writer of a complex structural 
irony rather than merely incidental satire. More had realised 
that not only the content but the form of Lucian's most 
characteristic works was ironical -- and ironical in a way that 
modified one's attitude towards the content. 
The composition of Utopia was contemporary with that of the 
History, and the former work displays the same interest in 
finding a literary form that will itself enact the process of 
disinterested inquiry. What differentiates Utopia from the 
History is the presence in the former of two characters who are 
both recognisable aspects of the historical More: they engage in 
debate, but neither emerges as fully vindicated. There is 
something to be said for each position, although that taken by 
Raphael is more fully explored. And it is just here that 
questions of the genesis of the work become relevant. 
190 
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Since the publication in 1952 of J. H. Hexter's work Utopia: 
The Biography of ~ Idea1 it has been recognised that the book 
owes its shape to the revision of an original conception. Its 
origins lie in More's membership of an English embassy to the 
Netherlands in 1515 to discuss trade problems with the Emperor 
Charles v. 2 When the negotiations reached am impasse, More found 
himself at leisure. He also found himself in the company of 
friends of Erasmus, most notably a citizen of Antwerp, Peter 
Giles. They discusssed many things together, including, under the 
stimulus of Amerigo Vespucci's account of his voyage to the New 
World, the topic of the ideal state. Various aspects of such a 
state, its customs and institutions were touched upon, and when 
More committed this to paper, it took the form of a traveller's 
account of such a society, chanced upon in the course of a 
voyage. The whole was then supplied with a fictional narrator, 
3 
Raphael Hythloday. 
On his return to England, More was offered employment in the 
4 
royal service by Wolsey and Henry VIII. Meditating on the 
implications of this offer for his career as humanist man of 
letters, More remembered what he had written in Antwerp, and, 
recalling the figure of Hythloday, constructed an imaginary 
debate between him and a new character called Morus, on the 
merits and demerits of a humanist entering the service of a 
prince.
5 
This was inserted into the previously written work, and 
the whole became the work in two books which we now have. This 
accounts for the evident opening of a seam in the original work 
1. J. H. Hexter, Utopia: The Biography of~ Idea, (Princeton, 
New Jersey, 1952). 
2. The Correspondence of Sir Thomas More, edited by Elizabeth 
Frances Rogers (Princeton, 1947), pp.16-26. 
3. The Complete Works of~· Thomas More, vol.4, Utopia, edited 
by Edward Surtz and J. H. Hexter, pp.xix-xxxiii. 
4. Ibid., p.xxxiii. 





in order to insert the Dialogue of Counsel, and also for the 
impression of some artistic incoherence in Book II. Topics such 
as Utopian ethics and religion which were appropriate to the type 
of discussion held between More and Giles in Antwerp ceased to 
interest More as his mind, under the pressure of new, more urgent 
circumstances, began to engage those topics more appropriate to a 
humanist about to enter the royal service -- that is, Utopian 
social practices and property arrangements, and their ideas on 
crime amd punishment, war and peace, luxury and idleness.
6 
Much of this account can be accepted as it stands, although 
the argument seems to rest on two mistaken assumptions. The first 
of these is that the genesis of the work was conversations held 
with Giles in Antwerp; but the verbal and rhetorical complexity 
suggest a much longer period of gestation, perhaps as long as 
I 
that suggested by Prevost. He spoke of 'a process of some six 
years, following a seminal period in the summer of 1509, when 
Erasmus, in More's own house, wrote the Praise Qf Folly. 7 The 
putative conversations were probably only a point in a much more 
extended process. Hexter's second assumption is that Hythloday, 
as fictional narrator, formed part of the original conception.
8 
Book II is a discourse, a first-person narration to an audience, 
although we are not told who the audience is, and find out only 
after the discourse is completed that the speaker's name is 
Raphael (244/15) . Further, there are scattered bits of 
autobiography in Book II, telling us that the narrator lived five 
years at Amaurotum, capital of the Utopians (116/28); of his 
literary tastes (180); that he was a member of the fourth voyage 
made by someone unspecified (180); and that only four of his 
party visited Utopia (218/10-11) . Many of these difficulties are 
cleared up at the beginning of Book I, so that much of that book 
6. Ibid., p.xl. 
7. Elizabeth McCutcheon, 'My Dear Peter: The Ars Poetica and 
Hermeneutics for More's Utopia (Amici Thomae Mori, Angers, 
1983), p.34. 
8. CW 4, pp.xvii-xviii. 
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must have been written in the Netherlands.
9 
But does this mean 
that Hythloday the narrator was part of what More originally 
wrote? 
The matter can best be decided if we begin reading at the 
opening of Book II. We begin with a purely factual description of 
the island of Utopia. It is clearly intended as a description of 
an ideal state, since we are told that Utopus, 'who as conqueror 
gave the island its name brought the rude and rustic people 
to such a perfection of culture and humanity as makes them now 
superior to almost all mortals' (113/3-7) .
10 
The factual 
description of this state then continues, and it is made clear 
that its excellence derives from its rational planning. As the 
description continues, however, some of the details raise 
disturbing questions. It is true that some of these, for example 
the public meals to which Fr. Surtz objected,
11 
may well have 
appealed to the abstemious More; but in other sections, such as 
those on war and slavery, the distortions generated by the 
tension between rational idealism and actuality are far from 
pleasant. It begins to look as though Utopia is not wholly as 
ideal as one had originally supposed. 
Why should this be so? Why should More Have wished to depict 
an apparently ideal state that is, in reality, far from ideal? It 
reflects, firstly, the tension in More between the sceptic and 
the idealist, one part of him believing that social reform was 
greatly to be desired, the other half that the imperfections of 
human nature made it impossible. Both sides of More's nature find 
expression in the original discourse. More began to describe an 
ideal state, but as he wrote, the sceptical side of his temper 
9. Ibid., p.xviii. 
10. Vtopus cuius utpote uictoris nomen refert insula ... quique 
rudem atque agrestem turbam ad id quo nunc caeteros prope 
mortales antecellit cultus, humanitatisque perduxit (112/1-
5) • 
11. Ibid., p.cliii. 
I'· 
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asserted itself, so that his depiction of this ideal state became 
qualified. When he came to add Book I, new circumstances meant 
that his interest shifted to the means by which his idealism 
could be translated into practice. 
In the book of epigrams which More published in 1518, there 
is one which throws particular light on his attitude towards 
bulding ideal states. This is the one entitled QVIS OPTIMUS 
REIPVB. STATVs.
12 
In this poem, More is responding to someone 
who has asked whether a king or a senate governs best. After 
providing arguments that weigh heavily in favour of a senate, he 
breaks off, saying: 
Is there anywhere a people upon whom you yourself, 
by your own decision, can impose either a king or a 
senate? If this does lie within your power, you are 
king. Stop considering to whom you may give power. 
The more basic question is whethef
3
it would do any 
good if you could (No.198/28-31). 
Bradner and Lynch make valuable comments on this poem in relation 
to Utopia. More could, of course, give any government he liked to 
14 
Utopia, but that was "no-place". They link the poem to the 
letter to Erasmus, in which More recounted his dream of himself 
as king of the Utopians.
15 
As the editors note: 'his reverie 
came to an end and left him in the complex realities of a waking 
world. In this poem, too, after speculating about the theoretical 
12. The Complete Works of~- Thomas More, Volume 3, Part II, 
edited by Clarence H. Miller, Leicester Bradner, Charles A. 
Lynch and Revilo P. Oliver (New Haven and London, 1984), 
No.198. 
13. Est ne usquam populus, cui regem siue 
Senatum/Praeficere arbitrio tu pates ipse tuo?/Si pates 
hoc, regnas: nee iam cui, consule, tradas/Imperium: 
prior est quaestio, an expediat (198/28-31) . 
14. cw 3.2, p.50. 
15. Ibid., p.50; Allen II, 499/40-48; ~- Thomas More: Selected 
Letters, edited by Elizabeth Frances Rogers (New Haven and 
London, 1961), p.85. 
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advantages of a monarch or a parliament, he calls himself back 
down to the real world of expedient rather than ideal choices' .
16 
Finally, the question in the last line of the poem 'is not which 
form is best but which form works in particular circumstances; or 
the question is whether it is expedient that you do the choosing. 
In the dramatic context of the poem (including its publication in 
the same volume with Utopia), the two words 'an expediat' are 
17 . 
like a struck gong reverberating in the mind' . Although the 
composition of this poem cannot be dated more certainly than 
1500-1518,
18 
its relevance to Utopia is obvious: More here 
expresses scepticism about the theoretical construction of ideal 
states, and allows this to be published in the same volume as his 
own account of such a state. 
This poem, then, helps us to understand why More has so 
heavily qualified his description of Utopia. This qualification 
is, as Elizabeth McCutcheon has shown, all-pervasive at the level 
19 
of style. In, fact, so pervasive is the use of litotes to 
express More's evasiveness, that it again leads one to doubt 
Hexter's assumption that the discourse on Utopia substantially 
represents the conversations held between More and Giles. It is 
improbable that such conversation would have included such 
profuse use of the resources of litotes; the discourse on Utopia 
is not simply a transcription of the conversations between More 
and Giles, but is a reconstrucion of them, artistically and 
stylistically shaped so as to give expression to the full 
complexity of More's response to the theoretical exercise of 
describing an ideal state. 
16. CW 3.2, p.50. 
17. Ibid., p.50. 
18. Ibid., pp.l0-11, 391. 
19. Elizabeth McCutcheon, 'Denying the Contrary: More's Use of 





It seems that we must posit a stage of the text intermediary 
between More's committing his conversations with Giles to 
writing, and the later composition of the Dialogue of Counsel. It 
was probably at this stage of revision that More introduced the 
figure of the narrator, originally as a means of establishing the 
fictional verisimilitude of his work. The discourse of Utopia was 
thus firmly established as a traveller's tale and, in this form, 
began to acquire associations with such genres as traveller's 
tales of the New World and the fantastic journey. The latter 
class reminds us particularly of Lucian's True History, in which 
great trouble is taken to give verisimilitude to what is 
evidently nothing but lies and fantastic invention; the narrator 
tells us as much at the beginning of his tale. More does 
something more complicated with his narrator, naming him Raphael 
Hythloday, 'angelic talker of nonsense'. If, as Raphael, he has 
20 
the role of 'salvation-bringer to Christian Europe' as an 
expert in trifles and a babbler of nonsense he is clearly not 
always to be taken seriously. Deciding which is the 'real' 
Hythloday is beside the point, since the name suggests the 
complexity of More's response to his own work, and the 
simultaneous raising and undercutting of expectations which he 
wished to induce in his audience. 
A further indication of the kind of complexity which More was 
now introducing into his work lies in the geographical names and 
descriptions. 'Utopia' itself looks like a Greek coinage for 
either 'no place' or 'happy place' . The first of these would be 
Ou-topia, the second Eu-topia; by combining the two in this way, 
More builds the ambiguity of his conception into the very name of 
his imaginary island. Its capital city, Amaurotum means 'Ghost 
City' or 'Shadowy City'; that it was named Mentirano until the 
edition of 1517
21 
indicates More's continues effort to enhance 
20. CW 4, pp.301-302. 
21. Arthur Barker, 'Clavis Moreana: The Yale Edition of Thomas 
More', in Essential Articles for the Study of Thomas More, 
edited by R. s. Sylvester and G. P. Marc'hadour (Hamden, 






the ambiguity of his text. The city is built on the river 
22 
Anydrus, 'waterless'. Although the reasons for this undoubtedly 
lie in More's character, it may be that something concrete also 
had a part to play. As More's mission in Antwerp was corning to an 
end, he became involved in the controversy between Erasmus and 
Martin Dorp over The Praise of Folly. Martin Dorp was a young 
theologian from the University of Louvain who had attacked, in 
both public and private letters, Erasmus' book, because of its 
satire on scholasticism and on the religious orders. More's 
letter to him in defence of Erasmus contains, besides a defence 
of his friend, a defence of humanistic learning, and of satire as 
an instrument of education and reform. So much is commonly agreed 
by commentators, but there may be a deeper significance, 
connected to the shape Utopia was taking in More's mind. His 
23 
letter to Dorp is dated Bruges, October 1515 although he was 
presumably aware of Erasmus' correspondence with Dorp some time 
before this. It is surely not impossible that as he carne to the 
defence of his friend and of the humanist enterprise, More was 
made aware of the possibility of similar attacks upon himself 
should Utopia be thought too bold. His revision of the text to 
increase its ambiguity may well have found justification in this 
episode. 
( 
The work which More took back with him to England was, then, ) 
quite different in its history from what Hexter has called More's 
'first intention' . 24 It had already been revised, and already 
22. It is not certain that the punning names existed at this 
stage of the text's development; later correspondence between 
More and Erasmus refers to the island by the Latin name of 
'Nusquarna' . But if the Greek names had not been present in 
the Antwerp version, how are we to explain their use in the 
Prefatory Letter to Giles, and the assumption that Giles had 
known of them previously? It may be that the Latin was used 
in the letter to Erasmus for the sake of the pun. 
23. SL 8; Corr.27. 
24. Hexter, 1952, p.28. 
T 
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represented More's second thoughts on the subject. Accordingly, 
any view of the nature of those sections which More added to the 
work in London must take into account the ambivalence already 
built into his account of Utopia. In particular, since the 
Dialogue of Counsel amplifies the character of Hythloday, we have 
to see how this was made to fit with what More had already 
written. More solved this problem by making his narrator an 
uncompromising idealist who demands r~dical institutional reform, 
and who refuses to have any dealings with the corrupt courts of 
Europe; he is opposed by the somewhat naive Giles and the 
sceptical Morus. The impulse that led More to devise his original 
ideal state and the second thoughts that led him to make his 
creation so ambivalent are thus both embodied in the Dialogue of 
Counsel, which now serves not only as an introduction to the 
account of Utopia but as the intellectual centre-piece of the 
work. 
Our sense of the relationship between More and his text .is 
confirmed by much of the detail of its publishing history and by 
the parerga to the work. Between Erasmus' leaving England and the 
eventual publication of Utopia, correspondence between himself 
and More shows something of the latter's attitude towards his 
book. On 3 September, More wrote to Erasmus asking him to take 
care of the publishing details: 
I am sending you my "Nowhere", which is nowhere 
well written. I have added a prefatory epistle to 
my friend, Peter. I know from experience that I do 
not have to tell you to giv2
5
your proper attention 
to everything else (SL 73) . 
'Everything else' probably refers to an offer of Erasmus to 
obtain suitable prefatory material from well-known humanists; it 
is certainly this to which More refers in his letter of 20 
September: 
25. Nvsquamam nostram nusquam bene scriptam ad te mitto; 
praescripsi epistolam ad Petrum meum. Cetera tu vt recte 
cures, expertus sum non esse opus vt te adhorter (Allen 






Some time ago I sent you my Nowhere; I am most 
anxious to have it published soon and also that it 
be handsomely set off with the highest of 
recommendations, if possible, from several people, 
both2 ~ntellectuals and distinguished statesmen (SL 
7 6) • 
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He wrote again on 31 October, expressing happiness that the book 
had been approved by Peter Giles, and adding: 
I am anxious to find out if it meets with the 
approval of Tunstal, and Busleiden, and your 
Chancellor; but their approval is more than I could 
wish for, since they are so fortunate as to be top-
ranking officials in their own governments, 
although they might be won over by the fact that in 
this commonwealth of mine the ruling class would be 
completely made up of such men a~ 7 are distinguished 
for learning and virtue (SL 80) . 
More was clearly anxious that his book should be praised by the 
right sort of people -- people, that is of reputation and 
influence. On December 4, he expressed his delight that the book 
28 
had been praised by Tunstal. 
With much of the prefatory material collected, the book 
finally appeared in that same month. The letters from famous 
humanists, so assiduously collected by Erasmus, form the bulk of 
the parerga, although other items, such as the specimen of the 
Utopian alphabet and the map of the island, also appear, and are 
26. Misi ad te iam pridem Nusquamam, quam ego gestio et 
breui prodire et bene ornatam etiam egregia et magnifica 
laude, eaque si fieri posset a pluribus non litteratis 
modo, sed etiam his qui sint ab administranda republica 
celabrati (Allen II, 467/13-17). 
27. Cupio scire an Tonstallus probet, an Buslydius, an 
Cancellarius vester; quibus vt probetur supra votum est, 
hominibus tam felicibus vt in his rebus publicis suis 
primos ducant ordines, nisi eo propicientur quod in illa 
republica nostra illi tales viri, litteris ac virtute 
tanti, principes plane essent futuri; (Allen II, 481/63-
68) . 
28. Allen II, 499/35-36; SL 84-85. 
.( 
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clearly designed to introduce the reader to the pretence of 
reality with which More chose to endow his non-existent island; 
their purpose is to enhance the fictional status of the work. 
The letters are a different matter. The letter of John 
Desmarais is, as Surtz says, 'uninspired, as though written from 
29 
a sense of duty'. In spite of its praise of More's book, it 
was omitted from later editions. That of Jerome Busleyden is also 
full of fulsome praise for the book and its author, talking of 
his holding up 'that ideal of a commonwealth, that pattern and 
perfect model of morality, whose equal has never been seen 
anywhere in the world for the soundness of its constitution, for 
its perfection, and for its desirability' (35/1-4) .
30 
All the 
praise is directed towards the content of the book; no mention is 
made of its status as a work of fiction. 
The letter of Guillaume Bud~, too, consists mainly of praise 
for the institutions of Utopia, particularly for its reformed 
legal system. There are, however, indications that Budt felt 
uneasy about the fictional status of the work, and particularly 
about its narrator. He says that Justice was not stationed in the 
Zodiac after her flight from earth: 
If we are to believe Hythlodaeus, she must have 
remained behind on the island of Utopia an~1not yet 
have made her way to the sky (11/39-13/2) . 
'If we are to believe Hythlodaeus': Bud,, apparently, in spite 
of his enthusiastic praise of Utopian customs and institutions, 
felt that the element of fiction in the work was in tension with 
29. CW 4, p.282. 
30. 'earn Reipublicae ideam, earn morum formulam, 
absolutissimumque simulacrum praescribere, quo nullo unquam 
in orbe uisum sit, uel salubrius institutum, uel magis 
absolutum, uel quod magis expetendum uideatur' (33/29-34/1-
3) • 
31. restitisse enim earn in Vtopia insula necesse est, 




the suggestions for social and political reform. Of his attitude 
to Hythloday, Coogan writes that it is twofold: a playfulness in 
sharing and shaping the fictional character, and serious concern 
. h h' d 
32 
f d" mb' 1 w1t 1s wor . In act, Bu e seems a 1va ent about the status 
of Hythloday. He has, however, as Sylvester points out, raised 
the question of the relationship between Hythloday and his 
33 
creator. More leads us to feel sympathy for Hythloday's views 
·while making it impossible to agree with him completely. This 
creates an interpretative problem that can be solved only by 
responding fully to Hythloday as social reformer and Hythloday as 
Menippean alazon, and seeing the relationship between them. 
Whether Budt felt the full implications of his phrase is perhaps 
open to doubt, and it is Giles and More who elaborate or, 
rather, imply -- the stance which the reader needs to adopt. 
Giles takes up the pretence of the reality of Hythloday, 
comparing him favourably to Ulysses and Amerigo Vespucci. Even 
so, the eloquence of his speech is nothing compared to that of 
More's writing. And Giles here, perhaps, alerts us to be wary of 
Hythloday: 'By heaven, I am even disposed to believe that in all 
the five years Raphael spent on the island, he did not see as 
much as one may perceive in More's description' (23/5-7) .
34 
Although the reader's attention is at once diverted to More's 
powers of memory and the fluency of his Latin style, we are 
surely being asked to look for those things which More saw but 
Raphael did not. The latter's credibility is in question even 
before we meet him. 
The most important of the introductory materials is More's 
letter to Peter Giles, in which he apologises for and offers an 
32. R. Coogan, 'Nunc Vivo et Volo', Moreana 31/32 (1971), 29-45, 
(p. 31. 
33. R. S. Sylvester, '"Si Hythlodaeo credimus": Vision and 
Revision in More's Utopia, in Essential Articles, p.295. 
34. 'Et hercule crediderim Raphaelem ipsum minus in ea insula 
uidisse per omne quinquennium quod illic egit, quam in MORI 






explanation of his delay in publishing the book (38/1-40/2); 
introduces the process of fictionalisation by asking Peter to 
recall several details which Hythloday had mentioned about Utopia 
(40/10-42/4); and takes the opportunity to satirise those who 
will misjudge the work (42/24-44/21) . As Elizabeth McCutcheon has 
shown in impressive detail, the letter also constitutes a 
h t . f Ut . 'd t 't ' t t ' 35 ermeneu 1cs or op1a, a gu1 e o 1 s 1n erpre at1on. 
The letter is silent on the subject-matter of the work, and 
is ambiguous and paradoxical, in spite of its concern for 
truthfulness to what follows. There is a flexibility to More's 
sense of the interconnection between his repertorial, authorial 
and historical selves that goes beyond a fixed sense of persona-
36 
More. The writer of the letter talks of the simplicity and 
artlessness of the work, while the text insists on its own 
b 1 d h . . . 
3 7 d. h. lf su t ety an sop 1st1cat1on. As More 1stances 1mse further 
and further through the figure of Morus, he becomes increasingly 
38 present through the subtlety and sophistication of the language. 
Precisely how subtle and sophisticated this is becomes 
apparent when he raises the issues of doubt, truthfulness and 
I 
lying. The section on lying 'depends ... upon a sly treatment of 
truth and falsehood as if they were exclusive or immediate 
contraries -- that is, contraries with no middle ground, so that 
if one is denied the other must be asserted' .
39 
For this reason, 
he insists upon knowing the exact measurement of the bridge in 






Just as I shall take great pains to have nothing 
incorrect in the book, so, if there is doubt about 









anything, I shall rather tell a~ objective 
40 
falsehood than an intentional l~e ... (41/31-35). 
41 
A marginal gloss refers to 'the Theological Distinction 
between an Intentional Lie and an Objective Falsehood', a 
distinction which is probably non-existent.
42 
More is either 
poking fun at scholastic theologians, or asking us to inquire 
into the meaning behind the words.
43 
If, as reporter, he is 
merely repeating from memory what he has been told, he cannot 
intentionally be lying; but Morus the reporter is a fictional 
creation of Thomas More the author, as is Morus' informant, 
Hythloday. The account of Utopia is an account of a fiction, 
something that is an objective falsehood: since it was created by 
More, is it also, in some sense, an intentional lie? Because of 
this complication of fictional selves, everything in the book is 
'in ambiguo'. 
Nor is this all, for in regard tothe fact in question, the 
'reporter' is correct. The paradoxes thus created are infinitely 
recessive, and are at the heart of More's hermeneutics both in 
the letter and in the work itself. The doubts that have already 
been raised as to the status of Hythloday and his account of 
Utopia are here confirmed. 
The final part of the letter offers a guide to the correct 
response by the reader, by way of warning against possible 
40. nam ut maxime curabo, ne quid sit in libra falsi, 
ita si quid sit in ambiguo, potius mendacium dicam, quam 
mentiar ... ' (40/27-29)). 
41. These marginal glosses were probably composed by Giles and 
Erasmus. Giles, in a letter to Busleyden, writes: 'I have 
appended also some brief annotations in the margins' (23/25-
26). [tum adiectis ad margines aliquot annotatianculis 
(22/21)]. Fr. Surtz points out that in the edition of 1517, 
Lupset attributes them to Erasmus, and comments: 'Many of the 
observations are typically Erasmian in spirit and 
observation. Consequently, Erasmus, as well as Giles, may 
have a hand in their composition' (CW 4, p.281). 
42. The Yale translation may be misleading at this point. As 
both McCutcheon (1983, p.47) and Fr. Surtz (CW 4, p.292) 
point out, the distinction derives from Aulus Gellius and 
turns on the moral question of intentionality. 





misreadings, which 'are interpreted psychologically as 
reflections of the reader's own self-interest and as a 
204 
projection, conscious or unconscious, of his own self-image onto 
44 
another's work'. Against this, More counterbalances the 
enjoyment and thoughtful response for which he hopes. What we can 
see in the letter is 
the subtlety and sophistication of his composite 
forms, his fascination with the roles of writer and 
reader, his powerfully realized fictions, the 
unique blend of the lucid and ambiguous in his 
language, his sense of the hypothetical or 
conditional, his aesthetic of complementary 
opposition and honest deception, and a method of 
paradox and puzzle which constantly challenges us 
and reflects ~he ~ubt~ety45 suppleness, and vigor of 
his mind and 1mag1nat1on. 
In conjunction with the other prefatory material, this letter 
bears out Robbin S. Johnson's contention that the three stages of 
composition -- Book I, Book II, and the parerga -- make the work 
progressively less direct and more complex rhetorically.
46 
The challenge to the reader begins early in the text. More 
begins with a strictly factual account of his activity as a 
member of the English embassy in the Netherlands. The language 
has a tone of ceremonious formality, as More impresses upon the 
reader his identity as a responsible public official: 
The most invincible King of England, Henry, the 
eighth of that name, who is distinguished by all 
the accomplishments of a model monarch, had certain 
weighty matters recently in dispute with His Serene 
Highness, Charles, Prince of Castile. With a view 
to their discussion and settlement, he sent me as a 
44. Ibid., p.59. 
45. Ibid., p.68. 
46. RobbinS. Johnson, More's 'Utopia': Ideal and Illusion, (New 
Haven and London, 1969), p.4. 
.( 
commissioner to Flanders -- as a companion and 
associate ~7 the peerless Cuthbert Tunstal, 
(47/8-14). 
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He is, of course, supplying necessary background information by 
way of introduction to his book, but he is doing more than this. 
He stresses his association with top public officials, and his 
being commissioned by his king. He is a man of public affairs, 
and the opening pages of his book have the air of grave and 
judicious realism appropriate to the memoirs of a diplomat. Yet 
even here More has introduced the characteristic playfulness of 
the work by use of the figure of litotes. In the opening 
sentence, the phrase 'Qvvm non exigvi momenti negocia quaedam' is 
'played against regal superlatives: "inuictissimus" (46/8-9), 
"ornatissimus" and "serenissimo" (46/10) .
48 
He knows, too, the stock phrases of humanist flattery: the 
chief diplomat on the Spanish side, Georges de Themsecke, is 'a 
man not only trained in eloquence but a natural orator -- most 
learned, too, in the law and consummately skilled in diplomacy by 
native ability as well as by long experience'' (47/27-30) .
49 
By 
speaking thus of his opponent, More conveys a sense of himself as 
fair-minded and judicious, and one who has sufficient experience 
to recognise the qualities of which he speaks. 
Similarly, he extols his friend Peter Giles in a delightful 
eulogy which serves to characterise both Giles and More. Having 
established the tone of realism, and having thus created the 
impression that what we are about to read is a true and factual 
47. 'Qvvm non exigui momenti negocia quaedam inuictissimus 
Angliae Rex Henricvs eius nominis octauus, omnibus 
egregij principus artibus ornatissimus, cum serenissimo 
Castellae principe Carole controuersa nuper habuisset, 
ad ea tractanda, componendaque, oratorem me legauit in 
Flandriam, comitem & collegam uiri incomparabilis 
Cuthberti Tunstalli ... ' (46/8-14). 
48. McCutcheon, 1971, pp.112-113. 
49. '··.non arte solum, uerumetiam natura facundus, ad haec 
iureconsultissimus, tractandi uero negocij cum ingenio, tum 
assiduo rerum usu eximius artifex' (46/24-26) . 
- . 
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account by one who is eminently qualified to give it and whose 
judgement we can trust, More at once introduces fictional 
elements into his work. The tone of verisimilitude is maintained 
while we read of his encounter with a stranger: 
a man of advanced years, with sunburnt countenance 
and long beard and cloak hanging carelessly from 
his shoulder, while his appearance and dress seems~ 
to me to be those of a ship's captain (49/20-23). 
It would be difficult to imagine one less like the people whom 
More had described in his opening paragraphs; he at once catches 
the imagination and excites curiosity. This is even more the case 
when Peter, whose companion he is, says of him: 
There is no mortal alive today who can give you 
such an accgynt of unknown peoples and lands ... 
(49/30-32). 
He goes on to compare his sailing to that of Ulysses or Plato, 
and it is now that we find out his name -- Raphael Hythlodaeus. 
The aura of realism is ruptured to accommodate a palpably 
fictional name; what seemed to be a purely factual account has 
been skilfully modulated into fiction. The reader becomes even 
more unsettled if the etymology of that strange name is 
investigated. 'Raphael' evokes associations with the archangel, 
while the coinage 'Hythlodaeus' means 'expert in nonsense' . We 
are presented, then, with an angelic expert in trifles, and this 
in a work which we had been initially led to believe was wholly 
serious. 
50. uergentis ad senium aetatis, uultu adusto, 
promissa barba, penula neglectim ab humero dependente, 
qui mihi ex uultu atque habitu nauclerus esse uibebatur' 
(48/18-21). 
51. 'Nam nemo uiuit hodie mortalium omnium, qui tantam tibi 







If the name of the stranger provokes the reader to look again 
at his physical description, then it can be seen that this may be 
designed to evoke not only the experienced traveller, but also 
the charlatan philosophers of Lucian, who are distinguished by 
their long hair and beards, and who lay claim to a wisdom which 
they do not possess. In particular, it may evoke the Cynic from 
the dialogue of that name. He is distinguished by his long hair 
and beard, and his mode of argument is markedly similar to that 
which Raphael will later employ. 
The stranger to whom More is introduced is obviously not a 
figure to which we can make a simple response. He may be angelic; 
he may be a mere trifler; he may be an experienced traveller with 
something worthwhile to relate; he may be a charlatan who will 
unwittingly expose his own weaknesses in the course of his 
argument. He may even be a combination of all these attributes. 
Equally disorienting is the way in which a character of this type 
is introduced into what one may have expected, on the evidence of 
the title, to be a political treatise. Is the work to be a 
serious one? Or is it an elaborate form of fiction? The care 
which More has taken to establish an atmosphere of verisimilitude 
seems to be undercut by the elements of fiction which he has 
introduced. Lucian had followed the same method in A True 
History. More generally, part of the method of Lucian's satirical 
dialogues consisted in utilising a comic framework which brought 
into question the seriousness of the ostensible subject matter. 
The inter-relationship of fictional and serious elements in 
Utopia is more complex, but More may well have taken the Lucianic 
method as one of his starting points. 
As we find out more about this stranger, we learn that he is 
more learned in Greek than in Latin, and had been a companion of 
Amerigo Vespucci on his last three voyages. More greets him 
civilly, and they sit in the garden of his house to hear 
Hythloday's conversation. More's report of Hythloday's 
conversation reveals him as an adventurous traveller and an 
apparently objective reporter on what he has seen. The brief 
,!<>< 
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account of the physical climate of the countries he has visited 
predisposes the reader to accept as equally truthful what he has 
to say about the social customs of these nations. More, at this 
point, undercuts the surface objectivity of his text by saying 
that he will relate 'what he told us of the manners and customs 
of the Utopians' (55/5-6) .
52 
We are confronted with the multi-
faceted ambiguity of that name just at the point where 
Hythloday's narration of their customs is to begin. 
It is at this point that More has chosen to insert the 
section known as the Dialogue of Counsel. It is primarily an 
'occasional' piece, having its origin in More's change of 
circumstances following his return to England. Yet it is not 
simply an awkward insertion into an existing text. Its themes are 
related to the account of an ideal political system; it is 
carefully shaped so as to lead naturally into Book II; and it 
deepens our sense of More's literary strategy, both in his 
portrayal of Hythloday and in his deliberately making it 
impossible for the reader to form any fixed opinion on the 
matters in debate. 
The debate begins with Hythloday being allowed to appear 
high-minded against the prudential arguments of a somewhat naive 
Peter Giles; he is not interested in entering royal service as a 
means of advancing the personal interests of himself and his 
friends and relatives. But there is a further reason for his 
refusal: 'As it is, now I live as I please, which I surely fancy 
is very seldom the case with your grand courtiers' (57/2-3) .
53 
With these mixed motives given, Morus enters the debate, 
praising Hythloday's lack of desire for riches and power, but 
suggesting that he will best use his 'generous and truly 
philosophic spirit' (57/11) 'if you so order your life as to 
apply your talent and industry to the public interest, even if it 
52. quae de moribus atque institutis narrabat Vtopiensium' 
(54/5-6) . 
53. 'Atqui nunc sic uiuo et uolo, quod ego certe suspicor 
paucissimis purpuratorum contingere' (56/1-2) . 
209 
involves some personal disadvantages to yourself' (57/12-14) .
54 
This can best'be done by helping a monarch follow honourable 
courses. Morus and Hythloday share substantial areas of 
agreement: neither would enter the royal service for personal 
gain, and they agree that monarchs are in need of good advice. 
Where they disagree is on the practical value of a humanist 
involving himself in the corrupting miasma of intrigues, 
selfishness and foolishness that seem to them to constitute a 
court. It must be noted, however, that Hythloday's position is 
not dismissed lightly: his idealism clearly held a dangerous 
fascination for More, and he is more than once allowed to score 
points at the expense of Morus. The method here is not dissimilar 
to that used in Lucian's dialogue The Cynic which More had 
translated. 
He begins his discussion with Morus by drawing a wholly 
bleak portrait of kings and courts. Kings prefer war to peace, 
and have more care for gaining new territory than for 
administering that which they have (56/20-26; 57/22-30). Among 
courtiers, flattery and self-serving prevents them profitting by 
good counsel (56/26-33; 57/31-38). He himself has observed their 
behaviour, even in England. In the lengthy account that follows 
of Hythloday's account of his visit to Cardinal Morton, More 
proceeds to complicate his text in a variety of ways. 
Hythloday describes Morton in glowing terms as an ideal 
statesman in whom the king places the greatest confidence; 
whatever Morton says will command our respect. The discussion at 
Morton's table turns on the number of thieves in England and the 
proper punishment for them. Hythloday speaks against capital 
punishment as being 'too harsh a penalty for theft' and yet not 
'a sufficient deterrent' (61/18-19) .
55 
It would be better to 
54. site ita compares, ut uel cum aliquo priuatim 
incommode ingenium tuum atque industriam, publicis rebus 
accommodes' (56/10-11) . 
55. 'Est enim ad uindicanda furta nimis atrox, nee tamen ad 
refrenanda sufficiens' ( 60/15-16) . 
210 
provide them with some means of livelihood so that they would not 
need to steal. In describing how it is that people are driven to 
theft, he veers into radical social criticism: returned soldiers 
are prevented from earning a livelihood by their disabilities; 
the idle attendants of nobleman have no source of livelihood when 
their masters die or fall ill; the enclosure movement, while 
enriching the landowners, has produced a new class of landless 
beggars. Such are the causes of poverty and theft, although 
Hythloday's eloquence leads him far from his ostensible topic. He 
denounces the use of mercenaries in the French army, and inveighs 
against the uses of luxury in England before coming to his 
conclusion: 'Assuredly, unless you remedy these evils, it is 
useless for you to boast of the justice you execute in the 
punishment of theft' (71/8-10). 
56 
His criticism, then, is that evi~ 
', effects are produced by evil institutions and customs, and 
that unless these are remedied, nothing permanent will be 
achieved. In putting forward the theory that social evils are 
man-made, Hythloday has given us 'a historic landmark of humanist 
social criticism' .
57 
It is not sufficient, however, simply to 
praise the far-sighted radicalism of Hythloday's thought and to 
identify his views with those of More. It may well be the case 
that More saw merit in such an analysis of social evils; it by no 
means follows that he would adopt Hythloday's solution. 
It is at this point that the literary provenance of Hythloday 
begins to assume importance. He is, in part, a philosoohus 
gloriosus, one in whom saeva indignatio has become a ruling 
passion, to the exclusion of other necessary qualities.
58 
This 
56. 'Certe nisi his malis medemini, frustra iactetis exercitiam 
in uindicanda furta iustitiam ... ' (70/6-7). 
57. Robert P. Adams, The Better Part of Valour: More, Erasmus, 
Colet and Vives on Humanism, War and Peace, 1496-1535 
(Seattle, 1962), p.125. 
58. W. W. Wooden, Sir Thomas More, Satirist: A Study Qf the 
'Utopia' ~ Menippean Satire, (Unpublished Ph. D. 
dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1971. University 




is evident when we see his torrent of passionate indignation 
taking him far beyond the point he wishes to establish. It is 
evident, also, in the reply he makes when asked for his solution 
to the problem. The real complexity of his character now begins 
to emerge. He also takes on qualities of the personae of 
Menippean satire. In that genre can be found the alazon, a 
boastful charlatan, and the eiron who subjects him to shrewd 
criticsm, often assuming a mask of false naivet:~ In Hythloday, 
these functions are combined. As eiron he criticises the naive 
assumptions on which the punishment of thieves is based; as 
alazon, he proposes remedies which do not fully address the 
problem. Morus, as becomes appa,retlrlater, also acts as eiron, 
criticising Hythloday's assumptions and conclusions.
59 
This 
complexity in the figure of Hythloday is one measure of the 
complexity of More's response to Lucian. 
Following Hythloday's speech, Morton asks him to state how 
theft should be punished. In reply, Hythloday again eloquently 
attacks capital punishment as contrary to justice and to Biblical 
injunction. As for a more appropriate punishment 'I can find no 
better system in any country than that which, in the course of my 
travels, I observed in Persia among the people called the 
Polylerites ... ' (75/24-27). 
60 
Hythloday, then, has recourse to 
the fictional example of a people whose name means 'much 
nonsense' . Is this meant to imply that 'their reasonableness is 
61 
nonsensical, or non-existent, in the European world? Or is it 
meant to imply that Hythloday is talking nonsense? In view of the 
complexity which More has introduced into the character of 
Hythloday, neither meaning ought to be excluded. 
59. Ibid., pp.153-154. 
60. '···nullius institutum gentis magis probo, quam id quod 
interea dum peregrinabar, in Perside obseruatum apud uulgo 
dictos Polyleritas adnotaui ... ' (74/18-21)). 





As Hythloday explains the Polylerite system of punishment we 
can again observe his tendency to stray from his ostensible 
subject: rhetorical exempla are amplified for their persuasive 
power. The Polylerites are physically isolated, a condition that 
seems to be essential to Hythloday's ideal states. Having little 
contact with other peoples, they are free to experiment with 
their social systems and penal codes. However, as Robbin S. 
Johnson notes, their isolation symbolises the distance between 
the paradigm and social reality, and as Hythloday expounds these 
paradigms, he becomes progressively further abstracted from 
l 't 62 rea ~ y. 
The community of the Polylerites also exhibits the peculiar 
mixture of idealism and practicality that characterises the 
Utopians. Criminals are treated humanely not only because it is 
right to do so, but because it benefits the community. It is not 
clear whether Hythloday is really describing what he has seen, or 
whether his stress on the idealism of the Polylerites is merely 
his own rationalisation of their utilitarianism. The prisoners 
are generally well-treated, and are employed on public works; all 
are dressed in clothes of the same colour; the tip of one of 
their ears is cut off. In contrast to the English penal system, 
this is indeed lenient. More is here playing his complex game of 
positing a corrective to bad institutions in England, while 
having Hythloday ignore the problem of how the ideal may be 
converted into reality; it is just this problem that will be 
debated in the Dialogue of Counsel. 
The Polylerite system is, not however, as ideal as Hythloday 
supposes. He had begun by being appalled by England's use of the 
death penalty for theft, and the fervent idealism with which he 
denounced this, and the social conditions which gave rise to it, 
carried complete conviction. But what does he say of the 
Polylerites? 
62. Robbin S. Johnson, 'The Argument for Reform in More's 







'· I. ~ 
The slaves of each district are distinguished by a 
special badge, which it is a capital offense to 
throw away, as it is to appear beyond their own 
bounds or to talk to a slave from another district. 
Further, it is no safer to plot escape than 
actually to run away. Yes, and the punishment for 
connivance in such a plan is death for the 6 ~lave 
and slavery for the free man (77/39-79/5). 
213 
The state which Hythloday praises as practising a humane 
alternative to the death penalty for theft actually practises it 
for far less serious offences, even if it is utilised far less 
frequently than in England. Hythloday's idealism is such that he 
cannot see that the example he invokes in support of his case in 
fact ironically interrogates it. The irony is pointed nicely by 
his final comment: 'I added that I saw no reason why this method 
might not be adopted even in England and be far more beneficial 
in its working than the justice which my legal opponent had 
praised so highly' (79/38-81/2) .
64 
This myopia will prove to be 
characteristic of him, and although the moral earnestness which. 
lies at the root of his idealism is never questioned, More 
succeeds in raising doubts about its practical consequences. 
In reply to Hythloday, Cardinal Morton suggests that no harm 
can come from experimenting with this system, and making it law 
if it proves successful. At this point, however, attention is 
diverted by an incident which shocks and disgusts Hythloday. One 
of the Cardinal's hangers-on makes a jest at the expense of 
friars; Morton takes it in good part, and the hanger-on is 
emboldened to continue. The friar, feeling himself insulted, 
denounces the joker, threatening him with excommunication, in 
63. 'Suos quaeque regio propria distinguit nota, quam 
abiecisse, capitale est, ut uel extra suos conspici 
fines, uel cum alterius regionis seruo quicquam esse 
collocutum. At neque tutior fugae meditatio quam ipsa 
est fuga. Quin conscium talis fuisse consilij in seruo 
nex est: in libero seruitus' (7~/1-6). 
64. '··· adiecissem nihil mihi uideri causae, quare non hie 
modus haberi uel in Anglia possit, multo maiore cum fructu, 
quam illa iustitia, quam iuris ille peritus tantopere 
laudauerat' (78/32-80/3). 





spite of Morton's exhortation to him to control himself. Apart 
from the opportunity taken for satire at the expense of the 
friars, what purpose does this incident serve? Its importance 
comes from Hythloday's reaction to it: 
This conversation I had to relate ... to exhibit 
the attitude of those who rejected what I had said 
first yet who, immediately afterward, when the 
Cardinal did not disapprove of it, also gave their 
approval, flattering him so much that they even 
smiled on and almost allowed in earnest the fancies 
of the hanger-on, which his master in jest did not 
reject. From this reaction you may judge what 
little regard court~ers would pay to me and my 
advice (85/30-37) . 
214 
Hythloday pays more attention to the flatterers than to Morton; 
but the Cardinal himself is a courtier of Henry VII, and, as 
Hythloday acknowledges, he expresses interest in Hythloday's 
description of the Polylerite penal code, and himself suggests 
that England should experiment with it. Once again, Hythloday's 
exemolum proves the precise opposite of what he claims is the 
case. If, in the description of the Polylerites, he had been 
simply unable to see that he was casting doubt on his own case, 
in this instance his ignorance seems almost wilful. He knows that 
Morton had reacted favo~rably, but overlooks this in his 
eagerness to find evidence to support his case. His refusal to 
serve his Prince is not rational, but emotional and 
temperamental. 
I 
The impression that we have so far formed of Hythloday 
inevitably conditions our response to his further arguments 
against becoming a royal councillor. It is Morus who specifically 
,' 
65. narranda tamen mihi fuit omnino propter eorum 
iudicium, qui quae me dicente spreuerant, eadem rursus 
euestigio non improbante Cardinale, etiam ipsi 
comprobarunt, usque adeo assentantes ei, ut parasiti 
quoque eius inuentis, quae dominus per iocum non 
aspernabatur, adblandirentur & serio propemodum 
admitterent. Vt hinc possis aestimare quanti me ac mea 





raises this issue by praising what Hythloday has already said 
while concluding that he ought not to shun the courts of kings, 
and should instead follow the advice of his 'favorite author', 
Plato, that 'commonwealths will finally be happy only if either 
philosophers become kings or kings turn to philosophy. What a 
distant prospect of happiness there will be if philosophers will 
not condescend even to impart their counsel to kings!' (87/12-
15) .
66 
This turning of Hythloday's favourite author aginst him 
is a palpable hit, and Hythloday can answer it only by resorting 
to hypothetical examples. 
If, says, Hythloday, I were present at a meeting of the 
French King's council where the councillors were advising on the 
best way to make war, what would happen if I undercut their 
cynical realism by suggesting that Italy should be left alone? He 
might even mention the example of the Achorians. We are at once 
back in the realm of irony, since the name 'Achoria' means No-
place. Is this meant to imply that Hythloday is dwelling in. 
Cloud-cuckoo-land with his impractical idealism and fictional 
exempla? The behaviour of the Achorians is, of course the 
opposite of that of European kings, but Hythloday, caught up in 
the sweep of his own rhetoric, avoids making any suggestion as to 
how the Achorian ideal may be translated into the European 
reality. He ends by asking what sort of reception he would 
receive if he advised the French King to 'look after his 
ancestral kingdom and make it as flourishing as possible, love 
his subjects and be loved by them, live with them and rule them 
gently, and have no designs upon other kingdoms since what he 
already possessed was more than enough for him' (91/25-29). 
67 
66. respublicas ita demum futuras esse felices, si aut 
regnent philosophi, aut reges philosophentur, quam procul 
aberit felicitas, si philosophi regibus nee dignentur saltern 
suum impartiri consilium?' (86/11-13) . 
67. '··· proinde auitum regnum coleret, ornaret quantum posset, 
& faceret quam florentissimum. Amet suos & ametur a suis, cum 
his una uiuat, imperetque suauiter, atque alia regna ualere 
sinat, quando id quod nunc ei contigisset, satis amplum 





More's reply is a masterpiece of quiet irony: '"To be sure, not a 
very favourable one," I granted' (91/31) .
68 
The irony seems to 
be directed at both the cynicism of the councillors and the 
naivete of Hythloday, so that More maintains the delicate balance 
between making us feel the moral force of Hythloday's point of 
view, while simultaneously letting us see the practical weakness 
of his position. 
Hythloday now turns to an example from domestic politics. 
The councillors of a king are debating with him the best ways of 
extorting money from the populace: debasing the coinage, using 
the pretext of war to raise taxes, enforcing long-forgotten laws 
by means of fines, corrupting judges -- all are mentioned 
seriously as possible methods of raising revenue, and Hythloday 
quite properly objects. Everything he says, however, is couched 
in sweeping generalisations which give moral force to his 
arguments but indicate also how hopelessly impractical he would 
be as an advisor. For Hythloday, all councillors give this type 
of advice, all judges are corrupt, all kings dishonourable. 
Everything must be either black or white; he can acknowledge no 
shade in between. The exhortatory imperatives at 97/5ff. reveal 
the cast of his mind exactly. 'Let the King do this'; 'Let the 
King do that'. And he again resorts to a fictional example to 
prove his point. This time, it is that of the Macarians, who have 
an ideal financial system. Like the Achorians, they are 'a people 
not very far distant from Utopia' (97/17) .
69 
Hythloday, of 
course, thinks of them as being not geographically distant, but 
it is probable that More meant the statement to be taken 
metaphorically as well. If Hythloday's account of the Achorians 
and Macarians has told us as much about him as about them, then 
we can confidently expect his account of the Utopians to do 
likewise. 
68. 'Profecto non ualde pronis inquam' (90/22). 





As with the account of the Achorians, Hythloday ends by 
saying: 'if I tried to obtrude these and like ideas on men 
strongly inclined to the opposite way of thinking, to what deaf 
ears should I tell the tale!' (97/35-38) .
70 
This time, Morus' 
irony is more pointed: they would be right to be deaf, since to 
give such advice in such circumstances would be foolishness. At 
this point, More introduces the phrases that express the central 
oppositions of the dialogue: 
In the private conversation of close friends this 
academic philosophy is not without its charm, but 
in the councils of kings, where great matters are 
debated with great authority, there is no room for 
these notions ... But there is another philosophy, 
more practical for statesmen, which knows its 
stage, adapts itself to the play in hand, and 
performs its role neatly and appropriately. Thi~ 1 is 
the philosophy which you must employ (99/5-16). 
This is the central argument in the debate, and it is 
expressed, significantly, in a metaphor drawn from Lucian.
72 
The 
ohilosophus gloriosus who would make no concession to the awkward 
facts of human nature, is opposed by the eiron, who is prepared 
to adapt himself to the world as he finds it. More's use of the 
metaphor of life-as-a-play is, however, more subtle that that of 
Lucian, for whom it expressed a sense of good-humoured 
70. 'Haec ergo atque huiusmodi si ingererem apud homines in 
contrariam partem uehementer inclinatos, quam surdis essem 
narraturus fabulam'?' ( 96/29-31) . 
71. 'Apud amiculos in familiari colloquio non insuauis est 
haec philosophia scholastica. Caeterum in consilijs 
principum, ubi res magnae magna autoritate aguntur, non 
est his rebus locus ... sed est philosophia ciuilior, 
quae suam nouit scenam, eique sese accommodans, in ea 
fabula quae in manibus est, suas partes concinne & cum 
decoro tutatur. Hac utendum est tibi' (98/6-14). 
72. The metaphor was by no means unique to Lucian, and had a 
wide currency in antiquity and the Middle Ages. See, for 
example, Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literat~ and the 
Latin Middle Ages, translated by Willard R. Trask (London, 
1953), pp.138-144. However, the terms in which More 




resignation and quietism. This is far from More's purpose. While 
recognising the validity of much that Hythloday has said, Morus 
also sees the weaknesses in his position: 
If you cannot pluck up wrongheaded opinions by the 
root; if you cannot cure according to your heart's 
desire vices of long standing, yet you must not on 
that account desert the commonwealth. You must not 
abandon the ship in a storm b7§ause you cannot 
control the winds (99/31-35). 
Hythloday's principled refusal to serve, no matter how nobly 
motivated, is ultimately a refusal to engage with the facts of 
human experience. If, as seems probable, both Morus and Hythloday 
represent opposing tendencies in the character of the historical 
More, then it can be seen that while he possessed an intense 
awareness of the radical corruption of human nature, and while he 
may well have,indulged in compensatory daydreams of human 
perfectibility, his hold on reality was ultimately too strong to 
allow him to follow the course recommended by Hythloday. One can 
occasionally dwell imaginatively in an ideal world, but one must 
live and act in the real one. For Morus, the issue finally turns 
on his scepticism about the perfectibility of human nature: 
What you cannot turn to good you must make as 
little bad as you can. For it is impossible that 
all . should be well unless ;all men were good, a 
situation which I do not 7*pect for a great many 
years to come! (101/1-4) . 
UescerJt h1tc lfGdes 
translated. 
which, of course, More had earlier 
73. 'Si radicitus euelli non possint opiniones prauae, nee 
receptis usu uitijs mederi queas, ex animi tui 
sententia, non ideo tamen deserenda Respublica est, & in 
tempestate nauis destituenda est, quoniam uentos 
inhibere non possis' (98/25-28). 
74. '···quod in bonum nequis uertere, efficias saltern, ut 
sit quam minime malum. Nam ut omnis bene sint, fieri non 
possit, nisi omnes bani sint, quod ad aliquot abhinc 
annos adhuc non expecto' (100/1-3). 
219 
I 
Typically, Hythloday responds to this by invoking a state where 
human nature is perfect. His account of Utopia is the last of his 
series of fictional exempla, and our reception of it will be 
conditioned by our view of his character, as well as by our 
memory of the dubious status of his earlier examples of the 
Polylerites, the Achorians and the Macarians. Although Book I of 
Utopia has its genesis in a personal crisis in More's career, it 
is also an indispensible guide to the proper interpretation of 
the ideal state of Book II. 
Hythloday's final reply to Morus' objections is couched in 
the language of Christian Humanism,
75 
and the force of his 
argument is such that Morus can make only a feeble reply. Christ, 
says Hythloday, forbade dissembling in the teaching of truth, but 
his teachingsihave been perverted by preachers who accommodate 
them to the morals of men: 'By this method I cannot see what they 
have gained, except that men may be bad in greater comfort' 
(101/25-26) .
76 
The moral force of his argument is impressive, 
but his particular application of it raises doubts: the indirect 
approach favoured by Morus would be no use at court, where there 
is no room for dissembling. 
75. 
76. 
One must openly approve the worst counsels and 
subscribe to the most ruinous decrees. He would be 
counted a spy and almost a traitor, who q~ves only 
faint praise to evil counsels (103/6-8). 
This, of course, is one of the reasons for Hexter's argument 
that Hythloday is is the spokesman for the Christian Humanist 
views of More and Erasmus, and that Utopia is a document in 
their programme of reform (CW 4, lxiv ff.; Hexter, 1952, 
pp .118 ff.) . 
'···quare nihil uideo quid profecerint, nisi ut securius 
liceat esse malos' (100/27-28) . 
77. '··· approbanda sunt aperte .pessima consilia, & 
decretis pestilentissimis subscribendum est. 
Speculatoris uice fuerit, ac pene proditoris, etiam qui 
improbe consulta maligne laudauerit (102/5-8). 
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Hythloday has never been to court, has never taken part in a 
Royal council; he cannot possibly know these things with 
certainty. He is about to appeal to his experience among the 
Utopians as evidence of an idael commonwealth, yet he is here 
speaking with assurance of things quite beyond his experience. 
Again, the limits of his moral idealism are made clear. 
Hythloday now introduces the topic which has been regarded 
as the main feature of Utopian life, and which links the satire 
on Europe with the ideal imaginary state: common ownership of 
property. It is impossible to have justice or prosperity where 
all things are owned privately, and one ought to adopt the 
institutions of the Utopians. Even as Hythloday produces another 
torrent of eloquence in defence of his claims, More is silently 
undermining him by having him misquote Plato. Hythloday claims 
that Plato saw that the general welfare could be guaranteed only 
by the maintenance of equality in all respects. Plato, however, 
had extended the provision of equality only to his ruling class; 
the Utopian ideal of absolute equality is less Platonic in origin 
than Hythloday claims. 
Morus' reply to these final arguments of Hythloday states 
the orthodox conservative position on property: without the 
motive of personal gain, people would become slothful. In the 
context of Hythloday's eloquence, that argument does not have a 
convincing ring to it.
78 
This is somewhat surprising, since we 
have just been convinced that Morus has the better of the 
argument about service at court; now we find Hythloday, in spite 
of the ironies that seem to undercut what he says, having the 
better of the argument on property. Did More wish to acknowledge 
that, in spite of Hythloday's intellectual rigidity, in spite of 
the frequent misjudgements occasioned by his moral fervour, there 
is, after all, much to be said for his position? The ironies tug 
in so many possible directions that one is not quite sure what 
one is meant to believe at this point. 
78. It is this eloquence that led Hexter to identify Hythloday's 
views with those of More (CW 4, lxxxviii), just as he had 
earlier argued that More's comments here are refuted in Book 
II. Hexter, 1952, pp.40-42. 
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The spiralling ironies which allow neither Hythloday nor 
Morus to 'win' the argument seem designed to place the reader in 
a state of alertness and responsiveness. Hythloday's previous 
exempla may have failed to carry conviction, but his sincerity 
and idealism are such that one wants to believe that his ideal 
state will be what he says it is. At the same time, what we have 
so far seen of his methods of argument and standards of proof has 
been enough to suggest that we should scrutinise very carefully 
what he does say: his own interpretation is not to be trusted. As 
W. J. Barnes has put it: 
By observing Hythloday ... and noting his 
idiosyncrasies and inconsistencies, we may just be 
alerted to watch for the inconsistencies and 
contradictions that greet us at almost every turn 
in Utopian society. If we see the ironic in the 
characterisation of Hythloday; if, also, we see the 
complex irony working in the confrontation of 
Hythloday and the More-figure in Book I, then we 
may be prepared for the irony which qualifies and 
conditions our response to the experie~~e of 
Hythloday and the Utopians in Book II. 
In Book I of Utopia, More has taken advantage of a 
particular occasion to extend the scope of his original work, and 
to provide a method for its interpretation. He has done this 
chiefly through the use of the complex Menippean figure of 
Raphael Hythloday, utilising a number of lessons drawn from his 
reading of Lucian. Our response to this figure will condition our 
response to his account of Utopia. 
Any reading of Book II is complicated, however, by the 
circumstances of composition. More did not at first have Raphael 
in mind, and some of the ironies in Book II were conceived 
independently of the presence of this persona. Moreover, the 
shape of what is now Book II seems not to have been present in 
More's mind as he wrote, but rather to have evolved as part of 
the process of composition; as a result, there are sections in 
79. W. J. Barnes, 'Irony and the English Apprehension of 
Renewal~ Queen's Quarterly
1




this part of the work which are strictly redundant -- they have 
their origin in More's original conception but are out of place 
in his final meditation on the shape of a society built by reason 
alone. The most notable of such sections is that on the Utopian 
theory of pleasure; as will be seen, rather than merely excise 
it, More has utilised it for the purpose of extending our 
conception of the character of the narrator. 
Book II opens in the mode of a traveller's tale, with More 
being careful to establish the verisimilitude of his account in 
the Lucianic manner. It is not until we are well into the account 
of Utopia that we begin to see exactly how he is subverting the 
mode he has so carefully built up. We are told details about the 
situation of the island, its geography, its defences; and we are 
given an early hint that this is to be an acount of an ideal 
society: 'But Utopus .... brought the rude and rustic people to 
such a perfection of culture and humanity as makes them now 
superior to almost all other mortals' (113/3-7) .
80 
This idealism 
is connected with the apparent perfection of their planning. The 
island contains fifty-four cities of identical layout, and 
similar in appearance; lands are apportioned so that no city has 
any desire to extend its territory; the system of farming is 
highly organised. The only apparent breaks in the tone of 
objectivity come from the use of comic names such as Amaurotum, 
and from the humorous detail of the chicks who acknowledge humans 
as their mothers. 
When we come to the description of the capital city. 
Amaurotum, part of More's purpose begins to become clear. In 
certain respects, this city closely resembles London: a tidal 
river flows through it; the river is spanned by a stone bridge. 
However, the orderliness of the town planning in Amaurotum, with 
houses divided by avenues twenty feet broad, and every house's 
having a garden at the back, are far removed from More's London. 
80. 'Sed Vtopus ... rudem atque agrestem turbam ad id quo nunc 





In its physical characteristics, then, Amaurotum both is and is 
not London. The effect of having an imaginary image thus imposed 
upon a real one is unsettling; it is intended to provoke thought 
about whether the real society could profitably adopt any of the 
institutions of the imaginary one. 
The description of the government of the island is puzzling 
for its neglect of certain vital details. We are told, for 
instance, how the government of this one city is constituted, and 
we can reasonably assume that the others are governed in the same 
way. Nothing, however, is said about the relation of one city to 
others. Is the island governed by a federal system? Or is it 
constituted of independent city-states? This is something we 
never know. Nor are the details of the government of Amaurotum 
complete: we are not told how the senate is chosen, or precisely 
what division of powers applies to what is obviously a mixed 
constitution. Hythloday is more interested in the proceedings of 
this body, whereby nothing is debated on the day on which it is 
first proposed so that it may be eventually debated more 
judiciously. 
The account continues with a section on the occupations of 
the Utopians: each is taught one particular craft of a 
utilitarian nature; clothing is uniform throughout the island, 
except for a distinction between the sexes; there are a number of 
regulations as to the circumstances in which one can change one's 
occupation; the Utopian day is divided into regular numbers of 
hours for work, meals, sleeping and leisure; leisure hours are 
commonly devoted to intellectual pursuits, or games of a 
moralistic or allegorical character. The result of the rational 
planning of the Utopians is a uniformity enforced by both law and 
custom; the details of how Utopia is organised provoke us to 
question Hythloday's repeated claim that it has very few laws. 
At this point, the narrator intervenes to forestall an 
objection: if they work for only six hours, will there not be a 
shortage of commodities? In reply to this hypothetical objection, 





prevalence of idleness in Europe. No work is done by women, 
priests, or the religious; masters of estates and their retainers 
are equally idle, as are beggars. Of those who work, few are 
engaged in essential trades: 'For, in a society where we make 
money the standard of everything, it is necessary to practise 
many crafts which are quite vain and superfluous, ministering 
only to luxury and licentiousness' (131/13-15) .
81 
If all these 
idlers were set to useful work, they could easily produce all 
that is required by necessity or comfort. And, he goes on, this 
is proved by the experience of Utopia. This passage is so 
characteristic of the method employed by Hythloday in Book I --
answering an objection by recourse to an example of which only he 
can have personal experience -- that one wonders whether the 
attack on Europe idleness might not have been added when More was 
trying to make the two parts of his work consistent with one 
another. 
Hythloday now goes on to describe Utopian social relations 
and once again a seemingly factual description is gradually 
undermined; the remorseless rationalism of Utopian life produces 
not only ideal social relations, but a number of unpleasant 
distortions. If, for example, the population of the island 
becomes too numerous, they found a colony in a"neighbouring land. 
If the natives are willing, both peoples merge, to the advantage 
of both. Those who refuse to live according to Utopian laws are 
expelled from the territory; if they resist, war is waged against 
them: 'They consider it a most just cause for war when a people 
which does not use its soil but keeps it idle and waste 
nevertheless forbids the use and possession of it to others who 
by the rule of nature ought to be maintained by it' (137/19-22) .
82 
81. siquidem ubi omnia pecun1JS metimur, multas artes 
necesse est exerceri inanes prorsus ac superfluas, luxus 
tantum ac libidinis ministras' (130/12-14) . 
82. '··· nam earn iustissimam belli causam ducunt, quum populus 
quispiam eius soli quo ipse non utitur, sed uelut inane ac 
uacuum possidet, alijs tamen qui ex naturae praescripto inde 
nutriri debeant, usum ac possessionem interdicat (136/14-17). 
! ' 
'>., 
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This is the logic of Utopian utilitarianism. Such a rule of 
. d 1 1 . . 1 83 d 1 h h . . nature was a recogn~se ega pr~nc~p e an a t oug ~t ~s not 
certain that More is inviting us to condemn it as a justification 
of self-interest, we must surely keep in mind the Utopian 
condemnation of all war. Hythloday maintains his tone of 
uncritical admiration of all things Utopian, while the deadpan 
irony of More lets us see the logical consequences of this 
attitude. 
Irony may again be present in the description of the Utopian 
meals. These are taken in common, although one may dine at home 
if one wishes: 'yet no one does it willingly since the practice 
is considered not decent' (141/28-29) .
84 
There may be no law 
against it, but public opinion is a powerful agent in inducing 
conformity. The marginal note here is surely tongue-in cheek: 
'How Respect for Freedom is Preserved Everywhere so that People 
Do Nothing under Compulsion!' .
85 
The atmosphere of these public 
meals seems one of stultifying conformity: the young and the old 
mingle together so that 'the grave and reverend behaviour of the 
old may restrain the younger people from mischievous freedom in 
word and gesture' (143/33-35) .
86 
As well as this, they begin the 
meal with a reading conducive to morality, and introduce approved 
topics of conversation. We are assured that these are neither 
sombre nor dull; but we may perhaps be permitted our doubts. Yet 
however oppressive these practices may seem, it is well to 
remember the abstemiousness of More's own household.
87 
Once 
again, More's concern is less with the desirability or otherwise 
83. cw 4, p.416. 
84. '··· nemo tamen hoc libenter facit, cum neque honestum 
habeatur' (140/23-24) . 
85. 'Vt ubique libertatis habetur ratio, ne quid fiat a coactis' 
(140) . 
86. '··· ut senum grauitas ac reuerentia ... iuniores ab improba 
uerborum, gestuumque licentia cohibeat' (142/29-33). 




of particular Utopian institutions than with the means of 
translating his ideal into practice. 
226 
The lack.of freedom in Utopia is again emphasised when 
Hythloday talks of their travel arrangements. They can visit 
other cities if they receive permission, but to leave one's 
territory without permission is to invite severe punishment or, 
for a repeated offense, slavery. We may be appalled by the 
coercion of the Utopian state, but Hythloday finds occasion at 
this point to eulogise it: 
Now you can see how nowhere is there any license to 
waste time, nowhere any pretext to evade work -- no 
wine shop, no alehouse, no brothel anywhere, no 
opportunity for corruption, no lurking hole, no 
secret meeting place. On the contrary, being under 
the eyes of all, people are bound either to be 
performing the usual labour or to be enjoying their 
\~i~l.<gf in a fashion not without decency (147 /21-
28) .. 
Hythloday now moves on to the topic of trade and money, and 
again More has introduced elements of irony into the discourse. 
The Utopians have no use for money, but keep it in their treasury 
for use in emergencies, especially for paying foreign mercenaries 
'whom they would rather jeopardize than their own citizens' 
(149/39-39) .
89 
As he had done with the question of colonisation, 
Hythloday simply does not see the moral problem involved with 
this, nor does it occur to him that this use of mercenaries was 
something he had denounced in relation to European kings. In his 
eagerness to praise Utopia, he is involving himself in a mass of 
contradictions. 
88. 'Iam uidetis quam nulla sit usquam ociandi licentia, 
nullus inertiae praetextus, nulla taberna uinaria, nulla 
ceruisiaria, nusquam lupanar, nulla corruptelae occasio, 
nullae latebrae, conciliabulum nullum, sed omnium 
praesentes oculi necessitatem aut consueti laboris, aut 
ocij non inhonesti faciunt' (146/15-21) . 




The Utopians do not value gold and silver more highly than 
their nature deserves: they use them for chamberpots and other 
humble vessels, and for the chains they put on their slaves. The 
marginal note at this point makes it seem that More must have 
enjoyed throwing in this sugestion: '0 Magnificent Affront to 
Gold!' (153) .
90 
This, and the following anecdote of the 
Anemolian ambassadors, constitute one of the points in the text 
at which More is most freely commenting adversely on conditions 
in Europe. In spite of the irony which is increasingly being 
obtruded into the account of Utopia, More does not simply reject 
the idealism of Hythloday and the Utopians. The Anemolian 
ambassadors are said to have visited Utopia, determined to 
impress the Utopians with the magnificence of their clothing and 
jewelry. The golden chains had, of course, the opposite of the 
desired effect, so that the ambassadors were shamed into putting 
away their finery. 
This anecdote, and the following attack on the use of gold 
in Europe, together with the marginal gloss that extols the 
Utopians as being wiser than the majority of Christians, might 
seem to lend support to the interpretation of Utopia advanced by 
R. w. Chambers: 
The underlying thought of Utopia always is, With 
nothing ~ Reason to guide them, the Utopians do 
this; and~~ Christian Englishmen, we Christian 
Europeans ... 
Yet the explicit contrasts between Utopia and Europe occur just 
as the ironies of the text begin to question the validity of 
Hythloday's assumptions. Pointing the contrasts between the 
90. '0 magnificam auri contumeliam' (152). 
91. Chambers, p.121. Similar opinions have been expressed 
by Fr. Edward Surtz S. J., The Praise of Pleasure, 
(Harvard, 1957), p.193 (Cited hereafter as Pleasure); 
The Praise of Wisdom, (Chicago, 1957), p.l; and by 




imaginary ideal and the corrupt reality is not an adequate 
hermeneutic approach to a text as ironical and ambiguous as 
Utopia. 
Hythloday now recounts their attitude to philosophy, at 
length arriving at that discussion of Utopian ethical theory that 
has seemed to many to be the intellectual core of the work. In 
the debate over virtue and pleasure, he says, 'they seem to lean 
more than they should to the school that espouses pleasure as the 
object by which to define the whole or the chief part of human 
happiness' (161/25-29) .
92 
This, however, seems to be a 
misinterpretation of what the Utopians actually believe. The 
whole section, as Surtz notes, must be regarded as a declamation, 
a literary exercise to be judged, not by the truth of its 
assertions, but by the success of its style and form; and in 
93 
which More has cunningly prejudiced the argument. The initial 
use of the word 'uoluptas' leads one to assume that it is bodily 
pleasures that are being talked about, but the use of a variety 
of weaker synonyms eventually leads More to reveal that 'they 
cling above all to mental pleasures, which they value as the 
first and foremost of all pleasures' (175/34-35) .
94 
Everything 
that Hythloday has told us about Utopia has reinforced the idea 
that their pleasures are indeed abstemious: how, then, to account 
for his obvious uneasiness with this topic? 
If, as seems likely, the declamation on pleasure formed part 
of what More had originally written, then it is possible that he 
was indulging in a degree of wish-fulfilment in exploring the 
. . h . d 1 'bl 95 . propos~t~on t at v~rtue an p easure are compat~ e. Hav~ng 
' 
92. 'At hac in re propensiores aequo uidentur in factionem 
uoluptatis assertricem, ut qua uel totam, uel potissimam 
felicitatis humanae partem definiant' (160/20-23). 
93. Surtz, Pleasure, p.12. 
94. 'Amplectuntur ergo in primis animi uoluptates, (eas enim 
primas omnium principesque ducunt' (174/29-30). 
95. Alistair Fox, Thomas More: History and Providence, (Oxford, 
1982), p.54. 
229 
later conceived the character of Hythoday, and having recast the 
purpose of the original work, he may well have felt that the 
lengthy declamation on pleasure was no longer appropriate to his 
new conception of the work; yet rather than completely abandon 
what is, after all, a minor tour-de-force in the genre of 
paradoxical declamation, he decided to utilise it to further 
undercut the character of Hythloday. Accordingly, he has 
Hythloday utter a disclaimer that is wholly unnecessary. 
Hythloday, after all, has been presented in both books as being 
profoundly disgusted by the pursuit of false pleaure~ in Europe, 
and in the section on Utopian ethics he takes the opportunity to 
denounce this at length and eloquently. In doing so, he 
occasionally sounds like Lucian's Cynic. For one so profoundly 
and sincerely opposed to the pursuit of false pleasures, the 
notion that his admired Utopians actively pursue pleasure causes 
him uneasiness; he is accordingly concerned to disassociate 
himself from any imputation of approving of hedonism. 
We are reminded that Hythloday's judgement on wha~has seen 
and heard is not always inmpeccable, and this reminder comes at a 
strategic point in the text. As Wooden notes, after this obvious 
failure of interpretation on the part of Hythloday, we can no 
longer allow him to evaluate Utopian customs for us.
96 
It is 
following this section that the ironic distance between 
Hythloday's admiration for Utopian rationalism and the facts of 
Utopian life begins to increase markedly. The irony is pointed 
again when Hythloday ends his discussion of Utopian ethics with a 
palpable sense of relief: 
96. 
Whether in this stand they are right or wrong, time 
does not permit us to examine - nor is it 
necessary. We have taken upon ourselves only to 
describe their principles, and not also to defend 
them. But of this I am sure, that whatever you 
think of their ideas, there is nowhere in the world 
Wooden, p.212. 
a more exce197nt people nor a happier commonwealth 
(179/15-22). 
230 
He may not wish to defend this part of their philosophy, but he 
is more than willing to defend their communism. The surface tone 
of objectivity is dissipated when the narrator is caught in such 
a blatant falsification of his own procedure, and attention is 
directed not just to what is being described, but to the 
character and preoccupations of the narrator. 
As if to remind us of the Lucianic provenance of Hythloday, 
More at this point inserts a detail worthy of A True History: in 
order to have wood close to seas, rivers and cities, the Utopians 
have uprooted whole forests and transplanted them. Hythloday 
utters this without a hint of irony on his part, and we are 
reminded that the reality of this ideal state is purely 
fictional, that not everything in it is to be taken seriously. 
These passages of irony at the expense of Hythloday are 
followed by a short section of idealisation of the Utopians: 
Hythloday praises their aptness at learning, stressing their 
fondness for Greek authors. This, of course, was likely to 
recommend them highly to an audience of humanists. It is all the 
more ironical, then, that this is followed by sections likely to 
have the opposite effect. The account of slavery in Utopia is 
part of Hythloday's description of a rational and virtuous 
people, but that they enslave and treat harshly some of their own 
countrymen is an indication that human nature in Utopia is no 
less intractable than in Europe. As Hythloday tells us: 'Their 
own countrymen are dealt with more harshly, since their conduct 
is regarded as all the more regrettable and deserving a more 
severe punishment as an object lesson because, having had an 
97. qua in re rectene an secus sentiant, excutere nos, 
neque tempus patitur, neque necesse est. quippe qui 
narranda eorum instituta, non etiam tuenda suscepimus. 
Caeterum noc mihi certe persuadeo, utut sese habeant 
haec decreta: nusquam neque praestantiorem populum, 
neque feliciorem esse rempublicam' (178/12-15). 
' I 
'I 
excellent rearing to a virtuous life, they still could not be 
restrained from crime' (185/26-30) .
98 
Utopia, then is not as 
ideal as Hythloday would have us believe; there may be an 
intended irony in the marginal comment: 'The Extraordinary 
99 
Fairness of this people', pointing towards the unconscious 
irony of what Hythloday is saying. 
231 
Euthanasia is practised among the Utopians, and this may be 
one of those sections where T. S. Dorsch has argued that the real 
meaning is to obtained only by reading the words in the opposite 
f h . 1' 1 
100 h . f . 1 o t e1r 1tera sense. T e Utop1an custom o premar1ta 
inspection of partners had been laughed at by Hythloday and his 
companions, but defended by the Utopians on logical grounds; it 
is another example of the rationality of the Utopians leading to 
a reductio ad absurdum. Hythloday also talks in some detail about 
the Utopian customs in divorce and adultery, and provides an 
example of the punishments meted out for serious crimes: slavery, 
or if the slave prove recalcitrant, death. 
After describing these laws and punishments, Hythloday goes 
on to say: 'They have very few laws because very few are needed 
for persons so educated' (195/8-9) .
101 
It is true that the 
Utopians have fewer laws than do European states, but Hythloday, 
in his praise of Utopia, loses sight of the question of how the 
ideal can be imposed upon actual states. Hythloday's assertion 
is followed by another of his sweeping attacks upon the 
customs of Europe. There are no lawyers in Utopia because their 
laws are less complicated than those of other 
98. 'sed suos durius quos eo deploratiores, ac deteriora meritos 
exempla censent, quod tam praeclara educatione ad uirtutem 
egregie instructi: contineri tamen ab scelere non potuerint. 
(184/22-25). 
99. 'Mira huius gentis aequitas' (184). 
100. T. S. Dorsch, 'Sir Thomas More and Lucian: an interpretation 
of Utopia', Archiv fur des Studium der Neuen Sprachen und 
Literaturen, 68 (1967), 345-363 (p.357). 





countries. The reason for this policy is that 'since all laws are 
promulgated to remind every man of his duty, the more recondite 
102 
interpretation reminds only very few' (195/28-30) . This was 
the feature of Utopia that so appealed to Bude, and it may be 
presumed to have held equal attraction for More. Nevertheless, 
the difficulty of translating such a legal code into practice can 
hardly be supposed to have escaped the attention of one trained 
and experienced in the law. 
There follows a passage of satire on the treaty arrangements 
of Europe, although this is less simple than it seems. With 
deadpan irony, Hythloday says: 'In Europe, however, and 
especially in those parts where the faith and religion of Christ 
prevails, the majesty of treaties is everywhere holy and 
inviolable (197/26-28) .
103 
He fails to notice, however, 
that he is admitting that which destroys the premises of his 
argument: his perfect Utopian society is to be transplanted to a 
Europe where human nature is, by his own admission, far from 
104 
perfect. This difficulty is never noticed by Hythloday, 
although it is precisely what Morus had alluded to in the Debate 
on Counsel: 'it is impossible that all should be well unless all 
men were good' (101/2-3);
105 
The attitude which Morus had 
enunciated in Book I has crept into Hythloday's account of Utopia 
in Book II without his being aware of it. 
The irony is doubled, moreover, when we realise that human 
nature is not perfect in Utopia any more than in Europe. This has 
already been noticed in regard to slavery and punishment, but 
102. '··· quum omnes leges ... ea tantum causa promulgentur: ut 
ab hijs quisque sui commonefiat officij: subtilior 
interpretatio paucissimos admonet ... ' (194/23-25). 
103. 'Etenim in Europa idque his potissimum partibus quas CHRISTI 
fides & religio possidet, sancta est & inuiolabilis ubique 
maiestas foederum' (196/21-23) . 
104. Fox, p.57. 








becomes even more telling in connection with the Utopian practice 
of war. In this section, the irony at the expense of Hythloday is 
at its most consistent and most devastating. As T. S. Dorsch has 
noted: 'everything relating to the Utopians' attitude to war and 
methods of conducting a war is described with an irony that could 
scarcely be missed' .
106 
Hythloday begins by telling us that 
'War, as an activity fit only for beasts and yet practiced by no 
kind of beast so constantly as by man, they regard with utter 
loathing' (199/36-37) .
107 
They do, however, go to war, though 
not lightly: 'They do so only to protect their own territory or 
to drive an invading enemy out of their friends' lands or, in 
pity for a people oppressed by tyranny, to deliver them by force 
of arms from the yoke and slavery of the tyrant, a course 
prompted by human sympathy' (201/5-9) .
108 
As Dorsch puts it: 
'Considering their detestation of war, we may well be surprised 
to see how often the Utopians find occasion to fight' .
109 
The Utopians are diligent in undertaking war when their 
merchant friends are being unjustly persecuted under pretext of 
law. The example brought forward by Hythloday, of a war fought on 
behalf of the Nephelogetes against the Alaopolitans shows that 
much greater evil follows from the defence of their principles 
than from the actual cause of the war. 
Into this war the neighbouring nations brought 
their energies and resources to assist the power 
and to intensify the rancor of both sides. Most 
flourishing nations were either shaken to their 
106. Dorsch, p.356. 
107. 'BEllum utpote rem plane beluinam, nee ulli tamen beluarum 
formae in tam assiduo, atque homini est usu, summopere 
abominantur' (198/30-31. 
108. '···non temere capessunt tamen, nisi quo aut suos fines 
tueantur, aut amicorum terris, infuses hostes propulsent, aut 
populum quempiam tyrannide pressum, miserati, (quod 
humanitatis gratia faciunt) suis uiribus Tyranni iugo, & 
seruitute liberent' (200/4-8) . 
109. Dorsch, p.354.; cf. Johnson, 1969, p.114. 
\ ' 
foundations or grievously afflicted. The troubles 
upon troubles that arose were ended only by the 
enslavement and surrender of the Alaopolitans. 
Since the Utopians were not fighting in their own 
interest, they yielded them into the power of the 
Nephelogetes, a people who, when the Alaopolitans 
were prosperous wiiU not in the least comparable to 
them (201/25-33) . 
234 
To point the irony further, More has Hythloday the bland 
comment: 'So severely do the Utopians punish wrongs done to their 
friends, even in money matters -- but not wrongs done to 
themselves' (201/34-35) .
111 
To cause so much havoc over 
something which they consider to be of no importance is, and to 
justify it in the name of an abstract principle, is rationalism 
run riot. 
The actual conduct of Utopian wars is matter for irony as 
well. They offer rewards for anyone killing the enemy king; they 
reward treachery on the part of their enemies; they stir up 
strife among the enemy by supporting pretenders. All this is 
justified in idealistic terms as concluding wars with the minimum 
possible amount of casualties; but war itself is supposed to be 
abhorrent to them. The practice of supporting pretenders with 
arms and money is, of course, an accurate reflection of the 
actual practice of European states, but it is not what we would 
expect from a people living in an ideal state, and officially 
committed to the doctrine of the common humanity of all peoples. 
In Utopia as in Europe practice does not invariably follow 
principle. 
110. '··· quum ad proprias utriusque partis uires, odiaque 
circumiectarum etiam gentium studia atque opes 
adiungerentur, ut florentissimis populorum alijs 
concussis, alijs uehementer afflictis, orientia ex malis 
mala, Alaopolitarum seruitus demum, ac deditio finierit, 
qua in Nephelegotarum (neque enim sibi certabant 
Vtopienses) potestatem concessere, gentis, florentibus 
Alaopolitarum rebus, haud quaquam cum illis conferendae' 
(200/21-28) . 
111. 'Tam acriter Vtopienses amicorum, etiam in pecunijs, 




Even more ironically, considering what Hythloday had said in 
Book I, the Utopians make liberal use of the Zapoletan 
mercenaries. Again, their reasons are utilitarian: 'The Utopians 
do not care in the least how many Zapoletans they lose, thinking 
they would be the greatest benefactors to the human race if they 
could relieve the world of all the dregs of this abominable and 
impious people' (209/11-15) .
112 
The account of Utopian military 
practices contains the apotheosis of their institutions. 'Each 
man is surrounded by his own children and relations by marriage 
and blood so that those may be closest and lend one another 
mutual assistance whom nature most impels to love one another 
The absence of anxiety about livelihood at home ... makes their 
spirit exalted and disdainful of defeat Finally, their good 
and sound opinions, in which they have been trained from 
childhood both by teaching and by the good institutions of their 
country, give them additional courage' (211/3-25) .
113 
As Robbin 
S. Johnson states: 'Utopian education achieves its institutional 
apotheosis not in what may do to fertilize each man's nature and 
reason but in what it may do to compartmentalize personalities 
0 ff 0 0 h 0 , 114 h d 0 b ~nto an e ~c~ent war mac ~ne . T e ~screpancy etween 
Hythloday's idealism and the actual details of the Utopian state 
seems to be as wide as it could possibly be. 
More, however, goes on to make this disrepancy wider still 
in his account of the religion of Utopia. If Hythloday has failed 
to observe the obnoxious and oppressive features of life in 
112. 'Neque enim pensi quicquam habent, quam multos ex eis 
perdant. rati de genere humano maximam merituros gratiam se, 
si tota illa colluuie populi tam tetri, ac nepharij orbem 
terrarum purgare possent' (208/10-13) . 
113. '· .. tum sui quemque liberi affines cognati circunsistunt, 
ut hi de proximo sint mutuo sibi subsidio, quos maxime ad 
ferendas inuicem suppetias natura stimulat ... Quippe uictus 
illa securitas quae cuique domi est, ... sublimem illis 
animum & uinci dedignantem facit ... postremo rectae 
opiniones (quibus & doctrina & bonis reipublicae institutis 
imbuti a pueris sunt) uirtutem addunt' (210/2-19) . 




Utopia, here he fails to understand the one feature for which 
More seems to have felt genuine sympathy. It is not the fact that 
the Utopians practice religious toleration which interests More, 
nor even the pious earnestness of their religion. Their 
toleration is impressive, particularly their quiet assurance 
'that, provided the matter was handled reasonably and moderately, 
truth by its own natural force would finally emerge sooner or 
later and stand forth conspicuously' (221/20-22) .
115 
More important than this and the other details of the 
Utopian religious system is what we are told of their public 
prayer. Each man thanks God 
for all the benefits received, particularly that by 
the divine favoy he has chanced on that 
commonwealth which is the happiest and has received 
that religion which he hopes to be the truest. If 
he errs in these matters or if there is anything 
better Qnd more approved by God than that 
commonwealth or that religion, he prays that He 
will, of His goodness, bring him to the knowledge 
of it, for he is ready to follow in whatever path 
He may lead him. But if this form of a commonwealth 
be the best and his religion the truest, he prays 
that then He may give him steadfastness and bring 
all other mortals to the same way of living and the 
same opinion of God - unless there be something in 
this variety of religions whil~ 6delights His 
inscrutable will (237/14-26). 
115. ' ... facile tamen praeuidit (modo cum ratione ac modestia 
res agatur) futurum denique: ut ipsa per se ueri uis emergat 
aliquando atque emineat' (220/15-17). 
116. ' ... tot ob recepta beneficia gratias agit. nominatim 
uero quod deo propitio in earn rempublicam inciderit quae 
sit felicissima, earn religionem sortitus sit, quam 
speret esse uerissimam. Qua in re, si quid erret, aut si 
quid sit alterutra melius, & quod deus magis approbet, 
orare se eius bonitas efficiat, hoc ut ipse cognoscat. 
paratum enim sequi se quaqua uersus ab eo ducatur, sin & 
haec Reipublicae forma sit optima, & sua religio 
rectissima, tum uti & ipsi constantiam tribuat, & 
caeteros mortales omneis ad eadem instituta uiuendi, in 
eandem de deo opinionem perducat, nisi inscrutabilem 
eius uoluntatem etiam sit, quod in hac religionum 







This willingness to submit themselves to Providence, the 
readiness to the entertain the notion that they may be wrong, is 
at the core of the religious experience of the Utopians, just as 
it is at the core of More's acceptance of the norms of Menippean 
satire. As Wooden states: 
It is one of the fundamental lessons of Menippean 
satire that the philosophus gloriosus' schemes 
never do or can bring perfection, perfect order, 
117 from the changeable world of man, ruled by Fortune. 
He further states, with clear relevance to Utopia, that the 
satiric touchstone is 
the virtuous and practical philosophy of doing 
one's best to improve the lot of mankind insofar as 
one's efforts are consonant with virtue and1~8e of a practical and directly beneficial nature. 
It is, in fact, a variant on the Menippean doctrine of the mean 
and sure estate. Where Teiresias in Menippus had advised Menippus 
to adopt an attitude of good-humoured scepticism, and where the 
standard Menippean and Lucianic attitude is to pour scorn on 
those who reduce life to a set of rigid rules and principles, 
More saw that those attitudes, while healthy, were finally 
insufficient. Always tempted to see the world in the black-and-
white terms of a Hythloday, More yet struggled to express a more 
complex personal response which involved the willingness to 
entertain the notion of the open-ended nature of experience. This 
is what he has embodied in his account of Utopian religion, and 
it is only at this stage that we can realise just how drastically 
Hythloday has erred in his account of Utopia. 
As Hythloday's account of this society is progressively 
unfolded, one becomes ever more cautious about accepting his 
evaluation of it. Many details are absurd, many are obnoxious, 
! 
117. Wooden, p.155. 




and some which stand in flat contradiction to Hythloday's own 
stated principles yet receive his approval. We feel the force of 
his insistence on the perfection of Utopia even while realising 
that he is wrong. When we finally come to the section on 
religion, we realise that the Utopians themselves do not 
attribute to their society the same degree of ultimate perfection 
that Hythloday does. Driven by his emotional and intellectual 
absolutism, Hythloday has simply misinterpreteted what he has 
seen. Utopian institutions and customs do not actually conform to 
any ideal; only one as wilfully blind as Hythloday would maintain 
that they do. Since even Utopian customs and institutions do not 
correspond to an ideal pattern in the way that Hythloday 
suggests, the way is open for Morus, the practical reformer, to 
enter the service of his prince with the intention of 'making 
things less bad' . Radical idealism can accommodate itself to the 
facts of human nature. 
This final revelation of the extent of Hythloday's 
misinterpretation comes immediately before his eulogy of Utopia, 
and must therefore condition our response to his panegyric. He 
begins by saying that he has described as exactly as he could 
'the structure of that comonwealth which I judge not merely the 
best but the only one which can rightly claim the name of a 
commonwealth' (237/38-39) .
119 
This sweeping claim is in direct 
contradiction to what the Utopians themselves claim, so that what 
Hythloday says in praise of Utopia from here on must be regarded 
with some scepticism. He draws the distinction which he has 
repeatedly used between affairs in Utopia and those in Europe, 
and praises Utopian communism and justice. Typically, most of 
what he has to say is an attack on Europe rather than an account 
of Utopia, and it is again the moral force of his argument that 
is impressive. 
119. ' ... formam Reipublcae quam ego certe non optimam tantum, 
sed solam etiam censeo, quae sibi suo iure possit Reipublicae 






Paradoxically, it is just this moral earnestness that has 
blinded him to the real state of affairs in Utopia. There are 
many virtues in their communism, but it is inseparable from a 
utilitarian ethic which subordinates the individual to the state 
to a dangerous degree. Eventually, his very vocabulary gives him 
away. After attacking the state of affairs in Europe, he talks 
again of how the Utopians had abolished all greed for money: 
'What a mass of troubles was then cut away! What a crop of crimes 
was then pulled up by the roots!' (243/1-2) .
120 
The violence of 
the metaphor suggests that Hythloday has an emotional need to 
feel the perfection of Utopia. He finishes his peroration with a 
sermon on pride which he admits 'is too deeply fixed in men to be 
easily plucked out' (245/3) .
121 
Nevertheless, the Utopians have 
succeeded in this. They have 'extirpated the roots of ambition 
and factionalism along with all other vices' (245/9-10) . 
122 
It 
is doubtful that most readers feel that the Utopians have 
eliminated all vices from their commonwealth, but Raphael cannot 
bear the thought that his imaginary commonwealth is less than 
perfect. Unwilling to compromise with reality, he simply shuts 
his eyes to those features of Utopian life that might undermine 
his vision, and finishes his account with a grand rhetorical 
sweep that is intended to produce conviction in his hearers. 
This monologue ended, we are reminded that other people are 
present besides Raphael, and that what they say may well have a 
bearing on how we are meant to take his final peroration. Morus' 
immediate comment is notoriously ambiguous: 
many things came to my mind which seemed very 
absurdly established in the customs and laws of the 
120. '··· quanta moles molestiarum recisa, quanta scelerum seges 
radicitus euulsa est?' (242/1-2). 
121. '· .. pressius hominibus infixa est, quam ut facile possit 
euelli' (244/2-3) . 
122. 'Extirpatis enim domi cum caeteris uitijs ambitionis, & 
factionum radicibus' (244/7-8) . This is just what Morus had 
earlier maintained to be impossible (99/31-101/4). The 
contrast between the two could hardly be more graphically 
expressed. 
r I 
people described - not only in their method of 
waging war, their ceremonies and religion, as well 
as their other institutions, but most of all in 
that feature which is the principal foundation of 
their structure. I mean their common life and 
subsistence - without any exchange of money. This 
latter alone utterly overthrows all the nobility, 
magnificence. splendor, and majesty which are, in 
the estimation of the common people, the true 
glorl2~ and ornaments of the commonwealth (245/18-
26) . 
240 
Hexter has shown that all these terms are used in pejorative 
senses in Utopia, and has argued that this is proof positive that 
More was here being ironical at the expense of his alter ~ 
Morus, and that we are meant to disagree with his assessment and 
124 
agree with that of Hythloday. We have seen, however, that we 
are not intended to agree with Hythloday's account of Utopia, so 
that these words cannot be taken in the sense for which Hexter so 
125 
ably argues. Furthermore, as Ward Allen has shown, the actual 
pattern of the disputed words in Utopia is 'incomplete, 
d d mb . 126 . . b h scattere , an a ~guous' : ~t ~s y no means as co erent as 
Hexter assumes. How, then, are they to be read? We have just 
spent a considerable time listening to Hythloday's monologue, 
and, as we are returned from his fantasy island to the 'real' 
world of Antwerp, More wishes to indicate his own attitude to 
what Hythloday has said. His initial comment, then suggests that 
123. haud pauca mihi succurrebant, quae in eius populi 
moribus, legibusque perquam absurde uidebantur 
instituta; non solum de belli gerendi ratione, & rebus 
diuinis, ac religione, alijsque insuper eorum 
institutis, sed in eo quoque ipso maxime, quod maximum 
totius institutionis fundamentum est uita scilicet, 
uictuque communi, sine ullo pecuniae commercia, qua una 
re funditus euertitur omnis nobilitas, magnificentia, 
splendor, maiestas, uera ut publica est opinio decora 
atque ornamenta Reipublicae' (244/14-21) . 
124. J. H. Hexter, Intention, Words and Meanings: The Case of 
More's 'Utopia', New Literary History (1975), pp. 529-541. 
125. Ward Allen, "The Tone of More's Farewell to Utopia: A Reply 
to J. H. Hexter", Moreana 51 (1976), 108-118. 




there is much truth in what Hythloday has said, but that it is 
one thing to sketch such a society imaginatively, and quite 
another to bring it into existence in the real world. The two 
strands of More's nature that have gone into Utopia, his idealism 
and his realism, are thus neatly brought together at the 
conclusion of his work. 
We are reminded as well of Hythloday's personal limitations: 
'I was not quite certain that he could brook any opposition to 
his views' (245/27-28) .
127 
Morus would love the opportunity to 
continue the discussion and to put his point of view, but 
Hythloday is not a man with whom one argues lightly. Morus has to 
be content with telling us that he cannot fully agree with 
Hythloday: 'But I readily admit that there are very many features 
in the Utopian commonwealth which it is easier for me to wish for 
in our countries than to have any hope of seeing realised' 
(245/39-247 /3) .
128 
Utopia, then ends with More on the side of the reformers in 
principle, but sceptical about the chances of putting large-scale 
reforms into action. He is, nevertheless, committed to rational 
consideration of the topic. Both his hopes for reform and his 
scepticism as to its possibility are conveyed in his book, the 
one in Hythloday, the other in Morus. To give expression to both 
these sides of his character, and to unite them into an aesthetic 
whole, More drew upon his fondness for and knowledge of the forms 
of Menippean satire. He utilises the figure of the philosophus 
gloriosus in his characterisation of Hythloday, and casts his 
tale of an ideal society into the form of Lucian's True History. 
What he has finally achieved, however, is beyond the aesthetic 
and intellectual scope of Lucian, for More does not allow us to 
take up a definite attitude to the issues he raises. He is 
127. '··· neque mihi satis exploratum erat, possetne ferre, ut 
contra suam sententiam sentiretur' (244/22-23) . 
128. '··· ita facile confiteor permulta esse in Vtopiensium 
republica, quae in nostris ciuitatibus optarim uerius, quam 
sperarim'. (246/1-2). 
242 
looking, not for assent to a set of propositions, but for active 
and honest engagement with the issues they raise. If he utilises 
Lucian to help mould this purpose, he nevertheless has created 
something that is finally Marean rather than Lucianic. 
CONCLUSION 
Lucian was one of a number of classical authors to influence 
significantly the writings of Sir Thomas More and Erasmus. Their 
response to him is important as a touchstone for assessing the 
response to classical literature by the Christian humanists of 
the Northern European Renaissance. Both More and Erasmus seem to 
follow in the tradition established by Petrarch of assimilating 
classical authors to Christian teaching; in this task,it was 
inevitable that most attention would be paid to the ethical 
philosophers, particularly Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca and 
Plutarch. They could be regarded as teaching the highest type of 
moral wisdom available without the benefit of the teachings of 
Christ and the Church. The Ciceronian claim that philosophy 
taught ~ bene atgue beate vivendi could be accepted and its 
significance deepened to assimilate it to the claims of 
Christianity. The result was what Erasmus and others called the 
philosophia Christi. 
This project might be easily enough applied to philosophy, 
but the status of other classical literature -- drama, poetry and 
satire -- was more problematic. Should this literature be read 
for profit or pleasure? Was there anything in it which might tend 
to corrupt the reader, particularly the young reader? How could 
pagan literature be pressed into service in the humanists' 
various campaigns for educational, social and political reform? 
All these questions greatly exercised the minds of the humanists, 
and various answers were supplied. 
In the first place, much Latin literature could be defended 
on the grounds of the need to acquire a correct Latin style. More 
importantly, however, both Latin and Greek literature could be 
defended on the grounds of its usefulness. In applying the 
Horatian maxim that poetry was both utile et dulce, the humanists 
made much of the useful ethical and practical lessons that could 
be drawn from the poets and dramatists of antiquity. If some 
poetry seemed to teach no immediately useful lesson, or if it 
contained passages difficult to explain away on those grounds, 
some humanists, such as Erasmus, availed themselves of the 
243 
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medieval theories of exegesis: if the literal sense seems 
offensive, then the passage in question might be susceptible to 
an allegorical explanation. 
Clearly the humanists felt that the extensive use they were 
making of pagan classical literature might easily become a 
double-edged sword. The elements of pleasure in a given text 
might well constitute enticing allurements which might lead one 
to its more profitable elements; but there was, of course, no 
guarantee of this. The result of this somewhat ambivalent 
approach to the literature of antiquity is the creation of a 
certain tension in the humanists' approach to the art of fiction, 
a tension that is evident in their own fictional writings, 
particularly The Praise of Folly and Utopia. 
More and Erasmus, faced with a felt difficulty in using 
fictional literature for instructive purposes, attempt different 
solutions to the problem, and these differences are exemplified 
in ther differing approaches to Lucian. He, in many ways, 
perfectly exemplifies the difficulties with which the humanists 
felt themselves to be faced. A clear and attractive style makes 
him suitable for teaching Greek to beginners; his humour, fantasy 
and comedy are sufficiently enticing; and he can, in many 
instances, serve as a source of ethical precepts: both More and 
Erasmus note his attacks on superstition, on charh:J.to.•1· 
philosophers, on hypocrisy, on luxury. In many dialogues, he 
provides a satirical overview of the life of man showing the 
myriad ills to which it is subject. On the other hand, he is 
quite clearly atheistic in religious matters and profoundly 
sceptical in philosophy. His prescription that the best course 
for the seeker for truth is to stop worrying and put one's trust 
in the life of 'the common sort' may be an antidote of sorts to 
the hair-splitting of oversubtle metaphysicians and theologians 
but is hardly likely to recommend itself to a humanist as the 
pinnacle of human wisdom. 
Both More and Erasmus see this problem clearly, and both 
attempt to solve it in their own ways. Erasmus relies on an 
interpretation of Lucian which stresses the ethical lessons 
contained within the framework of humour. On occasions, we find 
him stretching a point too far, as when he finds useful lessons 
in such a squib as Astrology; more characteristically, he regards 
244 
the form of the Lucianic dialogue as the coating on a didactic 
pill. More is superficially similar, but his interpetation of 
those dialogues which he translated often deliberately begs the 
question or misleads. He seems to have seen, perhaps more clearly 
than Erasmus, the sceptical tendencies of Lucian and to have 
found them, to some extent, attractive. More importantly, he 
senses that the form of Lucian's most characteristic work is 
problematic, that it resists any easy reduction to a set of 
detachable ethical formulae. The dialogue form can be used not 
simply to teach a lesson but to enact the process of inquiry. 
These differing approaches to Lucian find their parallels in 
other works by More and Erasmus. The latter's educational 
treatises set out explicitly his conception of literature, and 
one can sense a certain nervousness in the repeated recourse to 
the formula of dulce et utile: he recognises the capacity of the 
work of literature to resist this kind of neat ethical 
explanation. In his Colloquies, one finds that the most frequent 
mode is the use of the dialogue form as a vehicle for satire on 
the corruptions of the age, or for conveying a range of ethical 
and moral precepts: Erasmus is not interested in the 
epistemological implications of the dialogue as a genre. 
The Praise of Folly seems initially to recognise and respond 
to the potential complexities of the genre of the paradoxical 
encomium. Erasmus begins his work in a mode which acknowledges 
the complexity of human experience and the real difficulty of 
finding meaning in it. He seems, however, to have felt uneasy 
about the implied scepticism of this part of his work in spite of 
its being attributed to a foolish persona. A radical change in 
tone accompanies a less complex section of scathing satire and a 
concluding section which can solve the problem only by radically 
changing the terms in which it is posed. For Erasmus, the nature 
of man and the purpose of his life cannot be allowed to remain in 
doubt; his fictional exploration of this problem cannot, finally, 
be allowed to leave the reader in a state of numbed perplexity; 
some more positive statement is required. 
In contrast to this, More, in The History of King Richard III 
and Utopia, has given us works of genuine ironic complexity. Both 
draw partly on hints found in embryo in Lucian. The former work 




response and to frustrate the wish to see a straightforward moral 
lesson in the history of Richard's usurpation: the result is a 
profound and disturbing meditation on the nature and meaning of 
human history and its relation to divine providence. In Utopia; 
More utilises the figure of the Lucianic philosophus gloriosus 
to give fictional form to the related problems of the nature of 
the ideal state and the desirability or otherwise of a humanist's 
entering the service of his prince. No easy solution is provided; 
neither Morus nor Hythloday represents the whole truth; the 
function of the work is not to provide such a solution but to 
dramatise the difficulty of finding it. 
The response to Lucian which can be traced in the works of 
More and Erasmus can be seen as providing contrasting paradigms 
of the Renaissance approach to literature. It must delight and 
instruct. The way in which it does this, however, is very much 
open to debate. Does it work by providing a series of moral 
truths under the pretext of giving pleasure? Does it work by . 
providing embodied examples of, in Sidney's phrase, 'notable 
virtues and vices'? Or is its function more disinterested, lying, 
perhaps in its training of the mind to recognise the complexities 
of human problems? If the two former approaches seem to 
predominate in formal discussions of literary theory, the latter 
approach finds its vindication in the actual literary productions 
of poets and dramatists. Just as they had in the work of More and 
Erasmus, the two contrasting approaches to literature continue to 
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